

SPECIAL EDITION

AIRPOWER

Special Edition 1995

JOURNAL



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The *Airpower Journal*, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the *Journal* are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

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EDITORIALS

SPECIAL EDITION 1995

WELCOME TO *Airpower Journal's* special edition for 1995. The articles presented here are the product of research directed by the USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Air Staff-sponsored research center located at the US Air Force Academy. The primary purpose of INSS is to promote Air Force research on national security, arms control, and area studies. Acting as a clearinghouse for information and new ideas, INSS supports the analytic needs of a broad community of organizations tasked with defense and national security policy, as well as decision-making responsibilities. Consequently, you'll find the content and focus of these articles outside our usual scope. Not all of the articles seem to deal directly with airpower. In fact, very few of them do. On the surface, it appears that we've changed horses in mid-stream. A closer examination, however, reveals just the opposite.

The mission of *Airpower Journal* is to shape the professional dialogue of the USAF officer corps. We accomplish our mission by providing an open forum for the presentation and discussion of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. In short, anything that is of importance to the USAF officer corps will appear on these pages. Sometimes, as is the case with this special edition, that means printing articles that do not appear to be directly related to airpower. Just pick up any

newspaper, however, or catch the evening news, and you'll see that airpower has become the weapon of choice for politicians and policy-makers. Why? Because airpower's flexibility provides a wide range of options—from air strikes to airlift—to meet any situation. It is of vital importance, then, for us to be knowledgeable of the issues discussed in this edition: the democratization of Eastern Europe; the implications of the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty; the involvement of our South American neighbors in peacekeeping operations; and the development and use of nonlethal technologies. Sooner or later, we—as airmen—will become involved in situations affected by these issues.

In a very real way, then, the articles in this edition of *Airpower Journal* do indeed deal with airpower. We would be remiss not to recognize that fact. We would also be negligent if we were not prepared for possible duty in these situations, and that is what this special edition is all about. Through *Airpower Journal*, INSS provides a tool for our readers whose current or future duties necessitate thought or action in these areas. We're offering them a broader, more comprehensive look at airpower, as well as a more thorough understanding of how airpower interacts with such broad areas as politics, international relations, law, and economics. So, you see, we haven't changed horses at all—we've just switched saddles.

JMP

Introduction to the Institute for National Security Studies

LT COL JEFFREY A. LARSEN, USAF, Director, INSS

THE USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is proud to sponsor this second annual special edition of the *Airpower Journal*. The enclosed articles represent the findings of several of our research efforts over the past year. While they are some of the best, they are only a small part of the 40-plus projects involving 62 persons at 17 locations around the country that INSS sponsored last year.

The Institute for National Security Studies is an independent research center located at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Now in its third year of operation, INSS is sponsored by a number of organizations, including the National Security Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (AF/XOXI); Air Force Intelligence (AF/IN); and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). XOXI provides the bulk of our research topics and funding, and we are grateful to them for their continued recognition of the value of applied research to support the Air Staff mission. Our "founding father" was former XOXI division chief Col Pete Engstrom (USAF, Retired). Current XOXI chief Col Rick Wallace follows in his stead as a steadfast supporter of INSS. We are also grateful to the USAF Academy and its dean of the faculty, Brig Gen Ruben Cubero, for his continued support and belief in the concept and value of the INSS operation. Finally, thanks to Maj Gen Kenneth Minihan, AF/IN, for adding information warfare to our list of interest areas and for backing up his interest with the finances to conduct such research.

INSS continues to sponsor research into the areas of arms control, national security affairs, Air Force policy, regional studies, the revolution in military affairs, and informa-

tion warfare. We sponsor individual and team research efforts on topics of interest to our benefactors. We also sponsor conferences and guest speakers. Our funds go a long way, providing travel and incidental expenses on a reimbursable basis but not paying salaries, overhead, or block grants. We also have a modest publication effort, including a quarterly newsletter, a series of occasional papers and reports, and a forthcoming textbook on arms control edited by the INSS staff.

A special thanks to my staff for helping prepare these articles for the *APJ* editors: Capt Gregory Rattray, deputy director of INSS; Maj Timothy Krein, our Air Force Reserve officer; and Lt Col William Fruland, our first USAF National Defense Fellow. Bill was particularly valuable in editing and commenting on these papers in their early draft versions. Lt T. J. O'Connell, our executive officer last year, handled with aplomb all administrative details involving these articles.

INSS looks forward to continued success in getting research products into the hands of Air Force policymakers in Washington at modest cost. We also strive to facilitate the intellectual growth of our own military academic community, which bodes well for the work produced by these future leaders of America's national security apparatus. Congratulations to all the authors on being selected for this special edition!

Feel free to write or call INSS at USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 4K25, US Air Force Academy (HQ USAFA/DFE), Colorado Springs CO 80840. Phone: 719-472-2717 (DSN 259-2717). FAX 719-472-2716 (DSN 259-2716). □

WHEN EAST

FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES

CAPT MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH, USAF



The dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact have triggered a complete reappraisal of US national security strategy. Particularly fascinating has been the dramatic shift in policy toward postcommunist states. The previously routinized geopolitical rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, centered on the zero-sum game of containing communism, has gradually shifted to the post-cold-war strategy of full-scale engagement aimed at fostering stability and prosperity in the region by encouraging processes of democratic development.

In August 1994, the Clinton administration released the new national security strategy of the United States in a policy document entitled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Its authors argue that "our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold

MEETS WEST

in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper."¹

The strategy of engagement calls for pursuing security through "enlargement," a policy based on the concept that "democracies don't fight one another."² This concept—predominant in recent years in the literature of political science—has also been advanced by Anthony Lake, national security advisor, and Morton Halperin, democratization advisor to President Bill Clinton.

Post-cold-war US foreign policy has redirected the instruments of foreign policy toward achieving the goal of enlarging the community of democracies within the international system. While the responsibility for US assistance to emerging democracies of the former Eastern bloc clearly falls within the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the military instrument of foreign policy has also assumed a significant role. US foreign-policy makers have come to realize that while military institutions in evolving democracies cannot by themselves cause an overall democratic outcome, a dysfunctional, nondemocratically motivated military institution can become a formidable obstacle to the achievement of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states.

The cornerstone of the US military's contribution to the overall US democratization strategy toward the former Eastern bloc has been the "military-to-military" concept. This approach seeks to exploit the common bonds of military professionalism across states in order to influence institutional processes and behavioral patterns within transitioning postcommunist states.

The US military effort has four main elements: (1) the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), (2) alternative military-to-military initiatives conducted outside JCTP's area of responsibility (AOR), (3) the expanded International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and (4) the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

JCTP achieves its goals through the deployment of teams of US military personnel into host countries. Once military liaison teams (MLT) are deployed, their objective is to facilitate visits to the host country by teams of US military personnel expert in a particular aspect of military reform. MLTs also staff visits by members of the host military to US military units, either in the United States or in the European theater. The military-to-military initiatives directed at states outside JCTP's AOR try to achieve the same results but depend more on the attaché staff than on a permanently deployed team. IMET provides funds for nationals of postcommunist states to study in US military education and training programs to expose students to democratic principles prevalent in the US military. Finally, the Marshall Center—which accepted its first class of students in August 1994—educates senior military and civilian personnel who are engaged in the process of democratic reform. By exposing them to a curriculum steeped in the principles of civilian control, defense planning, and other Western national security concepts, the US military hopes that they will be better prepared to transition from communist to democratic military institutions.

All of these programs could benefit from a greater understanding of the situation that they are trying to influence in postcommunist states. In the summer of 1994, I visited eight of the MLTs deployed in the former

Eastern bloc, determined to write a report on the strides being made toward democracy due to their efforts. This opportunity enabled me to observe the transition processes currently under way in each state and to identify any common patterns.

US efforts cannot simply depend on an understanding of "where we want to take them." We must also know where the military institutions of the former Eastern bloc have been.

I concluded that external efforts to influence the democratization process will be successful to the extent that they reflect an understanding of the obstacles to democratic ideas inherent in the transitioning nation. A firm understanding of the principles that have guided the development of our own democratically accountable military institutions is also essential. In short, US efforts cannot simply depend on an understanding of "where we want to take them." We must also know where the military institutions of the former Eastern bloc have been.

Legacy of the Soviet Military in Central and Eastern Europe

Although the unique historical experience and political culture of each postcommunist state will dictate a unique path from communism, it is possible to generalize how the common experience of Soviet bloc membership has affected the starting point of each state's democratic transition—especially within the military. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, all Eastern bloc political systems were established by the ac-

tive or tacit support of the Soviet army following World War II.³ The Soviet army subsequently supervised the transformation of the Eastern European armies according to the Soviet model. The goal was not to create independent militaries integrated within an alliance but to establish militaries integrated with the Soviet military, using the structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) to institutionalize these changes.⁴ Upon dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the militaries of the region had hierarchical structures, officer education programs, conscription systems, and patterns of civilian interaction that closely paralleled the Soviet army's design.

One crucial difference, however, was that the subordination to Moscow often resulted in the perception that the native militaries could not be relied upon to defend their own states. The native communist leadership always had to consider the Soviet army as a threat to its regime, while the native population could not depend on its own military to defend it from either the native communist regime or Moscow. This situation contributed greatly to the negative perception that most Eastern and Central Europeans had of their own military establishments when the Warsaw Pact dissolved.

Many postcommunist states under study are also experiencing the phenomenon of national independence—some for the first time and others for the first time in five decades. In these cases, such as the Baltic states and Belarus, the problem is not retooling a communist-era military to serve a postcommunist state but creating military structures from scratch. The recent experience of these countries has not been one of heavy-handed influence by the Soviet military but actually being a part of it. Integrating former Soviet officers into newly independent military structures poses a particularly formidable challenge to these states.

As I traveled across the region, I quickly saw that a litany of problems plagued each transitioning state—problems that resulted directly from participation in the Soviet

bloc. Most of these problems were noted by frustrated Westerners assigned to assist the postcommunist states. These people were confronting systems completely foreign to someone who has internalized the values and processes of democratic societies.

Soviet Models as Obstacles to Reform

Many of these issues were also highlighted by citizens of the transitioning postcommunist states, not only as a means of contrasting where they have been with where they want to go, but also as a means of pointing to the obstacles that continue to hinder the progress toward Western models of reform. It is important to be cognizant of these trends in order to maximize attempts to overcome them through assistance programs.

Presence of Soviet-trained Officers. Soviet models of military professionalism and leadership are most prevalent, of course, in the form of the Soviet-trained officers who still comprise the majority of the officer corps in the postcommunist militaries. Some people argue that the last vestiges of the former Soviet Union can be found in the ranks of the postcommunist states' militaries.⁵ These officers feel threatened by increasing Western influence and are reluctant to change, because admitting the need to change implies that their specific experience is irrelevant or somehow inappropriate to the postcommunist era.⁶

Indeed, the opportunity to continue a career as a professional military officer, or at least to maintain a comfortable lifestyle within the officer corps, is threatened when transition issues are seriously considered. Devising force structures compatible with postcommunist budget realities and threats means that significant downsizing will result and that many officers will be forced out of the only career they have ever known.⁷

This issue is made more difficult by the differences in the retirement systems of the Western and Eastern models. Unlike the US

officer corps, Eastern officers never worried about planning for life in the civilian sector upon retirement. Officers typically retired in their late fifties and lived until their early sixties, making the planning of a second career a moot point. Additionally, officers of the East were trained in military educational systems that were not accredited by the civilian sector, a fact that makes their education and training much less marketable. Compound these factors with a marked repugnance for Soviet-trained officers within many of the postcommunist societies, and it's not difficult to understand the prevailing motivation to resist change.⁸

Of course, not all Soviet-trained officers are resistant to reform, and—to the extent that changes are happening—such changes are being driven by officers trained in the Soviet model. However, the dependence of these fledgling democracies on Soviet-trained officers to fulfill their national security needs is frustrating to reformers in other government structures; indeed, they are pressing for even greater change.

Meanwhile, as Soviet-trained officers predominate at the top levels, big gaps exist in the lieutenant and captain ranks. These junior officers are either leaving the service for better opportunities in expanding civilian economies or staying within the Russian military, where the pay is higher. In fact, in

In the West, there is a tradition of becoming a career officer for love of country even though ... this has meant a very low standard of living.... In contrast, the Soviet model attracted people in search of stability and better living conditions.

Belarus it is possible to complete the military academy and choose to be commissioned in the Russian army.⁹ Some of these

young officers are also leaving due to their frustration with the lack of progress in reforms in a process that is still very much "top down."¹⁰

Western personnel in positions to assist and advise transitioning militaries of the postcommunist states should be aware of the continued presence of Soviet-trained officers and of their motivation to resist change. People in a position to influence the transition processes of these militaries should also understand the standards of professionalism and leadership that were inherited from the Soviet model.

Western military personnel who are in-country to assist the transitioning militaries of the East have noted fundamentally different concepts of officership and attitudes toward a military career. The American defense attaché in the Czech Republic observed that officers of the East and West are motivated by quite different factors. In the West, there is a tradition of becoming a career officer for love of country even though, historically, this has meant accepting a lower standard of living than what might be possible in the civilian sector. In contrast, the Soviet model attracted people in search of stability and better living conditions than might be expected in the civilian sector.¹¹

Observations of military officers from the postcommunist states are telling as well. A former Soviet officer and aide to the Lithuanian general staff was impressed with the way that Americans talk about their military careers. "They sound like they're proud of their job." He went on to say that he thinks that it's very good to love a job. He was particularly impressed with the fact that American officers would work hard for their boss, even if they didn't like him. He also noticed that "Americans love their country and working for their country and are proud to display the flag." In Lithuania, however, he thinks that officers work only for money.¹²

Treatment of Enlisted Personnel. One of the most glaring differences noted by military personnel from both the West and the East is the idea that the "duty of an officer is

to take care of his troops."¹³ While American officers are taught to lead by example and to put the needs of their troops ahead of their own, the Soviet model institutionalized a widespread system of hazing and general mistreatment of conscripts.

American and native military personnel have admitted that mistreatment of conscripts persists. The MLT chief in Lithuania reported that it was not uncommon to see black-and-blue soldiers working in the ministry of defense (MOD) building, where MLT had its offices.¹⁴ If evidence of beatings is obvious within the halls of a military headquarters monitored by the American advisory staff, then it seems logical that similar—and probably even more brutal—punishments are being meted out in the military outposts of the country.

It is impossible to overemphasize the differences between the Western and Eastern models with respect to standards of treatment of soldiers. In almost every case, when I asked a military member of the postcommunist states which aspect of the Western model had made the greatest impression on him, his answer dealt with the emphasis on the individual soldier.

Even high-ranking commanders were shocked at the relatively comfortable living conditions that are common for even the lowest-ranking troops in the West. A junior member of the Lithuanian general staff, who accompanied some senior members of the staff on a tour of US military facilities in Germany, related that these officers were impressed by the presence of hot showers in the barracks and deemed this a good idea to bring back home.¹⁵

Although living conditions of conscripts may be upgraded as economic resources become more available, trying to change the patterns of motivating conscripts to perform will be much more problematic. Officers of transitioning militaries yearn for the type of professionalism among enlisted soldiers that they have witnessed in the West, but they are skeptical about giving up their system of motivating through fear.

A Soviet-trained Lithuanian staff officer marveled at the intellectual ability of US Green Berets he saw working together as a team, but he struggled with trying to determine how to attain such an outcome within his own system. "A soldier must still accomplish his orders without thinking," he remarked, as if stumped by the prospect of motivating a soldier to think for himself or to carry out orders because he wanted to.¹⁶

Beating soldiers has become so associated with an overall system of maintaining good order and discipline that fundamental reform of the concept of relating to troops will be necessary to change this practice. Additionally, other deficiencies in leadership training have so reinforced this problem that only great changes across the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) training systems will produce an alternative system of leadership. Postcommunist officers need to understand how they can attain respect from soldiers under their command while simultaneously maintaining control of these troops.

Absence of Effective NCOs. This issue is very much related to both an NCO corps without any significant responsibility or expertise and to an officer corps with very limited leadership skills in motivating troops. One Western observer remarked that Soviet-trained officers and NCOs have very limited "experience with and exposure to interpersonal relations, management techniques, or leadership as we know it where leaders must motivate their people to do things."¹⁷ Until postcommunist states establish NCO corps that invest real responsibility in their leaders and teach them how to motivate troops, the vacuum of leadership in the enlisted ranks will continue, and habitual patterns of punishment will persist.¹⁸

Additionally, the widespread perception that conscripts are routinely abused in the militaries of the former Eastern bloc is probably the single most significant issue negatively affecting the relationship between these militaries and their societies at large. The postcommunist militaries are fighting

an uphill public-relations battle against populations, many of which have come to genuinely hate the military.¹⁹

This poor reputation stems from perceived unfairness in mandatory conscription systems that abound with loopholes and exempt the privileged. Additionally, the widespread perception that postcommunist militaries do not provide any valuable education or training leads to the belief that military service is a waste of time. Finally,

Beating soldiers has become so associated with an overall system of maintaining good order and discipline that fundamental reform of the concept of relating to troops will be necessary to change this practice.

deplorable living conditions and routinized systems of corporal punishment that sometimes result in the death of young conscripts do little to enhance the public image of these military institutions.

Legacy of Soviet Thought Processes. One factor that looms above all others relates to the very processes that direct the thinking of people who have lived in the Soviet bloc. Even ardent reformers who point their fingers at "Red colonels" and "Communists" admit their own handicap of having been raised within the Soviet system. "All Lithuanians are somehow Soviet," lamented a member of the national security committee of Lithuania's parliament as he tried to explain the difficulty of rooting out the *truly* Soviet mind-sets from the Lithuanian military.²⁰

Taking Responsibility. Officers from postcommunist states also observed the tremendous differences in responsibility and initiative between the US model and their

own system. An officer on the headquarters staff of the Iron Wolf Brigade in Lithuania noted that on an exchange visit with Green Berets, he learned that "every person was

The postcommunist militaries are fighting an uphill public-relations battle against populations, many of which have come to genuinely hate the military.

taught to think and to take responsibility for what they do." He added, "They had an individual approach to each person." He was very much impressed by this experience and was determined to try to apply these principles to the development of his own forces.²¹

Legacy of Soviet Professional Ethics. A retired US Army lieutenant colonel and Estonian-American employed by the Estonian government as the *prorektor* of the defense academy commented on the absence of professional ethics within the Estonian military and within the society in general. "In reality, there's a thin veneer of Western civilization here—everything else is the Soviet system." In one instance, he ran into great resistance when he tried to get the officers on the academy staff to pay for the coffee that the government bought for the guests of the academy. He ran into even greater resistance when he proposed that an honor code be established at the academy along the lines of the codes at US service academies.²²

The MLT chief in Budapest, a Hungarian-American, agreed that it is difficult for postcommunist militaries to transcend the culture of corruption. "In the Warsaw Pact, officers learned that corruption was the standard." He went on to add that *whom* an officer knew was—and still is—more important than an officer's performance or character.²³

Individual Power. One of the greatest impediments to reform is another holdover of Soviet political culture—individual power versus the good of the organization. A Latvian-American serving as an assistant to the minister of defense and advisor to the president of Latvia argued that the pursuit of power to the neglect of long-range planning in every situation is still the dominant mode of operating among policymakers in postcommunist Latvia. "Even simple courtesies such as introducing people are not done because not to do so reflects some type of power or control over the situation."²⁴

Related to this issue is the prevailing notion that "information is power." When the president of Latvia asked a high-ranking defense ministry advisor for a breakdown of the specific functions of various actors involved in Latvian defense policy, he discovered that no such organizational chart existed within the ministry. The advisor insisted that the absence of such a document was intentional and that the policymakers in the MOD were deliberately unclear on the issue. As a result, he was never able to complete his tasking for the president.²⁵

This aversion to information sharing also significantly affects the ability of transitioning militaries to improve their relationship with civil authorities and the public. The public affairs officer in the Lithuanian MOD remarked that public affairs officers in other ministries do not have access to information that should be disseminated to the public or civilian authorities. "In this building, some are for spreading information, and some are against it." Fortunately, her boss, the minister of defense, feels that "it is good to spread as much information as possible."²⁶

Western observers note that although the transparency of militaries in the region is improving, they still have a long way to go. The situation ranges from poor in some cases to improvement in others. The worst case is Belarus, the state most closely identified with the Soviet—and now Russian—military. According to the French attaché to Belarus, "It's a military secret when soldiers

are killed until the body is delivered. The policies of the Afghanistan war era still apply." He went on to say that Belarus's director of foreign affairs still doesn't allow Belarussian officers to have contact with foreigners except under strict provisions of the MOD.²⁷

In improving situations, the MOD will be responsive in cases in which the press or public has unilaterally discovered an incident. In these states, however, transitioning militaries are still reluctant to initiate bad news. One example in the Czech Republic involved a firing-range accident in which a shell exploded in a nearby village. The chiefs of the general staff and the MOD went out to inspect the accident site and to answer press questions. However, the transparency of the Czech military is still incomplete because it routinely makes distinctions between events that can be denied and those that cannot.²⁸

The reluctance to share information has also affected US military-assistance efforts. When a traveling contact team (TCT) briefs one unit on a certain topic, the team assumes that other neighboring units will receive the information. Although it is certainly not practical for TCTs to brief every battalion in the country, it is not unusual for information briefed to remain within that unit.²⁹

The continuing struggle to overcome a Soviet bureaucratic culture characterized by competing fiefdoms and an information-is-power mentality will complicate the transition processes, both within the postcommunist militaries and within their societies in general. These vestiges of the Soviet system come into conflict with democratic systems, which put a high value on vesting control in a broader group at the top of the structure of which the military is just one part.

The slow rate of progress in developing a culture of information sharing also has negative repercussions for the prospects of postcommunist militaries becoming democratically accountable through civilian oversight. The lesson that is slowly being learned is that democracy is a competitive

process whereby all agencies of the government—including the military—have to explain themselves to civilian authorities and the public in order to compete effectively for limited resources. Military leaders must become comfortable telling the appropriate authorities what they are doing and why. As long as the maturation of a culture of information sharing is delayed, postcommunist militaries will fall short of being democratically accountable institutions within the transitioning governments.³⁰

Negative Effects of Soviet Systemic Structures

Another series of issues hindering reform processes in the militaries of postcommunist states is related to the systemic structures and processes of the Soviet era that still endure across the region. Chief among these is the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic structures embodied in centralized planning procedures.

Limited Budget and Acquisition Skills. The centralized planning procedures that characterized the Soviet era meant that military commanders were not involved in budgeting and acquisition processes. Consequently, in the postcommunist era, when such skills are demanded of commanders, there is little ability to make budget trade-offs or to maintain fiscal responsibility.³¹ Additionally, inexperience with long-term defense planning makes the newly independent states vulnerable to spending limited defense resources without first developing a national security concept against which scarce resources can be applied.

This limited ability to make budgetary trade-offs also affects the capacity of these commanders to understand that trade-offs are inherent in Western assistance efforts as well. There is a perception that aid is unlimited and, therefore, that every proposed opportunity is desirable. In reality, aid is limited in each case, and certain opportunities cost more than others. Military leaders in the postcommunist states are not yet

comfortable with the idea of questioning the costs of various programs. Although the programs are "free" to them, selection of one opportunity may preclude the prospect of others.³²

Maintaining Past Infrastructures. Another obstacle to reform is the tendency to overlay military structures familiar to the postcommunist military leadership, usually the Soviet model, as a starting point for both newly independent satellite militaries and militaries that are building structures for the first time.³³ While the maintenance of past infrastructures is the prevailing trend, at least one instance of the inappropriate, wholesale adoption of Western staff structures has occurred. Specifically, Albanian military staff working with the American MLT acquired a copy of the organizational chart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. They used this model to draw up the new Albanian military structure—complete with an office known as the Exercise Coordination Section. The Albanians then asked their MLT advisors what function that office should perform. The American advisor called SHAPE and learned that the office coordinated peacekeeping exercises between Turkey and Greece.³⁴

The greatest theoretical obstacle to the application of democratic principles to transitioning postcommunist militaries is the tendency to misinterpret the concept of democracy.

Although it is understandable that postcommunist military leaderships would adopt structures that are familiar to them, this trend reinforces the general observation

of a lack of planning skills to develop structures tailored to the distinct needs of the much smaller and leaner transitioning militaries. Additionally, with starting points of inherited military structures, the relabeled "new" structure will not include all the positions necessary in militaries in democratic societies but will include positions superfluous to militaries in a democracy. Even more serious in the national security sense, such schemes will include organizational structures inappropriate to militaries with completely new roles and missions.

Misinterpretation of Democratic Principles

The greatest theoretical obstacle to the application of democratic principles to transitioning postcommunist militaries is the tendency to misinterpret the concept of democracy. This misunderstanding may be attributed to the Soviet propaganda campaigns of the cold war era, as well as to the general vacuum of accurate information on the principles of democracy available in the postcommunist era. This lack of understanding is particularly damaging within military institutions that are trying to balance the principles of freedom and discipline.

One widely accepted interpretation of democracy in the former Eastern bloc is that people can do whatever they want. The USAID representative in Romania related that this logic extends to such things as the routine violation of traffic laws and other symbols of an ordered society. He said that it's not uncommon for a citizen who tries to correct another citizen for such infractions to be called *Securitate!*³⁵

The difficulties encountered when one attempts to balance rights and responsibilities in a military environment are illustrated in an interview with a career Soviet officer now serving in the Lithuanian army. "We have now just the beginning of a democratic society: It's hard to get used to the fact that people can leave when they want. . . . It's not uncommon for a soldier to spend half the day in one unit and the other half in another

unit. Now things are improving because they are beginning to understand that they have a responsibility to their unit."³⁶

Another officer lamented that "sometimes there is too much democracy in the military. Everybody doesn't understand that they still have to do what they're told." He went on to add that the attitude that "democracy means that I am free to do what I want" makes it hard for the general staff to implement reforms. If commanders in units don't agree with the changes, they'll ignore them because "that's their understanding of democracy."³⁷

While some officers have an understanding of democracy that assumes that military discipline somehow goes by the wayside in democracies, other officers insist that the principles of democracy and military discipline are completely incompatible. The problem with the latter attitude is that such officers are resistant to reforms addressing the standards of treatment of conscripts, discussed above. Or they may have an understanding of how democracy should work in the society at large but do not think that such principles can be applied to the military.

Obstacles to Transition in Postcommunist States

In every postcommunist country I visited, the military leadership recognizes the need to improve its image with the public and parliament. In some cases, the opposition is so antimilitary that it argues that pressing budget limitations and the lack of serious threats to national security make continued support of the military an unaffordable luxury, given the rest of the challenges that confront postcommunist states.

Military leaders think that they can earn respect and improve their image by achieving a level of effectiveness on par with Western militaries.³⁸ However, as discussed earlier, without fundamental reform—including improved conditions for conscripts and the introduction of alternative models of professionalism and leadership—it is un-

likely that the relationships between postcommunist societies and militaries will be substantially improved.

The overall poor state of postcommunist economies also limits the progress of transitioning militaries. Although the economic conditions vary across the former Eastern bloc from markedly improved in the

Progress in overcoming obstacles and facilitating democracy is sporadic because the underlying principles and theory that should drive the program are not universally understood.

Visegrad countries to extremely strapped in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, the fight for resources will continue to be fierce. All aspects of reform—even organizational—drain scarce coffers. Both reformers in postcommunist militaries and Western advisors must realize that military budgets will continue to decline—at least in the short term.

This situation necessitates a keen emphasis on prioritization of reform objectives and the development of long-term strategies of national defense and the utilization of resources to best achieve reform. Previously, these militaries were part of the overall Soviet defense puzzle. Now, they must consider their own defense needs and develop appropriate doctrine to guide the shifting of strategic assets to best fit these new strategies. Western assistance efforts can help—and, indeed, already have helped—these states develop processes required to achieve this goal.

Policymakers—both within the former Eastern bloc and in positions external to it—must realize, too, that the militaries' transitions are occurring within the general context of wholesale transitions in every aspect of society and government. The reality

is that a vast interconnected web of transition is taking place across all institutions of postcommunist society. People who seek to assist postcommunist militaries must be cognizant of how reforms within other transitioning institutions affect reform within the military.

Even within the military institution, one must address many interrelated processes of transition simultaneously in order to achieve overall progress. If "democratizers" in the West and reformers in the East hope to realize their goal of establishing democratically accountable militaries in postcommunist states, then they must try to address the issues outlined in this article. These include the existence of psychological blind spots, the lingering impact of systemic vestiges of the Soviet era, the need to reform approaches to professionalism and leadership, and the requirement to provide education in democratic principles to civilian and military leaders as well as soldiers.

Effectiveness of the US Military's Democratization Approach

Clearly, people engaged in facilitating democratic outcomes in postcommunist states are not confronting a "clean slate." Yet, the US effort falls short on its recognition of specific, preexisting obstacles to democratization and the incorporation of specific program elements to combat them. The US assistance effort must be aware of the obstacles to reform that have resulted from Soviet bloc membership and must overcome them. Further, we should better understand the model of a democratic military that we are attempting to foster in the region.

To be fair, the efforts of in-country teams—given their resources, guidance from Europe and Washington, and specific "rules of engagement"—have been commendable. They have admirably performed the role-modeling function and have made strides to-

ward facilitating change in obstacles established by the Soviet model. Particularly noteworthy is their work in public affairs and the law, which is designed to assist host nations in progressing toward the democratization of their militaries.

However, the program could benefit from redirecting its measures of success away from tracking the frequency of events toward tracking how well it has addressed obstacles to reform or how much closer the transitioning military is to democracy. The problem is that progress in these areas is sporadic because the underlying principles and theory that should drive the program are not universally understood.

The success of the US military's effort to facilitate the democratic consolidation of militaries in postcommunist states depends on many factors. Highly trained professional military personnel who are fluent in foreign languages enhance the process, as does coordination among all members of the US team in-country, including the embassy staff and the defense attaché. Additionally, the attitude and support of host militaries are key factors. How motivated are they to reorient their defense structures and processes toward Western models? How severe are the limitations induced by obstacles to reform? What holdovers from the Soviet era must the military overcome or what advantages do they have? The overall condition of the web of political, economic, social, and military transitions within each postcommunist state also affects the degree of influence that external actors can have on internal processes.

Issues of incomplete coordination and internal turf battles continue to plague the overall effort of influencing postcommunist states. Parts of the US defense bureaucracy that have traditionally played a role in political-military relations are reluctant to share their role or delegate substantial powers to a new program within the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, defense attachés do not universally support the program, and the attitude of some of them actually undermines the effectiveness of the program,

sending the signal to host militaries that US defense structures are not complementary or united in purpose.

Additionally, self-imposed limitations—such as providing only information that falls short of actual training—also curtail the effectiveness of the program. Host militaries universally express concern that their continued need for information briefings is short-term or has already expired, while their need for real training will persist indefinitely.

Bureaucratic shortcomings—such as frequent rotations of MLT members and the assignment of personnel untrained in the transition in progress—could be easily overcome. If the goal of positively influencing military institutions of postcommunist states is a matter of such national import and a major thrust of post-cold-war defense policy, then the US military should embrace this role and ensure that the most competent officers and NCOs are selected and appropriately trained to serve within the program.

Finally, the participation of Russia, Ukraine, and other postcommunist states still does not fall within the geographical area of responsibility of US European Command (USEUCOM); thus, matters are handled separately in an ad hoc, less systematic process of military-to-military contacts. This division within the military bureaucracy is indicative of defense policymakers' inability to reach a consensus on how best to coordinate US defense resources and personnel within a single program.

As with any process influenced by both external and internal forces, outside actors

can only maximize factors that they themselves control. It is imperative, then, that US policymakers strive to develop and implement the best overall plan possible for outside influence. I contend that this effort entails a comprehensive understanding of both the Eastern model that they are attempting to influence and their own Western model.

By using obstacles to reform as a guide to issues that must be overcome and by using the American military as a model, one can enhance the effectiveness of the democratization effort. Policymakers must also work out some of the organizational and bureaucratic issues—such as overlap between the role of defense attachés and MLTs and of reserve and guard forces—that limit the effectiveness of the overall effort.

Makers of foreign and defense policy agree that the role of the military instrument in the democratization efforts of the United States has become institutionalized in recent years. The political-military role of the US armed forces is destined to continue. Meanwhile, the processes of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states and other theaters of the world are far from complete and continue to pose a destabilizing threat to consolidated democracies of the West. We must continue to study the processes of external influence so that the "Western insert" to the complex web of transition of postcommunist states strengthens the overall democratization processes that are under way.

□

Notes

1. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), 2.

2. Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF, Retired, Colorado Springs, Colo., interview with author, 22 April 1994.

3. Zoltan D. Barany, "Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems: Western Models Revisited," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 19 (Summer 1991): 88.

4. *Ibid.*, 89.

5. Lt Col Steven Chambers, USMC, MLT member, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 19 June 1994.

6. Mr Scott Dean, political officer, US Embassy, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.

7. Col Louis Boros, USMC, MLT chief, Budapest, Hungary, interview with author, 11 July 1994.

8. Col Paul B. East, USA, MLT chief, Prague, Czech Republic, interview with author, 14 July 1994.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Klochko, international liaison officer, Belarussian general staff, Minsk, Belarus, interview with author, 27 June 1994.

10. Col George H. Dunkelberg, defense and air attaché, Prague, Czech Republic, interview with author, 15 July 1994.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Senior Lt Arturas Indicianskis, liaison officer to MLT from the Lithuanian general staff, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 18 June 1994.
13. Mr Tonu Toomepuu, *prorektor* of the Estonian Defense Academy, Tallinn, Estonia, interview with author, 14 June 1994.
14. Col Robert Barziloski, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, MLT chief, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
15. Indicianskis.
16. Maj Aleksandr Temnolonskij, deputy commander for rapid deployment force, Headquarters Iron Wolf Brigade, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
17. Col Wayne C. Koppa, Michigan Army National Guard, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.
18. Dunkelberg.
19. Boros.
20. Dr Kestutis Gaska, member of national security committee of the Seimas, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 20 June 1994.
21. Temnolonskij.
22. Toomepuu.
23. Boros.
24. Mr Gundars Zalkains, MOD liaison to the Latvian MLT, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Lt Lolita Zegeriene, public affairs chief, MOD, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 22 June 1994.
27. Lt Col Jean Bourhis, French attaché, Minsk, Belarus, interview with author, 27 June 1994.
28. Dunkelberg.
29. Indicianskis.
30. Dean.
31. Mr Kert Volcker, political officer, US Embassy, Budapest, Hungary, interview with author, 12 July 1994.
32. For instance, the Latvians agreed to participate in a very expensive IMET course in Germany on war surgery that will cost the US government \$41,000. Col Wayne C. Koppa, the MLT chief, tried to convey to them that this may not be the optimal use of aid resources unless war surgery is a top priority of the Latvian military. He suggested that they might prefer an opportunity to put a Latvian officer in an officers' training course or war college. Koppa.
33. Senior Lieutenant Indicianskis related that the headquarters structure of the new Lithuanian military parallels very closely that of the Soviet military, even to the point that there is a chief of culture and sports—usually a major or lieutenant colonel—in every brigade, as in the Soviet military. Indicianskis.
34. Tom Cossaboom, Air Force historian, Colorado Springs, Colo., interview with author, 22 September 1994.
35. Mr Richard J. Hough, USAID representative, Bucharest, Romania, interview with author, 30 June 1994.
36. Colonel Vizbaras, commandant, NCO school, Kaunas, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
37. Indicianskis.
38. Volcker.



THE INCREASED ROLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN UN PEACEKEEPING

Opportunities and Challenges

MAJ ANTONIO L. PALA, USAF



In his opening speech for the Summit of the Americas, President Bill Clinton expressed his optimism for the future of the Western Hemisphere:

Here at the Summit of the Americas, the people of the United States will meet a whole new generation of leaders, a generation no longer subject to the dictates of military juntas who stifle liberties and loot their nation; a generation that has proved in Central America that bloody regional conflicts can be peacefully concluded through negotiation and reform and reconciliation; a generation which has

pledged to support democracy collectively wherever it is imperiled in this hemisphere.¹

Thirty-four presidents representing every nation in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba gathered in Miami to chart a convergent course for a more prosperous future. The last regional summit was held in 1967 in Uruguay, where nearly a dozen of the participants were dictators. Presently, Fidel Castro is the only leader in this hemisphere who was not democratically elected. Economic integration and a commitment to democratic governance were at the forefront of the summit's agenda. Curiously, military coop-

eration and alliances, which have been the staple of negotiations in this hemisphere, were not addressed. Inter-American democratic sentiment was documented in 1991 with Resolution 1080 of the Organization of American States (OAS), better known as the Santiago commitment to democracy, which essentially stated that representative democracy would be the standard for its member states.

This democratic surge in Latin America is due in large part to the end of the cold war. Changes in the international system since the fall of the Berlin Wall have provided a promising environment for Latin American leaders. Internal security threats previously posed by the East-West struggle are no longer present in most of the hemisphere. The spread of democracy, the control of the debt crisis, and an increased focus on economic integration appear to be at the apex of regional issues. At present, only Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru face a serious internal security struggle, although incidents like the Chiapas uprising in Mexico bring to light the possibility for internal conflict.

For the most part, Latin American countries are at peace, and their armed forces are faced with the challenge of adapting to the new international situation. This does not mean that the need for armed forces has gone away or that they will relegate themselves to police or civic-action duties. As Gabriel Marcella put it, "Defense of the nation from external enemies is the irreducible sine qua non legitimating function of the armed forces."² The armed forces are an integral institution within a state, and the absence of a present enemy does not invalidate their existence. In light of the current international environment, several Latin American armed forces have incorporated United Nations (UN) peace operations as a secondary role within their defense doctrine. The Argentine army highlights the support of peace operations as a secondary role, along with providing logistical support to combat narco-trafficking, providing community sup-

port in emergency situations, and helping to protect the ecological system.³

Does UN peacekeeping provide a viable role for these armed forces? What are the advantages, if any, of incorporating these armed forces into the UN peacekeeping environment? Latin American participation within the UN or other multilateral operations is not a new phenomenon. Jack Child documented the contribution of Latin American contingents to UN missions in 1980.⁴ Latin American officers served as observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Lebanon as early as 1948, with others participating in the India-Pakistan observer mission in 1949. Brazil and Colombia deployed infantry battalions to the Suez in support of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956.⁵ UNEF I was commanded on two different occasions by a Brazilian general. In 1960 the Argentine air force provided pilots and maintenance personnel to operate DC-3 aircraft in the UN mission in the Congo. These crews flew more than 200 missions in combat conditions, providing critical transport and humanitarian relief.⁶ In 1974 Peru provided infantry for the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, with a Peruvian general serving as the interim commander of UNDOF for six months. UN participation by Latin American forces, although significant, was not an established part of their defense doctrine. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, India, and others provided the bulwark of UN peacekeepers prior to the end of the cold war.

Since 1989, however, the participation of certain Latin American armed forces with the UN has increased exponentially. As of 30 September 1994, there were 2,816 Latin American military personnel from 10 different countries serving in 13 UN operations throughout the world (tables 1 and 2).⁷ In 1990 the UN deployed 1,060 troops, including an 800-man Venezuelan battalion, to 14 locations throughout Honduras and Nicaragua as part of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The

Table 1
Latin American Participation
in UN Peacekeeping

Country	Personnel
Argentina (AR)	1,405
Bolivia (BO)	10
Brazil (BR)	336
Chile (CH)	21
Colombia (CO)	35
Guatemala (GU)	2
Honduras (HO)	16
Mexico (MX)	29
Uruguay (UR)	946
Venezuela (VE)	16
Total	2,816

Source: UN Military Staff Committee, 30 September 1994.

UN secretary-general praised the Venezuelans' participation, stating that they had served "with great distinction."⁸ Contingents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are currently serving in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), monitoring the cease-fire and disarmament process. These new roles can help form a new image for these historically controversial armed forces.

Argentina is currently the most active Latin American country within the UN framework. The number of Argentines deployed with the UN has increased over 400 percent in the last six years—from 20 observers in 1988 to over 1,400 troops in 1994.⁹ At present there are 890 Argentines in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and over 500 others stationed in eight other UN missions. If the current Argentine troop-rotation pattern continues, it is expected that within three years, better than 50 percent of the military's permanent personnel would have served with the UN.¹⁰ In the last two years,

four Argentines have lost their lives in the service of the UN, and several others have been injured. Uruguay provides the second largest contribution to the UN from Latin America, with nearly 900 Uruguayan troops presently in the UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and over 75 more serving in six other UN deployments. Brazil has contributed 264 troops to ONUMOZ, constituting the first deployment of Brazilian combat troops to a foreign country since the 1965 US/OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic.¹¹ Brazilians are also taking part in three other UN deployments. At the end of the Gulf War, the Chilean air force provided a helicopter squadron to monitor the UN-imposed buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Presently there are 20 Chileans in UN service. Additionally, military and police contingents from Latin America and the Caribbean have been instrumental in Haiti's effort to consolidate its newly restored democratic government.

The increased Latin American participation in peacekeeping has drawn the attention of prominent UN advocates. In a recent interview, Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN undersecretary, praised the important and varied contribution of Argentina to peacekeeping: "Argentina has provided hospitals, troops, engineers, police, and electoral observers. I wish that all countries would participate at this level and diversity."¹² Active participation with the UN missions will yield domestic, regional, and international benefits for these Latin American states.

Domestic Implications

At home, military participation in UN peacekeeping serves political as well as military objectives. Argentine army general Carlos Maria Zabala, a former UN sector commander in Croatia, cited many of the advantages of peacekeeping for his army:

On a professional level, it is an occasion to operate in a complex operational environment. You have the opportunity to work with other

Table 2

Latin American Participation in Current UN Missions (Including Troops, Military Observers, and Civilian Police)

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Country</i>
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	AR (6), CH (3)
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	CH (3), UR (3)
UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	AR (391)
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)	AR (5), BR (24)
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	AR (56), UR (6), VE (2)
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	AR (7), HO (16), UR (19), VE (8)
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	AR (2), BR (5), CH (15), CO (23), MX (29), VE (3)
UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)	AR (890), BR (43), CO (12), VE (3)
UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	AR (48), BO (10), BR (264), UR (874)
UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	UR (16)
UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)	UR (27)
UN Mission in Haiti (UNOMIH)	GU (2)
UN Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	UR (1)

Source: UN Military Staff Committee, 30 September 1994.

armies and appreciate their capabilities as well as your own. It provides first hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our troops to appreciate the importance of the UN and its peace operations. On a personal level, it lends opportunity for travel to foreign locations and exposure to other cultures and customs. Additionally, it allows the troops to feel as representatives of their country in an important mission abroad.¹³

On a political level, the participation of national contingents in a multinational capacity provides a level of prestige for the na-

tional government. *Armed Forces Journal International* recently stated that President Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina has developed a military policy directed at "increased participation in peacekeeping activities and projecting the image of a reliable international partner."¹⁴ This policy also offers the government a degree of leverage in the international arena. This can include offering the participation of armed forces in exchange for political and/or economic concessions from the world community. One concession obtained by Argentina, despite

opposition from the British, was the addition of radar to A-4M Skyhawk fighters recently purchased from the US. A statement by US Embassy officials in Buenos Aires confirmed that Argentina's participation in peacekeeping and its commitment to regional arms-control agreements were contributing factors to the sale of the upgraded A-4M aircraft.¹⁵ Regional experts argue that Argentina's increasing participation in peacekeeping is part of a broader foreign policy strategy intended to gain economic, commercial, and political concessions from the US. During a recent visit to Argentina, Vice President Al Gore recognized Argentine peacekeepers at a special ceremony:

The troops assembled here today, veteran United Nations peacekeepers, are proof of their nation's commitment to such noble endeavors. They are the ones who risked and sometimes, sadly, gave their lives for the sake of others. . . . They are the ones who returned full of pride, able to report to their countrymen, Argentina was present—mission accomplished. . . . To these brave soldiers who will carry forever in their hearts the honor symbolized by the blue berets they were privileged to wear, we give our thanks!¹⁶

Concessions from the US may include favorable debt renegotiation arrangements, a free-trade agreement, and the possible purchase by the US Air Force and Navy of the Argentine Pampa jet trainer.

Several of the Latin American armed forces active in peacekeeping have derived benefits that appear linked to their UN commitment. Argentina and Uruguay obtained several surplus C-130 transports from the US Air Force. The Argentine navy acquired two frigates, and the Chilean air force received additional helicopters and spare parts to support its deployment to Kuwait. In addition to hardware, the Latin American contingents assigned to the former Yugoslavia have received North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training and doctrine to facilitate communication with NATO aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone.

The development of new roles for the Latin American militaries is a fundamental

component for democratic consolidation. Previous attempts to expand military roles into nontraditional missions such as counternarcotics and civic action proved minimally effective at best. In fact, these

The interventionist tradition of Latin American armed forces has fostered a sense of mistrust on the part of civilian society. . . . Service in UN peacekeeping offers these militaries an opportunity to improve their image and prestige.

activities may very well increase the possibility that the military will be tempted to exercise dominant political roles, undermining the democratic process. For example, in 1990 Bolivian president Jaime Paz Zamora explicitly denounced US insistence on expanding the role of the Bolivian armed forces in the nation's antidrug campaign.¹⁷ He warned that such a role might undermine civilian control over the military, increase levels of repression and social violence in the Bolivian countryside, and thus pave the way for a future military coup against his democratically elected government. Similar concerns were expressed by former presidents Cesar Gaviria of Colombia and Alan Garcia of Peru.

The interventionist tradition of Latin American armed forces has fostered a sense of mistrust on the part of civilian society, particularly with regard to human-rights violations and the armed forces' lack of respect for civilian rule. Service in UN peacekeeping offers these militaries an opportunity to improve their image and prestige. The protection of innocent civilians in Croatia, the clearing of minefields in Cambodia, and the operation of a hospital in Mozambique can only enhance their profile



Argentina is currently the most active Latin American country within the UN framework. The number of Argentines deployed with the UN has increased over 400 percent in the last six years. Here, Argentine helicopters and crews prepare for a UN deployment to Cyprus.

at the national and international levels. These new roles cannot erase past mistakes but can offer the prospect for a better partnership with civilian authorities and society. As Deborah Norden observes, "The military's participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in the government's foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found disdain."¹⁸

During a period of worldwide reductions in military spending and the apparent demilitarization of the drug war, Latin American armed forces are being pressured to find new roles. In the past, these kinds of pressures were perceived to threaten the integrity and corporate interests of the military.

Under these confrontational conditions, the military has been known to lash out against democratic governments in an attempt to reassert its status and import. UN peacekeeping missions essentially provide this traditionally restless institution with an operational environment to exercise a military role. The primary motivation of UN participation may be institutional survival or the avoidance of large military reductions. However, the unintended consequences may promote democratic consolidation, increased professionalism, and a willingness to become subordinate to civilian rule.

In 1993 the foreign ministry of Paraguay—a country with a recent history of military rule—solicited a report on reforming and re-

structuring the ministry and its foreign policy. The report recommended that Paraguay contribute troops to UN peacekeeping as a means of institutionalizing and accelerating Paraguay's incorporation into the international community.¹⁹ Recently, the Paraguayan ambassador to the UN, Jose Felix Fernandez Estigarribia, officially proposed the use of Paraguayan military personnel to the UN Security Council. The participation of Paraguayan troops in peacekeeping also has the intended purpose of keeping an interventionist military from subverting the country's fragile democratic transition.²⁰

United Nations pay supplements also offer an important benefit to these armed forces. The average supplement for a member of a unit on a UN deployment is over \$980 (US) per month. Specialists within the unit receive an additional 25 percent pay hike. Officers assigned on UN observer missions receive a per diem rate that varies from \$85-\$120 (US), depending on the particular operation. When one considers that an Argentine captain's salary is roughly \$1,500 (US) per month, these pay supplements are of considerable consequence. Defense cuts and low salaries are affecting morale and readiness throughout the Latin American forces. Peacekeeping can help alleviate these ailments by providing both additional pay and reimbursement for operational costs incurred in the missions.

Linking UN participation to democratic ideals adds further motivation for governments to promote UN involvement for their troops. UN missions provide these armed forces with a new role that requires obedience to civilian authority as a condition for inclusion. Additionally, these multilateral deployments foster regional cooperation, thus reducing the likelihood of conflict with neighboring states.

Regional Implications

It is impossible to talk about security in Latin America without addressing regional security issues. Each particular region faces

its own geopolitical challenge and historical antecedents. To propose that Argentina will become the peacekeeping equivalent of Canada in the southern cone is absurd. Canada does not share borders with countries that pose a military threat—real or perceived. A large part of the Argentine military establishment still lives with the constant preoccupation of threat hypothesis rooted in geopolitical thought and the fear of neighbors closing in on their territory. Latin America has seen very few interstate conflicts in this century, and—in contrast to Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and most parts of Africa—it is a lightly militarized region. In Latin America, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) are small compared to expenditures in other parts of the world.²¹ Participation (preferably cooperation) in peace operations, whether under the auspices of the UN or OAS, can only improve regional security.

The outlook for a security framework based on the OAS is not positive. The OAS is a remnant of the post-World War II security mentality of limiting foreign intervention within the hemisphere. The Rio Treaty and the charter of the OAS are ill equipped to handle regional security problems. Additionally, the OAS-sanctioned Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF)—created to alleviate the Dominican crisis of 1965—was seen by many member states as a US cover for its unilateral intervention. The OAS is taking steps to improve its capabilities in the field of security. In 1992 it established the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, headed by Hernan Patiño Mayer, Argentine ambassador to the OAS.²² This OAS committee has been very concerned with the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBM) in the hemisphere. The powerful influence of the US within the hemisphere has always precluded smaller states from trusting the OAS as an impartial advocate of hemispheric needs. For these reasons, the UN appears to provide more hope as an interlocutor of security concerns and peace operations within the Latin American system. Recent interviews with Argentine officers reflect that

nearly 75 percent of them believe that the UN should increase its role in international security, while less than 40 percent felt that the OAS was capable of handling security problems.²³

What possible improvements to regional security can multilateral cooperation within a UN framework provide? One important benefit should be to foster regional integration and expand the mind-set from a zero-sum nationalist perspective to a broader image. Regional economic integration is a fact of life in the hemisphere, with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) being the most recognized of the initiatives. The announcement during the Summit of the Americas of Chile's incorporation into NAFTA has yielded some high expectations. Also during the summit, President Clinton and his 33 counterparts committed themselves to the establishment of a hemispheric free-trade zone by the year 2005. Additionally, the Common Market of South America (*Mercado Común del Sur*—MERCOSUR), en-

The new international order... has afforded small states considerably more maneuvering room as it relates to their foreign policy.

compassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has been progressing since 1993 and should be fully implemented by late 1995. MERCOSUR countries have begun to address the role of the armed forces within the member states and possible limits on defense expenditures.²⁴ Proposals for the establishment of a collective security regime within MERCOSUR are also being considered.²⁵ Interstate economic and security issues are currently being addressed by civilian and military leaders. This is a promising development for Latin America, where decision making in security matters was his-

torically the exclusive domain of the military.

Additionally, a positive increase in the establishment of CBMs in the region has improved the security outlook. Jack Child states that "CBMs have had the greatest impact on the so called 'ABC' countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) and have been linked to attempts at economic integration in the same area (MERCOSUR)."²⁶ Argentina's recent commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and its dismantlement of the Condor II missile program are positive indicators for the region. The establishment of an OAS commission to address CBMs and the recent surge in civil-military dialog in this field are promising omens for the hemisphere.

International Implications

The new international order, particularly the disintegration of the bipolarity of the cold war, has afforded small states considerably more maneuvering room as it relates to their foreign policy. During the cold war, states were normally aligned with one of the superpowers, a situation that determined—for the most part—the type of foreign policy that could be expected of them. By the same token, the superpowers looked toward their allies with protective and often possessive intentions. The dissension of an ally was a gain for the opponent's camp—*containment* was the operative word. Kenneth Waltz explains the particular nature of bipolarity:

In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them. Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern.²⁷

With the end of bipolarity, peripheries are becoming a visible reality. The vast majority of the African continent is a clear example of this situation. The superpowers have lost their interest in that region, and without their support, many of those states have

slipped into chaos. Latin American leaders are concerned about becoming part of the periphery. The Argentine ambassador to the OAS stated recently that "the biggest challenge facing Latin America was to avoid becoming marginalized by the world community."²⁸ He added that if Argentina were to disappear from the face of the world, the loss would not be recorded in a single major stock exchange, and stressed that Latin American countries could no longer afford to close themselves to the world community. These are astonishing revelations by an Argentine politician, particularly a Peronist.²⁹ The Menem administration has taken considerable effort to ensure that Argentina becomes a reliable and participating member of the international community. Menem's decision to send Argentine naval ships to the Gulf War was not popular, either with the population (nearly 70 percent opposed it in February 1991) or the opposition parties.³⁰ For the Menem administration, the international benefit of making such a decision must have outweighed the domestic political gamble and is a clear indication of Menem's desire to integrate his country into the world community.

Peacekeeping and increased participation with international organizations provide opportunities for smaller states to project themselves on a global stage. Canada, India, and several Scandinavian countries—among others—have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the UN for many years. The decision on the part of several Latin American states to increase their participation in these ventures will be of great assistance to a UN attempting to provide triage for the world's ailments.

There are natural advantages to the UN's seeking large-scale cooperation from Latin American armed forces. They not only offer an abundant pool of troops and a diversity in national participation, but these armed forces should be well suited—due to their language and culture—to serve in peacekeeping missions in Latin America and parts of Africa.³¹ The increased number of Spanish-

speaking forces participating with the UN has prompted Argentina and the UN to open a peacekeeping training facility in Buenos Aires.³² This base will provide training for civilian and military personnel destined for UN missions. Symbolically, perhaps, the site of the UN facility is the *Campo de Mayo* army base, where in 1987 rogue military officers attempted a coup against the democratically elected government of President Raul Alfonsin. The base was scheduled to open in 1994, but a lack of funding threatens to prevent that from happening.

Skepticism of peacekeeping still remains in several countries—particularly in the third world—because some UN troops come from countries with a long history of imperialism. Major powers carry the historical baggage of their colonial or imperial past, making their presence unwelcome and counterproductive

Peacekeeping and increased participation with international organizations provide opportunities for smaller states to project themselves on a global stage.

in many countries. The difficulties faced by US and Italian contingents in Somalia and by French peacekeepers in Cambodia demonstrate the dilemma faced by former colonialist powers in the delicate world of peacekeeping.³³ An important benefit for the UN and its peacekeeping missions is that Latin American militaries do not have an imperial history in the global arena. By contrast, countries with smaller military forces not associated with unilateral foreign intervention appear to provide less of a threat to countries hosting UN missions. This situation enhances the probability of success. French troops assigned to the UN in Cambodia (UNTAG) failed to gain the confidence of the populace and were constantly harassed, probably due to France's long imperial history in Southeast Asia. The French unit was

replaced by Uruguayan troops, who proved to be considerably more successful in fulfilling the UN mandate.³⁴ The importance of impartiality for UN troops was recently illustrated by Canadian prime minister Chretien, who stated that "as a medium sized country, Canada has always been able to play roles in peacekeeping, because very often we are more acceptable—just because we're small and nobody is afraid of us."³⁵ If this assumption is true for Canada—a medium military power and NATO member—what threat can a Latin American force pose?

Implications for the United States

These new roles also offer the US some opportunities to improve its position in the region. It is critical for the US not to overlook the important contributions that these forces are making in the field of international security and to recognize the positive aspects of this new role for the region. US State Department officials in Argentina are very cognizant of the effect of peacekeeping on Argentina's foreign policy and military. The briefing book prepared by the US Embassy for important visitors dedicates the first three pages to enumerating the partnership position of the Argentine efforts. The recognition of Argentine peacekeepers by Vice President Gore during a time-critical visit demonstrates the priority given to peacekeeping by the US ambassador. The Department of Defense (DOD)—particularly United States Southern Command (US-SOUTHCOM)—should give the same priority to these types of efforts on a theaterwide basis.

USSOUTHCOM should recognize the importance of these contributions and develop programs to foster multilateral cooperation. Integration is a better vehicle for professionalization than the indoctrination approach currently employed by DOD. US military influence in Latin America continues to decline, particularly due to reductions in US

military-aid programs to the region.³⁶ Efforts should be made to promote the transfer of surplus US military equipment into the region. These transfers should include materiel that supports peacekeeping functions, such as transport vehicles, communications equipment, and other nonoffensive items. Additionally, most of these items are also valuable for disaster relief and civic-action programs. Much of this equipment is available through US military missions in-country, but the recipient country is responsible for the cost of transporting the equipment from the US. These expenses are often prohibitive for these cash-starved countries. Revisions to the current policy should be made to eliminate or reduce the transportation costs of these transfers. This equipment would alleviate the in-country shortages posed by having units permanently deployed to UN missions. The slow and cumbersome UN reimbursement process further exacerbates this situation. US contributions could improve the readiness of Latin American armed forces and would reward their contribution to international security.

Increased US military participation and cooperation in the hemisphere is imperative. During a recent interview, Gen Juan D. Paulik, Argentine air force commander, stressed his desire to expand the number of exercises and deployments with the US Air Force. He wanted his units to participate on an operational level with the US in an effort to develop an interoperative capability.³⁷ In 1994 Argentina participated for the first time in the US Navy exercise FLEETEX. UNITAS, the joint US and Latin American naval exercise, has been a success for a number of years. These exercises provide a positive operational experience for all the forces, as well as promote regional cooperation. Participating side by side with a first-world military power can do more for professionalizing these armed forces than placing them in special schools exclusively for Latin American students. Peacekeeping missions also offer the opportunity to serve with first-world armies, and most UN veterans stress this as a particularly valuable feature.

The promotion of military professionalism in Latin America has been a constant concern for the US. The US Army School of the Americas as well as the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, by direction of the US Congress, include human-rights training within their normal courses. The incorporation of these topics within military training schools is perceived by many of the students to be a form of indoctrination. As Sam Fitch explains, "The notion that US officers could teach their Latin American counterparts to support democracy, to respect human rights, or to see the world as the United States sees it, has always been ethnocentric and often resented by the recipients of the instruction."³⁸ One of the four main objectives of USSOUTHCOM's peacetime operations plan involves

enhancing the role of the military in democratic society. Host nation military forces that can defend their nations against internal and external security threats, support the continued development of democracy and protect and promote the human rights of their citizens [sic].³⁹

Additionally, in its most recent fact sheet, USSOUTHCOM stated that "enhancing military professionalism" is one of its main objectives.⁴⁰ Ironically, USSOUTHCOM does not include the promotion of peacekeeping roles or the contribution of these armed forces to the UN anywhere in its mission statements or objectives.

Peacekeeping has become an important mission for many of these countries. The incorporation of courses that support multilateral operations in the curriculum of the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the US Army School of the Americas, or the Inter-American Defense College is necessary in order to capitalize on this positive trend. These training institutions need to evolve with the post-cold-war environment and recognize the importance of peacekeeping as a valuable military role. Latin American officers with peacekeeping experience should be invited to serve as faculty members at all the

above-mentioned schools. Additionally, more traditional US service-school slots should be made available to Latin American officers and civilians.

Conclusions

The participation of the Latin American armed forces in UN peacekeeping is a no-lose situation. Not only does it provide a vehicle for these armed forces to enhance their prestige at home and abroad, but also it allows national governments to play a greater role in the international arena as members of an increasingly interdependent post-cold-war world. The international community also benefits from Latin American multilateral participation by gaining additional troops to wear the blue helmets of the United Nations. At a time when the UN finds itself unable to fill its ranks, the willingness of the Latin American armed forces to participate in peacekeeping may offer the UN an abundant source of troops. The active participation of Latin American countries with the UN—and peacekeeping in particular—is a trend that should be neither overlooked nor underestimated. Moreover, international peacekeeping provides positive opportunities for nations undergoing sensitive regime changes, such as transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. As Latin American militaries seek to define new roles in the post-cold-war period and improve their tainted image at home and abroad, peacekeeping offers them a professional role that can help ease tensions in both the military institutions and their societies at large.

Further, the OAS should focus on these multilateral efforts by developing an organizational framework to better coordinate the lessons learned from the peacekeeping experiences of member states. Latin American participation in peacekeeping provides a wide array of opportunities for the hemisphere. □

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THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

THREATS FROM THE FLANKS

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ON 10 November 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the successful completion of 20 months of negotiations between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). At its completion, President George Bush hailed the agreement as ending the "military confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades."¹ Despite the dramatic nature of this document, the large-scale reductions required, and the complex inspection regime it established, the completion of the treaty was overshadowed by the ongoing deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Berlin Wall, and

impending conflict in the Persian Gulf. Even these events paled to insignificance in comparison to the dissolution of the Soviet Union roughly one year later. As a result, many observers announced the imminent demise of the CFE Treaty. The *London Times*, for example, sounded a particularly distressing note when it announced that "Europe's most ambitious arms control treaty risks [is] becoming unworkable because of the Soviet Union's disintegration."²

Almost paradoxically, the CFE Treaty survived the early reports of its demise. This is perhaps testimony to its value and the relative importance that participating states attach to it. Ongoing changes did slow its entry into force, as the treaty was not provisionally applied until 17 July 1992. It be-

came legally binding on all parties 10 days after the last country deposited its instruments of ratification. This did not occur until 9 November 1992.³ The implementation of the treaty is scheduled to take 40 months from the time it became legally binding. Final reductions are to be made by November 1995 with a subsequent four-month period (until March 1996) for all sides to verify residual levels. The purpose of this paper is to review the treaty and examine the likelihood that it will be fully completed.

The Treaty

The CFE Treaty has over 100 pages encompassing 23 treaty articles, several protocols, two annexes, plus several legally binding statements and other political documents associated with the accord. The agreement limits five categories of weapons—tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters, and attack aircraft—in the European territory of the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact (referred to as “groups of states parties”). The area of application (AOA) stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. This is further subdivided into geographic subzones. The reason for a zonal approach was to force the relocation of Soviet forces eastward from the inner-German border, prevent their concentration within the Soviet Union, and thus reduce the possibility of a “short-warning attack.” A portion of southeastern Turkey is excluded from the treaty due to Turkish concerns about potential threats from Syria or Iraq.

Though the treaty was negotiated in a multilateral forum, it is firmly rooted in the alliance formations of the cold war—NATO and the WTO. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the bloc-to-bloc character of the treaty continues and will do so at least until final implementation in 1996. Each alliance has the following limits: 20,000 main battle tanks; 30,000 armored combat vehi-

cles (ACV); 20,000 artillery pieces; 6,800 combat aircraft (excluding trainers, strategic bombers, and transport aircraft); and 2,000 attack helicopters. In addition, no single nation may have more than one-third of the total group entitlement for each category of equipment. This restriction was coupled with provisions restricting the size of forces of one country that could be stationed on the territory of another. Each alliance (NATO and WTO) had to negotiate the national entitlements with its members consistent with the group ceilings and other associated requirements.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the successor states agreed to their respective limitations at Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Additional adjustments were made on the division of Czechoslovakia. The treaty also requires that states place a portion of their allocation in designated permanent storage sites (DPSS). Last, the treaty places additional restrictions on the so-called flanks. This area includes all of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It also consists of the North Caucasus and Leningrad military districts in the Russian Federation, plus the southeastern third of the Ukraine. The total, for example, for Russian forces in this area is 700 tanks; 1,280 artillery pieces; and 580 ACVs in active units out of the total allocation for these items for the Russian Federation. Russia is also allowed to place 600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 ACVs in designated permanent storage sites in the northern portion of the flank (i.e., the Leningrad Military District). The concept of a separate “flank zone” was the result of efforts by Turkey and Norway. Neither country wanted the Soviet forces removed from the Central Region to reappear on its borders.

Besides the revised totals for each emerging state of the former Soviet Union, two other official statements by the Soviet Union (later adopted by its successor states) deserve particular mention. The first (enacted on 14 June 1991) provides that all treaty-limited equipment (tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles) assigned to naval infantry

or coastal defense forces count against the total treaty entitlement. The West insisted on this pronouncement to assuage concerns that the Soviet Union might transfer large amounts of equipment from the army to its naval forces to circumvent treaty obligations. The second statement acknowledged the requirement of the Soviet Union to destroy roughly 14,500 pieces of treaty-limited equipment that were moved east of the Ural Mountains (i.e., outside the area of the treaty) during the negotiations. The first is considered legally binding on the Soviet Union (and its successors), while the second is construed to be a political obligation. The Russian Federation and Ukraine acknowledged these responsibilities in the Tashkent Agreement as successor states of the USSR.

The treaty also contains many other specifications that would logically be required in an agreement of this complexity. It includes careful definitions of such diverse topics as groups of parties, artillery (must be 100 mm or larger), designated permanent storage sites, and so forth. It further lists procedures for the establishment of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) consisting of representatives from every state involved in the treaty to monitor problems that may occur during implementation, proper methods of verification, the requirement for periodic exchanges of information, update definitions as new equipment types are deployed, and so forth.⁴

Treaty Analysis

While the amount of equipment and geographic limitations imposed are important, they are still only a technical reflection of the strategic goals that both sides had when the negotiations commenced. The mandate of the CFE Treaty describes the objectives clearly. They include strengthening stability and security in Europe through the creation of balanced conventional forces; establishing lower levels for conventional armaments and equipment; eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and secu-

urity; and, as a priority, precluding the capability for launching surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations.⁵

These conditions are an appropriate mechanism to evaluate whether the United States should continue to participate in the implementation of the accord. Despite the tremendous changes in the world since 1990, the treaty continues to foster the objectives outlined and remains in the best interests of the United States for several reasons. First, the stabilizing limits established mean that no participating signatory can exceed its limits in any category of forces or can increase its CFE-limited arsenal without both the concurrence of the other members in its group and corresponding reductions by one or more states in the group. Consequently, it has reduced the possibility of arms racing throughout the continent. Curiously, while this may be most important in troubled areas in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) such as the Russian Federation and Ukraine, it also provides Hungary the means to prohibit the expansion of the Rumanian military and gives Turkey a mechanism to limit Greece.⁶

Second, the treaty enhances conventional deterrence by expanding the "transparency" that states have with each other's military forces and reducing the possibility of accidental conflict. Deterrence is further advanced by the asymmetrical nature of the reductions that requires NATO (in the aggregate) to reduce only a fraction of the amount required of the former members of the Warsaw Pact. The results are balanced forces between the two "groups of states parties."

Third, the treaty requires notification of any change in the size and character of the military forces of the participants and an annual exchange of information. Fourth, the strict inspection and verification regime ensures compliance. This, coupled with information exchanges, provides all members a great deal of predictability in forecasting the military forces of their neighbors.

Last, while requiring all sides to live up to stringent requirements, the treaty also establishes a clear momentum in the process that

may bear fruit in other areas. In attempting to calculate the value of CFE for the United States, it is also important to remember that the United States successfully protected certain operational objectives during the negotiations. These included the maintenance of alliance unity, exclusion of nuclear weapons or naval forces from the discussions, preservation of American rights to store prepositioned materiel in Europe, avoidance of the mandatory disbandment of withdrawn US forces, or any permanent limitations on the overall size of US forces. These advantages have not been compromised by events since and may be even more important today. In summary, the treaty appeals to the enlightened self-interest of the United States as well as its alliance partners.

Implementation

Implementation of the treaty has progressed surprisingly well. The verification regime established targets for states to achieve during the 40 months outlined for implementation. The lengthy period of implementation is due to the overwhelming complexity of the treaty and the monumental task of either removing or destroying a vast array of equipment—roughly 32,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) for the Warsaw Pact and 16,000 for NATO. The initial target (September 1993) required each state to meet 25 percent of its required reduction as it moved toward its respective allocation for each type of equipment. Goals of 60 percent by September 1994 and 100 percent by November 1995 were also established. The flank limitations go into effect in 1995 as well. At that time, four months is allocated for verifying residual force levels. When that is accomplished, a review conference of all signatories will be convened to discuss difficulties, possible changes to the treaty, and potential future agreements.

It is perhaps axiomatic for successful arms control agreements that they receive their most intense public scrutiny during the negotiations with little attention being paid

to the implementation process. If that is true, CFE has been very effective to date with little to no fanfare. All participants with the exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan (due to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh) reached their initial reduction goal in September 1993 and appear to have also done so in 1994. Overall, roughly 18,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment have been destroyed in the former Warsaw Pact. The Russian Federation alone has disposed of over 6,000 items. None of the inspections of this process to date has revealed discrepancies of a significance to suggest circumvention or violation of treaty provisions.

The process of implementation has also changed to meet the evolving international conditions in Europe, and this has presented NATO with opportunities as well as difficulties. The preamble of the treaty includes a clause that commits the signatories to strive "to replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations based on peaceful cooperation."⁷ Though the agreement is very specific in its technical content, it does not provide any description about how these new "patterns" are to be accomplished. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Committee (NACC), which includes all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO, was done in some measure to adjust the security environment in light of the demise of the Warsaw Pact. This has resulted in an increase in the flow of information and ideas on the conduct of implementation, including seminars on verification run by NATO for NACC members, attendance by Eastern European officers at the NATO arms control inspection course, and access to NATO's verification database (VERITY), which now provides on-line access to many capitals in the former Warsaw Pact. These new contacts have been formalized as NATO's Enhanced Cooperation Program.⁸ In addition, the creation of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) may expand these possibilities into such things as the participation of non-NATO participants on Western inspections as a PfP "event." It may also al-

low nonsignatories to the CFE Treaty (e.g., Slovenia) who have joined PfP to participate.

Difficulties have arisen, however, in the desire of the former members of the Warsaw Pact to conduct CFE inspections of their former allies to ensure compliance with treaty reductions. These so-called East-on-East inspections demonstrate the emerging security concerns of Central European countries, but they also reduce the total number of NATO inspections of those states in the East of particular interest (i.e., the Russian Federation and the Ukraine).

The Problem of the Flanks

Despite the optimism generated by the obvious progress, serious difficulties have arisen that may imperil final implementation of the CFE accord. The most serious of these is the request by the Russian Federation to be relieved of the Article V limitation on the amount of TLE that can be located in the flank areas of their country (consisting of the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts). US officials were first made aware of these concerns in early 1993.⁹

Gen Pavel Grachev (Russian defense minister), returning from an inspection tour of military units in the Transcaucasus, stated that the "geopolitical situation has changed" since the treaty had gone into effect and that Russia "now finds it necessary to reconsider the armed quotas envisioned by the [CFE] accords." Later Grachev's press office reported that a Defense Ministry collegium had discussed the pressing problem of CFE quotas and "expressed concern" that CFE limitations were forcing Russia to distribute arms in the European part of the country "without taking account of security interests."¹⁰

Curiously, the problem of the flanks was formally presented to the JCG by Ukrainian ambassador Kostenko on 14 September 1993. Ambassador Yu. V. Kostenko pointed out that the flank limits placed on the Ukraine were "completely unjustified at the present time." He further noted that this would

force the Ukraine to ensure the defense of one-quarter of its territory (see fig. 1) with only 17 percent of its available tanks, 7 percent of its ACVs, and 22 percent of its artillery.¹¹ This was quickly followed by a rather abrupt letter from Russian president Boris Yeltsin to all NATO leaders requesting the re-

The view that Russia is threatened by future external threats and ongoing strife on its borders . . . is reflected in its new military doctrine.

moval of ART. V of the treaty that describes the flank limitations. Yeltsin noted the drastic changes that had occurred in the political situation on the continent, the increased turmoil along Russia's borders, as well as the complex economic and social problems the Russian Federation was suffering in the redeployment of massive numbers of troops from Eastern Europe as his principal rationale. Yeltsin also observed that the two districts constrained by ART. V (Leningrad and North Caucasus) comprise over half the territory of European Russia, and that the restraints imposed were discriminatory as they were not imposed in a similar fashion on any Western state. Finally, the president noted that a solution to this problem needed to be reached quickly so that Russia could conduct the redeployment of its forces properly and construct sufficient infrastructure.¹²

Overall the rationale presented by Russian spokesmen in the JCG and elsewhere has been fairly consistent and revolves around their perception of Russian national security interests. The Russian leadership has presented essentially seven arguments in its analysis. First, the drastically changed political environment in the world makes the basis for the treaty and its bloc-to-bloc character no longer valid. In this regard, the treaty unfairly discriminates against Russia




Figure 1. Russia's CFE Article V Limitations

by placing internal restrictions with respect to where forces may be positioned on its territory. Second, the new Russian military doctrine that has received official governmental and parliamentary approval requires a more all-around balanced military defense.¹³ Third, the logic of the flanks has changed. Whereas previously the North Caucasus Military District was considered a rear area, it is now a border district.¹⁴ Consequently, it is illogical to expect that the deployment of only 15 percent of Russian

forces is adequate in an area (the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts) that is over half of European Russia. Fourth, the rising threat to stability, particularly due to Muslim fundamentalism in the southern area, is the greatest challenge to Russian security and requires a significant deployment of Russian forces to the North Caucasus. Fifth, the North Caucasus is better suited to station forces returning to Russia due to its climate as well as economic and social reasons. For example, there already exists some

of the necessary infrastructure for returning forces in this region. Sixth, changes to the treaty do not represent a precedent as it has evolved over the intervening years. Russian spokesmen normally cite the example of the Baltic states, who left the treaty upon achieving their independence as well as the addition of new states (i.e., the former members of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).¹⁵ Finally, several Russian spokesmen have privately suggested that while the Russian government strongly supports the treaty, its key elements remain the reductions and associated inspections. Despite this fact, they argue that the treaty is not well regarded by many members of the military.¹⁶ Russian leaders have also been quick to point out that they sought no increase in the total allocation of TLE under the CFE accord but rather simply the removal of the flank restrictions.

Russian experts have suggested several solutions to this problem. Initially, proposals focused exclusively on the total suspension of ART. V. Alternatively, the suggestion has been made to remove the North Caucasus from the flanks and recategorize it as a "rear district," which would change the map associated with the treaty. This was coupled with vague assurances about the level of forces in the Leningrad Military District, no "overconcentration of forces" in the North Caucasus, the right under the treaty to station large quantities of equipment in Kaliningrad would not be abused, and the implementation of these changes would not "prejudice the security of any State Party to the Treaty."¹⁷ In February, the Russian Federation added additional ideas that attempted to avoid any interpretation of a "change" in the treaty but rather a "reinterpretation" of key portions. This included the exemption of naval infantry and coastal defense forces from flank limits since this was a declaration by the Soviet Union. Consequently, some Russian officials have argued that it should be considered an addition to the treaty but not an integral part of the text. They further suggested that the authorization to remove equipment

from designated storage that was allowed in the treaty as a total for each "group of states" be reinterpreted to mean that "each state party" had this allowance. This would be coupled with the right to "temporary deployments."¹⁸ Most recently, Russian spokesmen have suggested that the time period for returning TLE to storage sites (established as 42 days in ART. X) should be considered a "recommendation."¹⁹

While the particular "remedy" has changed over time, all suggestions still appear to be viable from the Russian perspective. Furthermore, the argument and objective seem to be the same. Russian authorities seek to increase TLE in active forces (particularly those stationed in the North Caucasus region) and establish as a precedent that the internal limitations imposed on Russia by the flank requirement are no longer valid and are inconsistent with Russian security.

Flank Limits and the Ukraine

The flank limitations also restrict the deployment of forces within the borders of the Ukraine. This obviously complicates achievement of a solution satisfactory to all parties. The Ukraine has also been adamant since September 1993 that the flank limitations must be reviewed—for many of the same reasons cited by the Russian Federation. Ukrainian officials have observed, for example, that the flank limits only allow them to position 7 percent of their total TLE allocation in a portion of the Odessa Military District, which takes up nearly one-quarter of their entire territory.²⁰

Ukrainian defense experts have argued that their country requires a more balanced distribution of its forces. Implementation of the flank limitations would force them to position the majority of their forces in the Carpathian Military District. This would seem to be in contravention of a stated NATO goal of reducing forward deployed forces and the associated threat of surprise attack.²¹ Obviously, this problem is further

exacerbated by changes brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and emerging problems between Russia and the Ukraine. This includes the disappearance of the Kiev Military District, which was shared with Russia, the presence of Russian forces in eastern Moldova, and emerging Russian nationalism in the Crimea. In addition, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine have yet to settle the final distribution of TLE assigned to the Black Sea fleet (equipment assigned to naval infantry and coastal defense forces).²²

From the Ukrainian perspective, this is an issue of sovereignty as it attempts to establish itself as a midlevel power and not the "spinoff of an old empire." For obvious security reasons, the Ukrainians are also somewhat wary of the Russian Federation receiving any relief on the flanks. Finally,

Russia considers its forward defense to begin at the borders of the former Soviet Union and not the Russian Federation.

implementation of the flank limits presents the Ukrainians with a tremendous economic problem. It would require them to abandon infrastructure currently available in the restricted area and construct new facilities in the Carpathian Military District and Northern Odessa that they simply cannot afford based on their severe economic difficulties.²³

The Ukrainians have concluded that the simplest solution is to exempt the naval infantry and coastal defense forces from the sublimits established by the flank limitations, while retaining the rule that they would count against overall national totals. While this might have the desired effect, it is unclear how this could be done in light of the continuing impasse between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation over the Black Sea fleet. Consequently, an exemption on

naval infantry and coastal defense forces for the Ukraine would require that a similar accommodation be offered to the Russian Federation.

While there is no doubt that this seeming impasse over the flanks is a threat to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty, the manner in which it has unfolded does contain some positive aspects. It appears that all efforts by the parties involved (particularly Russia and the Ukraine) have been overt. Even the construction of infrastructure that may lead to forces in excess of the flank limitations has been reported publicly. There has been no attempt to disguise or hide the problem and the difficulties associated with it. All parties have used the Joint Consultative Group to air the issues. As a result, the procedures established in the treaty have been working, but one can still question whether this forum is sufficient to resolve the conflict. Last, the Russian military has been "out in front" on the issue in military-to-military contacts.

NATO's Position

The public response of NATO members has emphasized the position that the CFE Treaty is the "cornerstone of European security." Consequently, it cannot be renegotiated and to do so would establish a bad precedent for other arms control forums. This includes not only the basic text of the treaty but also all related documents, protocols, and declarations. Furthermore, the Russian Federation freely accepted the treaty as negotiated to include the agreements with the former members of the Warsaw Pact and declarations by the Soviet Union prior to its demise. Any alteration to these documents (such as those proposed) cannot occur until the review conference, which will occur following full implementation in the spring of 1996. Last, Russia has not sufficiently explained the analysis of new threats to its frontiers that substantiates the removal or modification of flank limits.

The West has also suggested that the treaty provides sufficient "flexibility" to meet Russian needs. Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States have observed some possibilities. The first possibility is that Russian troops in the North Caucasus could be "light" forces equipped with equipment that is not limited by the CFE Treaty (e.g., trucks, infantry weapons, small calibre artillery, and certain tracked vehicles that are not part of the ACV category). Such a force would also seem more appropriate to the terrain of the Caucasus as well as the threats of internal instability. The second possibility is that the Russians should recognize that there is no flank limitation for their aircraft (either fixed or rotary wing) which can be rapidly moved from zone to zone to meet any emerging threat. Another possibility is that they could transfer additional ACVs and other tracked vehicles to their internal security forces as allowed in Articles III and XII. ART. XII, for example, allows for up to 1,000 ACVs to be placed with internal security forces. Six hundred of these ACVs may be in the "flank zone." It does not, however, allow for any exemption for the transfer of tanks or artillery to internal security forces. A fourth possibility is that equipment for Russian units in the CFE flank zone could be stored outside the area but close enough for rapid deployment in time of crisis. A fifth possibility is that Russia and the Ukraine might also seek to renegotiate their allocation with the other former members of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova).²⁴

Other members of NATO have shown more or less willingness to compromise within the NATO high-level task force (HLTF). Germany has appeared sensitive to Russian concerns throughout the implementation period and has previously cosponsored proposals with Russia for less costly destruction procedures. The Germans have also suggested that the timetable for equipment destruction might be extended, or that excess equipment not destroyed at the end of the reduction period could be placed tem-

porarily at secure storage sites pending final destruction.²⁵

Other NATO countries have been less sympathetic to Russian proposals throughout the implementation process. France, for example, has been uniformly opposed to any concessions to the Russian Federation. The French fear that any concession would result in multiple proposals by other signatories on portions of the treaty they find objectionable, thereby threatening the entire basis of the accord. Turkey and Norway have been the most outspoken opponents to any compromise based on the fact that they border the flank areas.²⁶ These two states echo the doubts of France. Furthermore, Turkey believes that Russia maintains imperialist ambitions in the Caucasus region and is the primary motivator behind hostilities in Georgia as well as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. An increase in Russian forces in the flank area would also reduce the warning time available to Turkey and Norway and thus be counter to their security interests. Finally, these countries argue that a change in the CFE Treaty or its overall demise could open the way for a new European or regional arms race due to new tensions brought about by the end of the cold war. As a result, Turkey has hinted that any concessions on the flank issue could result in an overall Turkish review of continued participation in the accord. Due to the intense feelings by the Turks and the Norwegians, NATO has not yet agreed upon a formal alliance approach to solving this problem.

The Russian Response

In assessing Russian willingness to compromise, it may be useful to examine some additional factors affecting this problem from their perspective. There can be no doubt that this issue serves as a surrogate for broader internal and external problems facing the Russian Federation. It illustrates, for example, the ongoing friction between several players in the Russian "bureaucratic

politics" process. The Russian military was skeptical of the agreement from the very onset and questioned whether or not it had been left with adequate resources to defend the political and territorial integrity of the country.²⁷ But the military is far from a unitary actor. The appointment of General Grachev as Russia's first minister of defense caused resentment among senior officers on the General Staff that has continued. It is likely that many senior Russian officers blame him at least partially for the treaty.²⁸ Grachev has also had serious disagreements with General Nikolayev, head of interior security forces, over resources, the potential transfer of army assets to border troops, and major military exercises.²⁹ Consequently, the Ministry of Defense has continually rejected the transfer of ACVs to the Internal Security Forces as a partial solution to the flank impasse. There have also been differences between the military, Foreign Ministry, and the Office of the President over such issues as Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace.³⁰ Finally, several political parties during the 1993 elections advocated Russian rejection of CFE as well as the strategic arms reduction talks (START) II accord as being contrary to Russian national security.

All these tensions have led some to suggest that civil authorities may be losing control of the military³¹ and, consequently, may not be able to force a compromise on their own armed forces. The recent invasion of Chechnya by the Russian Federation and the bloody struggle to maintain this province in the federation is further evidence of this growing problem of civil-military relations. It is also likely that Russia will wish to maintain a large occupation force in Chechnya (which is in the flank zone) or may even be involved in extended hostilities in the region. Either of these possibilities make it even more unlikely that the Russian Federation will ultimately accept the flank limits.

The attitudes of the various factions in the Russian foreign policy establishment are unlikely to slacken and may in fact harden as the deadline for final implementation approaches. For example, it may be difficult

for President Yeltsin to compromise on this issue and risk being perceived as weak before the Russian presidential elections in June 1996. It should also be understood that this is viewed as a "military" problem to the Russian Federation while in many ways it is a "political" problem for the United States. Russian critics of the treaty, while describing the "flank issue" as discriminatory, have pointed out repeatedly how the treaty has placed the Russian Federation in an overall position of inferiority. Many argue that it is part of a concerted effort to "keep Russia down" and is indicative of a lack of willingness on the part of the United States to develop a true "strategic partnership" with Russia.³²

The resolution of this problem is tied not only to Russia's relations with the West but also to its future relations with the former members of the CIS and its perceived responsibilities toward the so-called "near abroad" (Russian citizens living outside the borders of the federation). In addition, the view that Russia is threatened by future external threats and ongoing strife on its borders (particularly in the Caucasus) is reflected in its new military doctrine. This document suggests that priority must go to the restoration and expansion of a mutually advantageous relationship between Russia and the other members of the CIS to meet these challenges. Furthermore, Russia proceeds from the fact that its security is indivisible from the security of the other members of the CIS.³³ In other words, Russia considers its forward defense to begin at the borders of the former Soviet Union and *not* the Russian Federation. Consequently, Russian military planners believe that they must position additional forces on the territory of these states (Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia, for example) and along their borders with them.

As a result, Russian leaders argue that the Russian Federation, working within the authority of the CIS, should have the primary responsibility for peacekeeping operations within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev

initially broached this issue in a speech given to the United Nations (UN) on 2 September 1993. Kozyrev sought recognition and financial support for Russian peacekeeping operations in the "near abroad."³⁴ General Grachev also raised this issue in discussions with Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali.

Grachev also asserted that forces assigned to peacekeeping operations and their authorized armaments should not count toward the maximum permissible levels under the CFE Treaty. Otherwise, a difficult situation would arise in units trained for peacekeeping such as the 45th Motorized Rifle Division (based in the Leningrad Military District) could not be replaced while operating in Tajikistan or elsewhere in the CIS.³⁵ This idea was reiterated by President Yeltsin during his address to the UN and subsequent summit with President Bill Clinton. Yeltsin asserted that Russia has similar rights to that of the United States in quelling disturbances on its borders. He also added that "the main peacekeeping burden in the territory of the former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian Federation."³⁶

In the summer of 1994, Russian peace-making troops deployed to the Georgian-Abkhazian border.³⁷ Some reports suggest that Russia may eventually have over two divisions deployed to Georgia. The status-of-forces agreement between the two countries allows basing facilities for two divisions, the presence of Russian border guards on the Georgian-Turkish border, use of Georgian airspace by Russian military aircraft, access to all telecommunications facilities, joint operations of all training facilities, and a lease to the Poti Naval Base for the Russian Black Sea fleet. A similar arrangement has been achieved with Armenia with the possibility of one Russian division on its territory. Moldova also has the Russian Fourteenth Army (roughly 9,000 troops) performing "peacemaking," and pressure is being placed on Azerbaijan to accept additional Russian "peacemakers." In summary, a combination of Russian foreign policy and a reluctance on the part of other UN members

to become involved in peacekeeping along the southern border of the Russian Federation may offer the Russian military an additional argument for exceeding their flank authorizations.

Conclusions

As the treaty approaches its last year of the implementation process, it seems increasingly clear that some solution to this impasse must be found. Any solution must include aspects of classical arms control theory as well as confront the difficulties inherent in a multilateral agreement and the impact of domestic pressures. While the technical details may differ and the degree to which the Russian Federation is willing to compromise is unclear, certain key factors are evident. First, NATO needs to decide precisely what it means by the phrase "within the flexibility allowed in the treaty." This is fundamental to maintaining a united front in the negotiations and will avoid an interpretation by the Russian Federation that NATO cannot accept. It also avoids any possibility of a take-it-or-leave-it confrontation in November 1995, as Russian objectives could be to meet the overall national levels with enough ambiguity so as to argue compliance. In determining an acceptable level of "flexibility," the alliance should also consider what additional guarantees the Russian Federation could offer the states most affected—Turkey and Norway. This could include such things as Russian assistance in the settlement of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, buffer zones, or additional inspection allocations for these areas. Some combination of these or other proposals might serve to reduce the threat of surprise attack to these two states.

Second, all alliance members (especially the United States) need to avoid any appearance of this issue becoming bilateral between their country and the Russian Federation. Russian tactics in the negotiations seem focused on emphasizing its "stra-

tegic partnership" with the United States and other attempts to split the alliance depending on the type of proposal presented or assurances offered. NATO members need to be aware of the stress that these negotiations place on the alliance.

Third, every effort must be made to frame the result in a fashion that avoids any renegotiation of the treaty. At this stage, the JCG must remain the forum for finding a compromise. The treaty does allow for the calling of an "extraordinary" conference, but this is unwise for two reasons. First, it could easily become a protracted negotiation and offer other states the opportunity to contest provisions they find difficult. Second, any alteration of the treaty by such a conference would likely require each state to ratify the accord again. This might also imperil the treaty. Consequently, a dichotomy exists as all members realize that the European security landscape has changed significantly since 1991, but to reopen the negotiations on this treaty would either doom it to failure or at least to a significant period of discussion.

Fourth, NATO members need to quietly but firmly remind the Russian Federation of the severe penalties associated with noncompliance in this forum and others. Arms control cannot occur in isolation, and success (or failure) in one area affects other forums. The Russian Federation could lose substantial aid (particularly due to the congressional requirement to certify treaty compliance) and its entry into the G-7 (the group comprising the seven most industrialized nations of the world) by flagrantly violating the accord.

Fifth, a solution must be found to the problem of Ukraine, and it may differ from the overall settlement. The future of Central Europe may well be defined by the relationship established between Ukraine and Russia. From a strict security perspective, the Ukrainian problem is more persuasive than the difficulties of the Russian Federation. The severe economic deprivations occurring in Ukraine add credence to the statements of Ukrainian leaders that they will be unable to comply due to financial limitations.

Finally, NATO members must have no illusions. The problem cannot be "wished away." The prospects for a last-minute compromise or change in Russian attitudes is unlikely, particularly in light of the recent hostilities in Chechnya and elsewhere in the flank area. It is certainly conceivable that the Russian Federation might declare itself fully in compliance with the treaty in November 1995 and challenge the West to argue that interpretation. This would place renewed strain on NATO and make a compromise extremely difficult politically, given the impending Russian parliamentary elections in December 1995 plus presidential elections in Russia and the United States in 1996.

As we consider what role conventional arms control should have in future US national security strategy, it is essential to remember that it remains a means to an end. It is also important to maintain a short- and longer-term perspective. In the near term, the final implementation of CFE is *not* assured and will *not* occur without concerted action by the United States. The failure of this agreement will adversely affect both future European security and the prospects for conventional arms control elsewhere. For the more distant future, we must remember that arms control remains a "means" to the ultimate goal of enhanced national security.

Our arms control policies have a tremendous resonance in broader areas having to do with the future of the US-European relationship. As a result, answers to wider questions may well serve as a guide to arms control policies. Does the United States wish to continue its role as the leader of NATO, with that alliance being the premier security organization on the continent? What is the US policy towards the assertion by the Russian Federation of a preeminent role in the security affairs of the former members of the Soviet Union? While these are questions of tremendous complexity, it is still necessary to remember that seemingly "tactical choices" now in CFE may define their ultimate answers.

The United States and its NATO partners

won a tremendous victory in the cold war through their policies and perseverance. Having achieved this peace, it remains to be seen how we build on this cornerstone to

achieve a secure and lasting peace in Europe and refocus our efforts for the next millennium. □


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NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY AND AIRPOWER

A Winning Combination for Strategic Paralysis*

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It is the year 2001, and industrialized country X is preparing to invade an ally of the United States. Honoring a previously signed alliance, the US contemplates military action against X and chooses a course of action designed to convince X not to invade our ally's territory. Prior to the establishment of a new government in X in 1999, X was an ally of the US. A strong feeling exists that if we could impose strategic paralysis on X by disrupting the connection between command structures and military forces, the regime would delay or cancel its decision to invade and return to normal relations with us. The challenge lies in achieving strategic paralysis without harming X's population, infrastructure, or fielded military forces. Harming X's population or infrastructure would create negative feelings and hinder the reestablishment of normal relations. US public opinion will not tolerate excessive loss of life on either side, and if infrastructure were destroyed, rebuilding fol-



lowing the conflict would be costly and time-consuming. What can the US military use in its current arsenal to help accomplish the objective within these constraints? Precision guided munitions (PGM) could cause strategic paralysis but would still result in costly destruction, possible collateral damage, and—very likely—unintentional loss of life. What if a new type of weapon could impose strategic paralysis on X without destroying its infrastructure or causing unintentional loss of life? Such a weapon does in fact exist—it is called nonlethal technology.

*This article is an excerpt from a 1993 Air Command and Staff College research project authored by Maj Biltim Chingono (Zimbabwe air force) and Maj Terry L. Carpenter; Chaplain, Maj Jeffrey A. Dull; Maj Michael S. Kalna; Maj Jim H. Keffer; Maj Jonathan W. Klaaren; and Maj Ronald S. Mitchell (all of the United States Air Force).

As the twentieth century comes to a close, the US military finds itself evaluating and modifying its cold war structure to meet a new, unstable, dangerous, and frequently violent international political environment. A large part of this evaluation consists of balancing a rapidly declining military budget and force structure against increased involvement in regional conflicts. We need a new vision—one that breaks down old military doctrine and strategy and replaces it with new ideas and technology. Looking toward the twenty-first century and the future of regional conflicts, we in the military must consider nonlethal warfare in our future campaign planning instead of simply dismissing the term as an oxymoron. We must clearly state that we do not consider nonlethal warfare a panacea or a means to an end—in and of itself. Instead, our focus should be that the services must provide war-fighting commanders with the best possible options to meet the strategic objectives they are given by the national command authorities (NCA).

Therefore, nonlethal technology must be considered one of many very effective tools that war fighters can use to meet their objectives. In the very near future, it will become clear that nonlethal methods have applicability across the entire spectrum of conflict, including crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and total war. Given our recent involvement in numerous regional conflicts and the growing potential of future involvement, it is fitting that we address nonlethal warfare in terms of what it can do to paralyze an enemy who supports regional conflict. Our position is that future conflicts will demand the use of nonlethal warfare, which can be applied at the strategic level to cause paralysis within the enemy state. Further, we contend that aerospace platforms can provide an effective method for the employment of nonlethal weapons.

The term *nonlethal warfare* sparks a wide range of emotions, particularly among military professionals. Although nonlethal weapons have been used sporadically throughout history, the concept of nonlethality as a new category of warfare is in

its infancy. The Department of Defense (DOD) is studying this new concept but at much too slow a pace. We need a spark—a thought-provoking, legitimate demonstration of the logical use of this new and controversial idea. This is our intent—to ignite the interest of military professionals to study nonlethal warfare and to include it in the planning process. In particular, we discuss the use of nonlethal warfare as one method of imposing strategic paralysis in order to prevent or—if necessary—support future conflict. We provide a definition of nonlethal warfare that we used throughout our research and briefly explain the types and capabilities of nonlethal technology. We address strategic analysis and strategic paralysis through the use of parallel warfare. Following a discussion of nonlethal employment, we provide justification for its immediate development. The article concludes by addressing future challenges and areas that need further research.

Nonlethal Warfare—What Is It?

Our research has clearly shown that although the term *nonlethal warfare* has many definitions, the types, capabilities, and potential applications of nonlethal technology are limited only by the imagination of the developer. Dr John Alexander of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico defines nonlethal warfare as the application of technology that allows force to be projected while minimizing the potential for lethal consequence. This force is projected with weapons that disrupt, incapacitate, or otherwise degrade the functioning of targets without unintentionally crossing the "death barrier." Nonlethal warfare allows commanders to control people and situations in which the application of lethal force is undesirable. Some attributes of nonlethal warfare are (1) expanded options for war-fighting commanders, (2) controlled levels of physi-

cal damage, (3) no unintentional loss of life, and (4) achievement of strategic paralysis.¹

We recognize that even with these goals, nothing can be purely nonlethal in every case. Although the term *nonlethal warfare*

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may change and despite the fact that a definition is not universally agreed upon, the concept will most certainly take on increasing importance in future conflicts. Of the multitude of types and capabilities of nonlethal weapons under study, many are classified and in various stages of development.

Nonlethal warfare is not new—it has been around for centuries. Numerous past conflicts provide good examples of the use of nonlethal weapons. Recently, Operation Desert Storm included a variety of applications (such as the use of carbon fibers to degrade the Iraqi electrical power system)² that demonstrated the potential benefits of using nonlethal technology in warfare. The effectiveness of nonlethal weaponry in historical examples, including Desert Storm, shows that nonlethal warfare is, in reality, already a part of our arsenal. Modern advances in technology have given rise to a wide variety of types and capabilities of nonlethal technology. Promising areas for development of future nonlethal applications are abundant. Especially promising are advances being made in artificial intelligence, microelectromechanical devices, information sciences, biomedical sciences, and a host of other emerging technologies. Table 1 provides an

overview of types, examples, and capabilities of nonlethal weapons.

Nonlethal Warfare for Strategic Paralysis

All the US military services are presently working on numerous types of current and emerging nonlethal capabilities that can be used for nonlethal warfare. However, what is lacking—and should be established immediately—is an appropriate, broad-based joint concept that considers nonlethal warfare as a means of delaying or defeating a potential enemy at the strategic level. Once this concept is developed, the services can pursue a coordinated research, development, and acquisition program on nonlethal warfare that meets the needs of the concept. Such an approach could produce strategies of nonlethal warfare that the US could employ in a coordinated and synergistic fashion to cause paralysis within an enemy system. This paralysis could prevent a state from conducting aggressive actions, stop a war from occurring, or significantly weaken the enemy's strategic war-fighting capabilities and allow time for deployment of conventional forces. Unfortunately, DOD is "putting the cart before the horse." The services are developing their own capabilities (primarily tactical) and giving little thought to integrating the capabilities of nonlethal warfare into a coordinated employment strategy that can strategically defeat an enemy. We must develop and employ a strategy of nonlethal warfare, basing it on an approach that maximizes the services' combined effectiveness in defeating an enemy. But where do we go from here?

A successful strategy of nonlethal warfare requires a comprehensive understanding of the enemy's strategic, operational, and tactical makeup and of the interrelationships among these elements. From this understanding, one can deduce the enemy's centers of gravity and, if appropriate, target them with a nonlethal strategy involving a

Table 1

Selected Types, Examples, and Capabilities of Nonlethal Weaponry

Type	Examples	Capabilities
Acoustic	Pulsed/attenuated high-intensity sound Infrasound (very low frequency [VLF]) Polysound (high volume, distracting) Acoustic stun grenades	Incapacitates people and equipment Incapacitates people Incapacitates people Incapacitate people
Biological	Biodegrading organisms (microbes) Disease organisms (nonfatal) Arthropods (biting, disease transmitting) Bioengineering (genetic engineering) Pheromones (behavior affecting)	Disable systems Deter/incapacitate people Deter/incapacitate people and systems Disables living systems Deny use of/disable systems
Chemical	Antiriot agents (tear gas, Mace, pepper sprays) Psychotropics (tranquilizers, calmatives, etc.) Smell/odor/quality alterers (water, air) Corrosives (supercaustics, embrittlers) Antitraction technologies (superlubricants) Adhesives (superglues, sticky compounds) Combustion-inhibiting technology	Incapacitate people Modify behavior/incapacitate people Incapacitate people/disable systems Degrade key metals and materials Disable vehicles Disable vehicles and equipment Disables combustion engines
Electromagnetic	Electrical interferors (power effects, pulses) Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) Electric shock (stunners, tasers) High-power microwave (HPM)	Degrade/destroy equipment and systems Degrades/destroys equipment and systems Incapacitates people Deters/incapacitates people and equipment
Environmental	Weather alterers (rain, drought, fog) Emulsifiers (augment weather)	Degrade/disrupt operations Disrupt lines of communication
Informational	Media campaigns (news, opinion) Public laws (international, national)	Disable/disrupt human systems Deter/degrade systems
Mechanical	Binding agents (fibers, polymers) Entanglers (foul propellers, rotors, vehicles) Barriers (line of sight/travel) Soft forces (water cannons, air cannons)	Incapacitate people/disable systems Disable moving parts Disrupt communications Incapacitate people
Optical	Lasers (laser rifles) Pulsed chemical lasers (airborne lasers) High-intensity pulses (flash grenades)	Deter people/disable equipment Disable/destroy equipment Disable people, equipment
Sociological	Economic (counterfeit currency, key systems) Political (discredits officials) Psychological operations (PSYOPS)	Disables financial systems Disrupts diplomatic systems Incapacitate/deter people
Technological	Computer viruses (timed, keyed, coded) Microdevices (microelectromechanical systems) Unmanned aerospace vehicles (drones, remotely piloted vehicles [RPV])	Disable computer systems Disable/disrupt systems Disable systems/protect crews

Sources: Ken C. York, Scott Gourley, and Seth Arenstein, "Non-Lethal Weapons Offer New SO/LIC Capabilities," *Tactical Technology*, 3 February 1993, 1-5; *Low Collateral Damage Munitions (LCDM) Programs* (Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.: US Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, 23 September 1992), 1-4; John Barry and Tom Morganthau, "Soon, 'Phasers on Stun,'" *Newsweek*, 7 February 1994, 24-26; Joseph F. Coates, *Nonlethal and Nondestructive Combat in Cities Overseas* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analyses, Science and Technology Division, 1970); Alan W. Debban, "Disabling Technologies and Applications," HQ USAF/XOXT background paper, 22 February 1993; Herbert H. Dobbs et al., *Assessment of Mission Kill Concept, Requirements, and Technologies* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, September 1990); Paul R. Evancoe, "Non-lethal Technologies Enhance Warrior's Punch," *National Defense* 78, no. 493 (December 1993): 26-29; and Abraham Tannenbaum and Angela M. Moore, "Non-lethal Weapons: Alternatives to Deadly Force," *The Futurist*, September-October 1993, 20-23.

series of parallel attacks (simultaneous offensive attacks on many of the enemy's critical centers of gravity) to paralyze the enemy state.

Although nonlethal warfare can be applied to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, application at the strategic level is most effective in achieving national security objectives. The key is a strategy of nonlethal warfare that gets inside the adversary's strategic decision-making cycle and targets crucial centers of gravity to reduce or eliminate the state's capabilities to prepare for and effectively conduct war. Armed with this understanding, planners can develop a strategy that uses strategic paralysis and parallel attack to deter or defeat a potential enemy or enemies at minimum cost in casualties, manpower, and money.

Combining the concept of strategic paralysis and parallel attack in a strategy of nonlethal warfare could provide a much more flexible, less costly, and less destructive option for the NCA. This strategy would allow for the employment of nonlethal warfare options prior to a war, with the aim of reducing or paralyzing the enemy's war-fighting capability and forcing the leadership to call off plans to wage war. If war did occur, then the options employed earlier would have weakened the enemy's war-fighting potential so that the conflict would be shorter and therefore less costly in terms of people and budgets. Additionally, the use of nonlethal weapons at the operational and tactical levels would complement the use of conventional weapons. The possibility of "fighting" a nonlethal war and forcing a belligerent to change his decision to go to war is attainable only if civilian and military leaders seriously consider the development of a strategy of nonlethal warfare and the collateral challenge of applying it to achieve victory.

Employment of Nonlethal Technology

How would we employ this nonlethal technology? We should use it early in a

conflict and in such a way that targeted leaders are unaware of its application. The objective of this strategy would be to disrupt leadership to such an extent that it would reconsider going to war. Innovative weapons and approaches for conducting these types of operations offer opportunities to apply the military instrument of power and stop a potential outbreak of war. By using technology to get into the enemy's networks, we could use electronic bullets from a remote site to destroy specific components of the regime's command and control equipment. Nonlethal weapons for attacking electricity already exist in the US arsenal. Also at our disposal are microbes or chemicals that alter petroleum products, rendering them useless. One can effectively disrupt most of a nation's transportation system through nonlethal means. Airpower could drop microbes or chemical agents on roads and airports to ruin them or to damage the rubber tires of vehicles that use the roads. We could drop different agents or caustics on rail lines to deteriorate the lines or to prevent train cars from generating the friction they need to move. We could also affect the economic infrastructure by infiltrating the state's electronic financial network and causing general economic chaos among the government and its people.

Nonlethal attacks against the governmental-political infrastructure could concentrate on a campaign to discredit leadership. An information blockade against a developed state would prove disastrous in the short term and worsen with time. A state's population is the most powerful force within any state. Therefore, influencing population to accept peaceful objectives should be a key focus for any strategy of nonlethal warfare. Media manipulation is an especially effective nonlethal method of influencing population. We could use the capabilities of nonlethal warfare—especially audio and video synthesis—against a state's media to alter messages from leaders. These are but a few examples of employing nonlethal technology at the strategic level. The bottom line is obvious: nonlethal warfare, espe-

cially at the strategic level, may prevent a state from continuing its attempt to achieve unacceptable objectives prior to war.

Nonlethal employment requires us not only to think toward the future in terms of development, but also to match existing capabilities with nonlethal requirements. Specifically, we must address intelligence and delivery systems up front to ensure initial success when we employ nonlethal technology.

Intelligence requirements for nonlethal warfare include accuracy across all intelligence disciplines. We must address such requirements at the same time we develop nonlethal weapons. We must have appropriate sensors to provide "targeting" data to the nonlethal weapon and to assess the effect of its employment. This intelligence will be a critical factor in enabling delivery systems for nonlethal weapons to attack the right mix of targets.

Virtually every weapon system in the current military inventory is capable of delivering nonlethal weapons. Even currently lethal offensive systems such as the F-15E Strike Eagle or the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile can be considered nonlethal if they are used in operations that minimize casualties. Therefore, the central question in selecting a delivery platform for nonlethal warfare is not the type of platform it is but what types of weapons it carries and how those weapons affect the target. Simply stated, the best delivery platforms— aerospace platforms—already exist in the US arsenal.

The inherent strengths of aerospace power make its platforms the delivery method of choice for employing nonlethal technology. The flexibility of airpower allows for a tailored, quick, and appropriate response using long-range missiles, aircraft, and space-based systems to achieve national objectives. Nonlethal delivery platforms of the future would need to incorporate stealth—including not only aircraft and missiles but also space-based systems. In the long term, perhaps the nonlethal war fighter would be capable of firing an electronic bullet from a computer terminal in the Penta-

gon to destroy a belligerent's computer or electrical grid on the other side of the world. In the short term—and for selected nonlethal weapons—aerospace forces will continue to be the dominant delivery platforms.

Justification for Employing Nonlethal Technology

Any research on a new idea in this time of change and austere funding must include justification for its employment. The character of war is changing and is being shaped by such external factors as the spiraling cost of defense, public opinion, the media, and dual-use technology. Nonlethal warfare is one way—and at this moment is the most promising way—to satisfy these constraints. The cost of fielding a military in today's world is an important issue. Shrinking defense budgets will prohibit us from acquiring all of the weapon systems required to perform our future mission. With fewer

We must develop and employ a strategy of nonlethal warfare, basing it on an approach that maximizes the services' combined effectiveness in defeating an enemy. But where do we go from here?

weapon systems, fewer troops, and a reduced training budget, we will need to drastically alter the way we fight a war. Nonlethal warfare is the force multiplier necessary to fill the gap caused by downsizing; at the same time, it provides us with a method for strategically paralyzing an enemy system. We also take into consideration the effectiveness of nonlethal technology in controlling the total cost of prosecuting a future war by ad-

dressing three major areas: (1) the cost of deploying forces to the theater of operations, (2) the cost of all personnel employed and materiel used during the course of the war, and (3) the cost of rebuilding the enemy's infrastructure. In all these areas, nonlethal technology affords cost-effective alternatives.

In addition to cost considerations, several other factors justify the incorporation of nonlethal weapons into our military arsenal: public opinion, the media, and dual-use technology. Public opinion shapes the decisions of America's leadership regarding armed conflict. Because nonlethal warfare limits bloodshed, it will be endorsed by the American public as a positive approach for conducting future wars. In an age of instant communication, capabilities available to the media have an increasingly important impact on military operations. The media serves as a conduit of information—not only to the American public, but also to the rest of the world. We need to eliminate the notoriety associated with war. If we use nonlethal technology to achieve paralysis, eliminate unintentional killing, and erase signs of visible destruction, then perhaps in some situations we can rid the news of sensationalism. Without a riveting story to tell, the media may be silenced. One last advantage of nonlethal warfare is its applicability to the civilian sector. Developing these weapons with a dual use in mind will greatly assist the efforts of our law enforcement communities. Currently, little is available to law enforcement short of deadly force. A means of safely subduing a suspect without using deadly force would be a significant addition to the war on crime. Such uses of nonlethal weapons are endless. Drug interdiction, border patrols, antiterrorism, and riot control are good examples.

Future Challenges

Although the American military has always preferred clear-cut, war-winning scenarios that lend themselves to current

doctrine and strategy, the reality is that operations short of total war are here to stay. These operations require effective planning and maximum use of resources to obtain objectives as quickly as possible and without high restoration costs. Nonlethal weapons are a form of future technology that meets these requirements. Despite the applicability of nonlethal warfare, many associated challenges need to be addressed in the near future. Issues such as education, push-pull technology, joint operations, vulnerability, moral considerations, and policy will help frame the essence of nonlethal warfare.

With many types of nonlethal weapons already developed, our first priority is to educate potential users on the capabilities of these weapons. Nonlethal proponents are just beginning to spread the word through symposiums, conferences, and workshops. They need to go one step further, however, and conduct an information campaign that introduces the concept of nonlethal warfare to commanders and to requirements organizations of operational commands. Currently, the best method of accomplishing this is to have developers of nonlethal weapons (agencies such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA], military laboratories, and national laboratories) visit the operational commands. We need to stress how these weapons will be force multipliers and how they can work independently or in concert with conventional weapons. We also need to solicit ideas concerning what capabilities these commands envision for the future because such capabilities will drive the development of nonlethal weapons.

How, then, do we accelerate the process to ensure that nonlethal technology is available in the immediate future? The answer lies with the war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC), who establish requirements based on their responsibilities and possible future objectives. CINCs must consider nonlethal warfare in all aspects of their planning processes and must identify those requirements for development that can be employed in the future to expand their war-fighting options. Only when these requirements become clear

can the development of nonlethal technology gain the focus it now needs to meet the requirements of the war fighter.

Certainly in this day of joint operations, it becomes increasingly important that we address nonlethal technology in terms of its applicability to all military services. We must establish an organization within DOD that monitors nonlethal technology and looks carefully at military requirements to ensure that services are not duplicating each other's efforts. This agency must also monitor the critical aspects of defense against nonlethal technology (see below). Additionally, this information center could serve to educate DOD about nonlethal capabilities and make dual-use technology available to the Department of Justice for civilian law enforcement.

If we can develop a good working relationship with the operational commands, we will have the concept of push-pull technology in place. The concept works as follows. First, the laboratories and defense analysis organizations develop the technology and make users aware of its possibilities (pushing the technology). Subsequently, the operational commands must incorporate this new technology into existing or future weapon systems (pulling the technology). Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) already has a system in place to implement this concept. AFMC has a system representative (SYSREP) at each operational command who works directly with the requirements directorate, feeds them information on new technology, and sends the command's future requirements back to AFMC. The command's approach has been very successful in the past and will definitely help move nonlethal technology out of the starting block. Contractors will play a similar role in the development of nonlethal technology. As in the past, these businesses will continue to market their products directly to the requirements organizations of major commands.

Being serious about nonlethal technology means providing incentives for businesses to develop these technologies. The best way to do this is through government-sponsored

programs. In 1993, for example, ARPA provided grant money to regional business alliances. Comprised of civilian-sector businesses and government organizations, these alliances competed for grants to develop new technologies (welding processes, new composite materials, etc.). The scope of this program could be expanded to include nonlethal technology, so long as the educational efforts described previously are successful. Of course, a market for nonlethal technology must exist if a program such as this is to be feasible.

The final challenge is perhaps the most important and most difficult. As the US military develops and uses nonlethal technology, it must ask the question, Is the

Is the United States more vulnerable than any other country in the world to the very technologies it is developing?

United States more vulnerable than any other country in the world to the very technologies it is developing? As we analyze potential enemies as systems, it becomes obvious that we are indeed vulnerable to nonlethal strategic paralysis. Now is the time to consider our vulnerability and build defenses. As technologies are researched, developed, and fielded, they must be accompanied by technology that defends us in case of proliferation. Nonlethal technology cannot always be maintained as a highly classified system that is inaccessible to enemies. In many cases, the first usage of a technology may spark development of that weapon by a potential adversary. Therefore, it is absolutely critical that we discuss defense against nonlethal warfare at great length in the very near future.

In addition, we must address moral and legal issues surrounding nonlethal warfare.

The use of nonlethal weapons presents an important legal dimension, especially as regards the law of armed conflict. This law requires that only objectives of military importance be attacked but permits the use

Technologies of the future will be able to incapacitate humans. If this option is the most efficient way to obtain strategic objectives, should we limit its use?

of sufficient mass to destroy those objectives. At the same time, one must avoid unnecessary and wasteful collateral destruction. Properly employed nonlethal weapons meet these criteria; however, we need more in-depth study to further address the law of armed conflict.

Most of the near-term work with nonlethal weapons will continue to be geared toward antimateriel uses. However, current treaties must be renegotiated to take into account other nonlethal technologies. Certain chemical and biological uses of nonlethal technology may be acceptable, given the nonlethal aspects of their use. Although international agreements currently proscribe the use of chemical or biological warfare in water and food supplies, these agreements came at a time when offensive chemical and biological warfare sought to kill the enemy. New forms of chemicals and microbes would not kill; instead, they would merely have a temporary effect on the population and conceivably could save lives by averting combat. Such weapons would most likely be in chemical or biological form. Chemicals placed in the water could indirectly affect agriculture and population by discoloring the water to make it appear undrinkable, slowing crop growth, or even temporarily altering the mental states of potential enemies. Clearly, we must address the incapacitation

of humans and the moral dilemma that surrounds this emotional issue.

Another controversial issue is the use of mind-altering drugs to influence the population of enemy states. According to Dr Stuart Yudofsky of Baylor University, psychopharmacology (the science of drugs that affect the mind) is on "the brink of revolution."³ Previously, psychopharmacology had concentrated on the development of drugs that modify brain chemistry of mentally ill patients, which led to the development of drugs such as Prozac during the late 1980s. Presently, scientists are studying "normal" brains and determining which chemicals cause certain personality traits. Imminent breakthroughs in this area will lead to the possibility of "made-to-order, off-the-shelf personalities."⁴ Additionally, these new drugs are supposed to have no serious side effects and no addictive properties.⁵ Potentially, psychopharmacology has great application for nonlethal warfare and should be followed closely to ensure that its offensive and defensive potentials are well understood. Although the United States may choose not to pursue mind-altering drugs as a weapon, other states may hold a different view. For that reason, it is imperative that we understand this capability. In short, technologies of the future will be able to incapacitate humans. If this option is the most efficient way to obtain strategic objectives, should we limit its use?

We must also remember that issues of morality and ethics do not begin and end solely with the consideration of target selection. We must look beyond these temporal musings to beg the question of the nonfatal control of other human beings and their societies. What of sovereignty and autonomy—of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as others perceive it? The Soviets feared this very form of nonlethal domination via the Reagan-era threats of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and "star wars" technology.

In 1984, George Orwell's antiutopian classic, "Big Brother" has nonlethal control of society's every thought and action. Con-

trol—not killing—is the moral issue here. The US must increase its pace in the understanding and development of nonlethal technologies in order to avoid falling victim to them. Certainly, the judicious use of these technologies will help curb the senseless loss of life and societal destruction graphically witnessed in two world wars. Just as the development and capabilities of nonlethal technology are limited only by the imagination of the developer, so too are the ethics and morality of its use limited only by the avarice or compassion of its user. Employed with compassion and tempered with concern for the rights of all people, nonlethal technology could stifle despots, paralyze tyrants, and cool hot-tempered governments, thus making them more receptive to open negotiations.

Finally, if we want to make nonlethal warfare a viable part of our military arsenal, we must create a policy for it. Having all of these "high-tech" weapons would be wonderful, but they are worthless without an appropriate policy for their application. A clearly defined policy would give us the authority to specify when and how we would utilize them.

Conclusion

We maintain that future conflicts will demand the use of nonlethal warfare and that aerospace platforms can provide an effective method for the employment of nonlethal weapons. We supplied a definition of nonlethal warfare and explained some of the types available, as well as their capabilities. With nonlethal weapons in mind, we briefly examined strategic analysis of an enemy as a system and discussed the use of these weapons to achieve strategic paralysis. We provided justification for the future development of nonlethal technologies by focusing on the cost-effectiveness of these systems. Finally, we presented some problems and issues associated with nonlethal warfare and defined future challenges for military professionals. Our research for this article was an eye-opening experience for us. But it is only the beginning. We hope it ignites the interest of the military community. Taking a leadership role in the development of nonlethal warfare and planning for its effective use in the future will ensure our position as the world's leading superpower in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. John B. Alexander, Los Alamos National Laboratory, N.M., presentation on nonlethal weapons and limited-force options, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 27 October 1993.

2. David A. Fulgham, "Secret Carbon-Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Air Defenses," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 27 April 1992, 18-20.

3. Sharon Begley, "One Pill Makes You Larger, One Pill Makes You Small . . ." *Newsweek*, 7 February 1994, 37.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF ITS PLACE IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD

DR VLADIMIR SHAMBERG





After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Russia emerged with about one-half of the population, three-quarters of the territory, and the lion's share of the armed forces and nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Russia became the Soviet Union's legal successor, assuming all rights and obligations resulting from the treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union, inheriting its place as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and taking on the responsibility for the foreign debts of the Soviet Union. Russia's political elite thought that such an inheritance would also include the Soviet Union's superpower status but that was not the case.

The new Russia found itself in an international situation drastically different from that of the Soviet Union or the prerevolutionary Russian Empire. In the place of the empire—be it Communist or old Russian—emerged 15 new independent states with Russia the biggest but still smaller than the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire at the time of Peter the Great's death in 1725. With the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, Russia lost its allies in Central and Eastern Europe that provided forward staging areas for the Soviet military might. Transition from the state-owned and centrally planned economy to a privately owned market economy inevitably resulted in a serious decline in production, severe inflation, and a sharp decline in the living standards of the big social groups. The transition from a totalitarian empire to democracy has just started, and the political situation is far from stable. Because of all that, Russia's position in the world is seriously weakened. At the same time, Russia with its geostrategic location, its armed forces and nuclear weaponry, its science and technology, its natural resources, and its highly educated labor force is potentially a first-rate global power. And this contradiction between current weakness and potential greatness determines Russia's position in the post-cold-war world.

In Search of New Relations with the West

From the very beginning, Russia's democratic leadership rejected the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet totalitarian empire and embarked on a search for a new foreign policy. Leaders thought that transition to democracy would make Russia the partner of the United States in world affairs. Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that

partnership is the best strategic choice for Russia and the United States. Rejection of it would mean the loss of a historic opportunity to facilitate the formation of a democratic, open Russian state and the transformation of an unstable, postconfrontational world into a stable and democratic one.¹

Russian leaders began to act in concert with the United States in various international situations, trying to go along with US foreign policy. However, they soon realized that Moscow's interests and positions were not always compatible with those of Washington. The Russian political elite was offended by a number of American foreign policy actions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) plans to admit former Warsaw Pact members into the alliance, strongly resisted by Moscow, were seen as a blatant attempt to isolate Russia and endanger its national security. Members of the Russian political elite greatly resented what they considered to be American interference in the relations between Russia and the newly independent states that were former members of the Soviet Union and American attempts to deny Russia its leading role in the post-Soviet space. The United States's apparent refusal to take into consideration Russia's position in the Balkan conflict was seen as an attempt to deny Russia its proper role in European affairs. Russian national pride was hurt by a number of petty humiliations. For example, the Russian president was not invited to the festivities commemorating the Allies' D day landing in Nor-

mandy, as if the Soviet Union did not play a major role in the war against Hitler's Germany.

All of these actions were a great disappointment for Russian leaders. They gradually began to perceive that Washington was not interested in having Russia as an equal partner, did not want to share with Russia leadership in world affairs, and wanted the United States to be the sole global superpower.

Russian politicians and foreign policy experts began to advocate that Russian foreign policy turn from its orientation towards the West to orientation towards Russia's national interests as guiding principles of the country's foreign policy. The general guiding principles of national interests included the following:

- Preserving political, economic, and military sovereignty of the country.
- Ensuring national security.
- Ensuring territorial integrity and stability of the borders.
- Defending rights, freedoms, dignity, and well-being of its citizens.

To those principles, Russian experts add some specific national interests of today's Russia:

- Creation of a favorable international environment for the implementation of internal reforms and the resurrection of Russia.
- Prevention of Russia's isolation in world politics.
- Vigorous actions against any further decline of Russia's influence in international relations.

Russian foreign policy then began a transition towards orientation on Russia's national interests. In the spring and fall of 1993, documents were published that formulated basic guidelines of this new foreign policy. In these documents and in a number of speeches, Russian officials stressed that orientation on national interests does not mean the return to ideologically oriented ex-

pansionist foreign policy. For example, Gen Pavel Grachev, the defense minister, wrote in a summer 1994 article entitled "Military Doctrine and National Security of Russia":

For the first time, we declared that we will defend not ideology but vital national interests of the country. Russia's national interests do not affect, even in the slightest, the security of other countries and are and will be ensured within the framework of equal and mutually beneficial relations between the states.²

Changes in Russian foreign policy were met with growing suspicions in the West. In many publications, Russia was and is accused of aggressive actions and attempts to dominate former parts of the Soviet Union and to restore the empire. Aggressive statements of ultranationalist politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy reinforced these suspicions. Ultranationalists were not the only ones who contributed to that. The emerging orientation of Russian foreign policy on national interests was accompanied by nationalistic rhetoric from highly placed government officials, though it was obviously designed for domestic consumption. This rhetoric—not founded on political, economic, or military realities—only served to strengthen the suspicions of Russia's coming "imperial revenge," first of all on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Actions aimed at promoting political, economic, and military cooperation with former republics of the Soviet Union were interpreted in the West as a course of action to restore the Russian Empire, which would ultimately lead to a new cold war.

There are political forces on the Russian political scene that would welcome a renewal of the cold war. In Russia one can find politicians who would like to provoke a crisis in relations with the outside world and to put Russia once again into a hostile encirclement, without which they could not even dream of achieving power. But they represent a very tiny fraction of public opinion in Russia and by no means determine Russian foreign policy thinking.

Nationalistic rhetoric was greatly intensi-

fied before the December 1993 elections. The election results brought about an impression that ultranationalists' aggressive stand in foreign policy was supported by large segments of voters. But the surveys conducted after the elections showed that this was not true. It certainly was not a position of the Russian leadership. Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in his article, published in *Foreign Affairs*, that "a firm and sometimes aggressive policy of defending one's national interests is not incompatible with partnership [with the West]."³ Kozyrev stressed in this article that "Russian foreign policy inevitably has to be of an independent and assertive nature. If Russian democrats fail to achieve it, they will be swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism, which is now exploiting the need for national and state self-assertion."⁴ In a speech to leaders of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service in April 1994, President Boris Yeltsin, analyzing Russia's relations with the West, stressed that Russia must henceforth distinguish between partnership with the West and attempts by the West to dominate Russia and to impose upon Moscow "actions that run counter to Russia's interests." In this speech, President Yeltsin emphasized Moscow's intention to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.⁵

In December 1994, President Yeltsin denounced as "anti-Russian" NATO plans to admit countries of Eastern Europe and warned of the dangers of a single superpower world. In a criticism of what Russia considered the United States's intention to emerge as the only superpower, President Yeltsin said, "History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital."⁶ A few days earlier in Brussels, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, protesting NATO plans to admit countries of Eastern Europe, refused to sign the "Partnership for Peace" program of cooperation between Russia and NATO.

Apprizing these Russian actions, the *New*

York Times in an article entitled "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," wrote:

To explain such unruly conduct, consider the possibility that the end of Communism hasn't transformed the West and the Russians into friends. And that, for all their good intentions, they have different ways of seeing the world, different fears to calm, different domestic needs to meet. . . . Sobered by the new assertiveness in Russia's foreign policy, mindful of Moscow's history of expansionism, the Western powers have begun to realize that Moscow cannot be counted on as a reliable strategic partner.⁷

Russian public opinion was bitterly disappointed with the setback in relations with the West. The Moscow newspaper *Segodnia* (Today) wrote in the beginning of December 1994:

One period of the post-communist Russia's transformation has finished and a new period started. First period was characterized by the course on rapid westernization, "inclusion in Europe," absolute pro-Western orientation of foreign and domestic policies with great hope for decisive Western economic aid and Western solidarity with the country which rejected communism. . . . This period ended with defeat and disillusionment. It was defeat of the West which lost the possibility of "easy" integration of Russia into the "Western world" and put political forces in Russia which were oriented on Western perspective in a position of political outsiders. . . . A new period of transformation which started now is and will be national period. Russia will be getting out of the most difficult and most inevitable crisis itself, without any outside help. . . . From now on we should not look all the time at the West being afraid to get grade "F" for "democracy" or for "foreign policy behavior."

The article's conclusion was that the period of "learning how to live" has ended. "We need partners, we do not need mentors."

On Russia's Place in the World and Global Strategy

Post-Communist Russia's place in the post-cold-war world and appropriate strategy

to ensure that place became a major concern of the Russian political leaders. In spite of Russia's current economic weakness and political instability, they still claim for Russia a superpower status. Russian officials and the political elite resent the fact that Russia is and will be treated as a regional power, a great regional power with its region spread across the two continents, but nevertheless a regional power.

Russia's place in the world and her possible global strategy were thoroughly analyzed recently by research institutes, influential independent groups like the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and independent experts. For example, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy published in August 1992 a report entitled "Strategy for Russia." The authors stated that the publication of the report was brought about by their concern that the country's leadership does not have a coherent understanding of Russia's interests and aims in the field of foreign policy. They thought that a pro-Western orientation would not only damage Russia's interests in other directions of Russian foreign policy but would also bring about a very strong negative reaction of the country's public opinion.⁸ In the summer of 1994, the council published a new document, "Strategy for Russia-2," which contained detailed and thorough analyses of Russia's place in the world, its national interests, its foreign policy aims, and possible global strategy to achieve these aims.⁹ Conclusions and recommendations of the council and other experts are worth paying attention to—first of all because they are trying to define objectively Russia's new position in the world, and to suggest a general strategy to defend and promote national interests and appropriate policies towards different countries and issues. And ultimately, their analyses influence government policy.

Apprizing the new international situation, Russian experts concluded first of all that Russia will be acting within a multipolar, not a bipolar, model of international relations. They argued that it would be impossible to develop a realistic foreign policy

strategy without developing the general theory of modern international relations—international relations in a post-cold-war, multipolar world. Without such a theory, practical actions in foreign policy will be dictated by pragmatic interests of the moment. From that general conclusion, Russian experts set out to evaluate the country's position in the world arena.

Confrontation with the West, and first of all with the United States, has ended. Now and in the foreseeable future, Russia has no enemies, which is a tremendous advantage in Russia's geostrategic position. "The cornerstone of our military doctrine," wrote General Grachev, "became a statement that Russia does not consider any state to be its enemy."¹⁰ At the same time, it is obvious that hopes to acquire new allies, first of all in the West, did not come true. No new effective security system has been created to replace the old system of two military blocs. And Russia needs a new security system in which it would consider itself at least to have relative security. But instead of the declared "new world order" has emerged a "new world disorder" in which Russia is most of all concerned with the conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union, around Russian borders.

After a comprehensive analysis of the post-cold-war international situation and national interests of major countries, experts of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy came to the conclusion that the contradictions between the vital national interests of Russia and the principal countries of the West are small. In the majority of cases, their interests are compatible and not contradictory. Contradictions emerge mostly in connection with the realization of national interests of secondary importance. The conclusion from this was that there are no real and insurmountable reasons for the worsening of relations between Russia and major Western countries.

Russian analysts admit that Russian foreign policy interests in many cases are not taken into consideration, nor are they respected by Western governments. The major

cause of this is Russia's relative economic weakness. If Russia does not put an end to economic depression and start economic recovery, it most likely will be doomed to the further weakening of its position in international relations, to possible isolation in the world arena, and even to direct threats to its territorial integrity. These Russian analysts conclude that the major objective of the Russian global strategy should be an "accumulation of forces," using the phrase coined by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister, after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War of the last century. Without an accumulation of forces and without first drastically improving its economy, Russia would not be able to ensure the well-being and freedom of its citizens and its international position as a respected member of the community of civilized nations. Experts admit that as of now neither political parties nor the Russian government nor President Yeltsin are able to develop and put forward a coherent program of the long-term global strategy.

Politicians and foreign policy experts actively discuss principal aims and policies towards different groups of countries: former members of the Soviet Union, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, West European countries, the United States, and leading countries of Asia and other geographical regions. Their general conclusion is that Russia in its present, relatively weakened state should pursue a flexible policy of balancing between major power centers, policies of building favorable balances of power with different states and in different regions. They advocate the policies of cooperation and presence in those regions where there exists interest in such cooperation and where cooperation may bring about economic dividends and increase Russia's political influence. In their opinion, the objects of such cooperation may be India, countries of Southeastern Europe, and the Near East. Some experts suggest that Russia should pursue the policy of "balancing at equal distance" from the old and new power centers. This position may be compared with the

role that England played in European politics for centuries when England, according to its interests, joined one or the other coalitions of continental powers as an additional force in that coalition.

Relations with the "Near Abroad" and Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Relations between Russia and the newly independent states that were former members of the Soviet Union are the most important focus of Russian foreign policy. For Russia, these states constitute the "Near Abroad." Economic and security interests of Russia as well as of these countries call for the closest possible political cooperation. Dissolution of the Soviet Union abruptly severed economic ties between industries, plants, suppliers and producers, and producers and consumers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was historically inevitable. But it brought about a very serious decline in living standards and quality of life for the majority of people in the former Soviet Union, and it led to numerous conflicts and confrontations, some of them violent and bloody. Economic conditions worsened everywhere. In spite of the fact that Russian economic conditions also worsened, its economy is in better shape than the economies of the countries of the "Near Abroad."

When the initial euphoria of independence wore off, the leadership of these countries began to understand the pressing necessity of much closer relations with other former members of the Soviet Union, first of all with Russia. Experts of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy came to the preliminary conclusion that many, if not the majority, of these newly independent states could not survive as absolutely independent without close cooperation with Russia and other newly independent states.

Foreign policy experts stress that the most important task now is to define Russian stra-

tegic aims towards the former members of the Soviet Union. They argue that without clearly defined strategic aims, policies towards these countries could be ineffective. Effective and long-term solutions for problems like maintaining stability, promoting cooperation in the fields of economy and finances, political-military cooperation, promoting human rights and freedoms—all these could be achieved only within the framework of the general political strategy. And at present, Russian leadership does not have a long-term general political strategy towards these states. Political decisions are made to solve current problems or contradictions.

Attempts to define Russia's role in the post-Soviet space revealed different positions. A number of leading parliamentarians and political scientists tried to formulate a "Monroe Doctrine," according to which all territory of the former Soviet Union would be in Russia's sphere of influence. President Yeltsin himself called for the world community to recognize Russia's special role in that realm. In his speech to leaders of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, quoted earlier, President Yeltsin stressed that Russia viewed these new states as areas of Russia's vital interests and would step up its efforts to promote their integration with Russia. Yeltsin stated that Russia would vigorously protect the interests of Russians living in the former Soviet republics. And it should be taken into consideration that there are 25 million ethnic Russians living in the post-Soviet space outside the borders of the Russian Federation. In this speech, President Yeltsin dismissed Western concern that Russia's assertiveness toward these states represented a form of neoimperialism. He also claimed that forces within both these newly independent states and in the West are attempting to use the charge of neoimperialism to exacerbate tensions between Russia and its neighbors.¹¹ Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in *Foreign Affairs*:

At first, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the West openly recognized the role of

Russia as the stabilizing factor and engine of economic reform in the former Soviet Union. We never refused that role, even though it costs us billions of dollars. What is wrong with Russia announcing as its goal the gradual reintegration—primarily economic reintegration—of the post-Soviet space on a voluntary and equal basis?¹²

Russian foreign policy experts admit that the price of Russia's special role in the post-Soviet space would be too high, and many of them put forward the question, Does Russia need this role? They acknowledged the existence of the wide gap between Russia's ambitions and its military and economic capabilities. At the same time, all experts agree that Russia would not be able to isolate itself from its neighbors. Whether Russia wants to or not, it would have to play a major role in any entity that would replace the Soviet Union, be it a new empire, union, confederation, or sphere of influence.

They admit that presently Russia does not have a strategic vision or perspective, to say nothing about necessary resources, to become a stronghold of security and stability in the post-Soviet space. Instead, it is more likely that Russia will become the force supporting the status quo in which a certain level of stability already exists. These experts presume that Russia will concentrate its efforts in the limited sphere of influence that would include Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Moldova. All these states need Russia as guarantor of the status quo. They need help and good relations or a military presence to ensure stability.

Relations between the Russian army and armies of the newly independent states that are former members of the Soviet Union presented a very serious problem for Russian leadership and the Russian military. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet armed forces were divided between new independent states. Russian generals had to establish a new relationship with their former colleagues and classmates in the Soviet military academies who are now commanders of the foreign armies. Nine members of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(with the exception of the Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan) signed the Tashkent Treaty for Collective Security. With this treaty came the establishment of a Council of the Defense Ministers and the Staff for Coordination of Military Cooperation. It should be stressed that this treaty was not aimed at the unification of the armies of its members. Col-Gen Boris Pyankov, first deputy chief of staff for coordination of military cooperation, firmly stated in an interview published in the summer of 1994, "We are today absolutely not ready to unite the armed forces. That would mean to scare the world and our present NATO partners We think about ensuring collective security with minimal expenditures and minimal personnel in the national armies."¹³

Russian military experts are seriously concerned with the fact that of the Western members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, only Belarus participated in the Treaty for Collective Security. The other members, besides Russia, are countries of the Central Asia and Transcaucasus. Because of its membership, this treaty covers territory quite different from the territory covered by the Warsaw Pact. In these new military agreements, Russia becomes the geopolitical center of Central Asia instead of being the geopolitical center of Eastern Europe. This move towards Asia may raise a question of competition and cooperation with the new military-political groupings, which at present are at the periphery of world politics. Russian military experts admitted that this could be welcomed by NATO leadership, by Central European countries, and by Ukraine and the Baltic states. They stressed at the same time that Russian Ministry of Defense and Russian political leadership were most strongly against it.¹⁴

Discussing the aim of creating or re-creating the federal state, experts from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy argued that this would be too costly politically and especially economically. They reject outright the proposals of ultranationalists—uni-

fication through forceful expansion and the disruption of the stability of neighboring states. Such policies are, in their view, not only amoral but also impractical; instability would inevitably move to Russia itself. At the same time, they argue that unification using strictly political and economic means would also be counterproductive. Such a course would force Russia to support the collapsing economies and to directly subsidize the living standards of the neighboring states to make them at least comparable with Russian living standards. Following such a course, Russia may again become an economic colony of the states which it would unite. Unification would inevitably lead to a sharp decline in the living standards in Russia, inciting social disturbances, and strengthening disintegration tendencies among Russian provinces. In this case, the national strategy of accumulation of forces would become impossible. This course would inevitably lead to the overburdening of Russian resources and perhaps the collapse of Russia like that of the Soviet Union.

Instead of the unification, experts from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy propose integration through the creation of political, military, and other conditions for economic cooperation and unity, which would ensure and support Russia's political and defense interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union. It would be a policy of creating around Russia a system of friendly states, economically open for Russia. The aim of this policy should not be the re-creation, in a modified form, of the situation that existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The aim should be to implement a modernization of relations that are favorable for Russia. This modernization should allow Russia to preserve many advantages of its former geostrategic position and at the same time to create for itself much more favorable economic relations with these states. The philosophy of such an approach would be "leadership instead of direct control."

It is necessary to admit that the position of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy with respect to integration goes along

with the predominant trend in Russian public opinion. Public opinion surveys have shown that people in all social groups who favor integration with the republics of the former Soviet Union greatly outnumber those who are against it. But Russians are ready only for the integration in which they would gain something and lose nothing. Russians are not against integration but against its implementation on conditions unfavorable for Russia. Russians will not sacrifice their interests for the well-being of the peoples of the former republics of the Soviet Union.

In summary, practical actions in the relations between Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union—economic cooperation, military cooperation, and use of Russian troops as peacekeeping forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union—should not be interpreted as attempts to restore the Soviet or Russian empires. The principal aim supported by the majority of the Russian population is not unification but integration, and integration on definite conditions favorable to Russia.

Russian political leadership and foreign policy experts are very much concerned about relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's general aim here is not to have hostile relations with these countries. On the contrary, the aim is to have friendly partners, first of all in the economic field.

Russian political leaders are very strongly against these countries being included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They consider the admission of these countries into NATO as a very serious hostile move against Russia, aimed at its isolation from Europe and from the West. Russian leadership, which brought home Russian troops from Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic states, argued that these countries have nothing to fear from democratic Russia and do not need NATO's defense guarantees against Russia. On the other hand, Russia's isolation may bring to power ultranationalists who might try to restore domination over Central and Eastern Europe. President Yelt-

sin in his Brussels speech asked, "If there are no blocs, splits, enemies or suspicions, why do you in the West still need NATO? Why shouldn't Russia be the eastern pillar of European security?" Evaluating the possibility of NATO expanding to the east, Yeltsin stated that "Europe, which has not yet thrown off the legacy of the cold war, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace."¹⁵ But in Budapest, Russian leadership had to realize that their efforts to block NATO expansion to the east failed. Answering Yeltsin, President Bill Clinton firmly stated, "NATO will not automatically exclude any nation from joining. At the same time, no country outside will be allowed to veto expansion."¹⁶

This was a humiliating defeat for Russian leadership and diplomacy. The newspaper *Isvestia*, analyzing the situation, stated that it was obvious even two years ago, when just an idea of the possibility of East European countries joining NATO was put forward, that Russia was powerless to prevent it. And President Yeltsin's promises "not to allow" NATO's expansion were not founded on anything real. *Isvestia* asked,

And what was the idea of making such a fuss about NATO expansion? Would not it be much better from the very beginning not to dramatize the situation and not to put itself into a deadlock? The more so, if we believe official statements of Russian leaders, that Moscow now considers NATO to be a partner, and not a potential enemy.¹⁷

Summarizing the American position, the *New York Times* stated, "From the American standpoint, NATO is still the center of Europe's security universe. Why? Because Russia, it seems, cannot be trusted completely."¹⁸

Russian foreign policy experts admit that leading industrial countries of the West began the division of the former Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of them think that what is going on may amount to the third great division of the spheres of influence among major countries. The first two divisions were implemented after the two world wars. The third

started after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is being implemented by political and economic means. This geopolitical process of redivision of the spheres of influence, which is unfavorable for Russia, manifested itself in the economic and political orientation of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic states, and some former "socialist" states of Southeast Asia and Africa toward the other power centers.

Russian foreign policy experts admit that the geopolitical consequences of the West's economic expansion in Central and Eastern Europe will be fully apparent in the beginning of the next century. Russia may be confronted by then not only with economic but also with political and military unification of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the West, first of all with Western Europe. Because of that, Russia's influence in this region in the beginning of the next century would be minimal, and the geopolitical and strategic consequences of that would be very serious.

Conclusion

Post-Communist Russia rejected the Soviet Union's expansionist foreign policy and declared that it would follow a course determined by vital national interests. The Russian political elite hoped that Russia, being a legal successor to the Soviet Union, would

inherit the Soviet Union's superpower status. New Russia retained great power potential in its transition from communism, but it finds itself in a currently weakened state. This contradiction between potential greatness and current weakness defined Russia's position in the post-cold-war world. Russia's current weakness encouraged the West to deny Russia superpower status. Western treatment of Russia as a regional power, denying Russia a leading role in global politics, hurts national pride and strengthens nationalist feelings.

Russia, with its potential, could eventually overcome its current weakness and become a global superpower. Western actions aimed at denying Russia this status may help Russian ultranationalists to come to power. And it may lead to fundamental changes in Russian foreign policy, which may once again become expansionist. And the world once again would be in a cold war. That is why the Western attitude towards Russia is of paramount importance. Foreign policy actions that would help President Yeltsin and democrats, despite all their obvious shortcomings, to stay in power would be in the interests of the United States and the world community. Former president George Bush once observed that democrats in the Kremlin would ensure the national security of the United States better than any number of nuclear warheads.

Notes


1. Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (May-June 1994): 59.
2. *Nesavisimaya Gaseta*, 9 June 1994.
3. Kozyrev, 62.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Rossiiskaya Gaseta*, 29 April 1994.
6. Elaine Sciolino, "Yeltsin Says NATO Trying to Split Continent Again," *New York Times*, 6 December 1994, A10.
7. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," *New York Times*, 11 December 1994, E4.
8. *Nesavisimaya Gaseta*, 19 August 1992.
9. *Ibid.*, 27 June 1994.

10. *Ibid.*, 6 June 1994.
11. *Rossiiskaya Gaseta*, 29 April 1994.
12. Kozyrev, 69.
13. *Nesavisimaya Gaseta*, 4 June 1994.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," E4.
16. Sciolino, "Yeltsin Says NATO Trying to Split Continent," A10.
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18. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," E4.

THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Competitive Strategy Making in the Post-Cold- War World

MAJ ROBERT F. HAHN II, USA



God help the American people if Congress starts legislating military strategy.

—Sen Richard Russell



The 1994 elections generated renewed public interest in the overall organization and functioning of Congress. Prior to the elections, most Republicans—and many Democrats—had been advancing the general proposition that something was fundamentally wrong with the way the legislative branch had been doing business the past few decades. When Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years, they immediately promised that life on Capitol Hill during the 104th Congress would be much different than it had been under Democratic leadership. As we approach the end of the first 100 days of Republican rule, it appears that—at least in the

House of Representatives—the new majority party has kept its promise. Both internal, organizational changes and new legislation have been proceeding at a pace not seen since the early 1970s. Although it is unlikely that Congress will keep up the current pace throughout the summer, the past few months have clearly demonstrated that the 104th Congress intends to be an activist one.

Defense policy is one area in which the new Congress intends to be active. In its “Contract with America,” the Republican leadership vowed that it would take whatever steps are necessary to strengthen America’s national security. Key Republicans in the House and Senate have already outlined their versions of what the contract calls a “National Security Restoration Act.”¹

Among their many provisions, these measures challenge the Clinton administration's commitment to defense spending in general and seek to place a number of restrictions on the use of US forces for UN peacekeeping operations. Other similar legislative efforts are sure to follow throughout the defense authorization and appropriation process.

The 104th Congress will clearly be an activist one, but can it be an effective one? As Senator Russell's comment suggests, Congress has rarely been thought of very highly in the defense policy-making arena. Modern critics of congressional involvement in the development of defense policy, especially in the military, have argued that there are numerous structural and political impediments to efficient policy-making by the legislative branch. Impediments most frequently cited include lack of expertise, excessive parochialism, fragmented committee structure, and partisan politics. According to its many detractors, Congress focuses most of its attention on micromanaging individual defense programs at the expense of issues associated with the broader context of American defense policy. Several individuals on Capitol Hill have expressed the view that they feel they are frequently treated as "the enemy" by members of the military services.²

Though emotionally appealing in an age when Congress still tends to receive lower public-approval ratings than lawyers and insurance salesmen, micromanagement and parochialism no longer accurately describe the workings of the legislative branch in the defense policy-making arena.³ Over the past 20 years, Congress has developed a set of institutional structures and policy-making processes—a Congressional Defense Department (CDD)—with which it can now successfully accomplish many of the essential tasks long associated with the development of a coherent strategy and force structure. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services can no longer treat Congress as an environmental constraint on a defense policy-making process that takes place overwhelmingly in the executive branch. Since the end of the cold war, Congress has be-

come—and will continue to be—an essential player in the development of our overall national security policy and the military strategy and force structure designed to support it. Members of the administration and the military services must now fundamentally change how they view the modern Congress. The current situation demands nothing less than a complete shift in paradigms and defense policy-making procedures if the nation is to successfully complete its transition to a national security strategy and force structure appropriate for the twenty-first century.

In this article, I briefly discuss the creation and functioning of CDD. I then highlight some examples of congressional activism in the early post-cold-war debates on defense policy. Finally, I examine the impact of recent developments—especially the election of the Republican majority—on the future of CDD and the future of defense policy-making in general.

Political Conflict and the Emergence of CDD

The defense policy-making process in Congress has changed significantly over the past 20 years. Many of the changes can be linked directly to the political conflicts that dominated the extended period of divided government from 1968–92. Institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches of government, internal struggles between the Senate and the House for congressional dominance, partisan conflicts accentuated by divided government, ideological struggles within party organizations, and each member's desire for reelection all helped create CDD.

A very simple model is useful in understanding the changes in the structure and functioning of Congress's defense policy-making system that led to the development of CDD. Political conflict stimulated fundamental institutional changes that eventually led to alternative policy outputs. During the past 20 years, Congress evolved from an in-

stitution with an overwhelmingly programmatic focus to one that now effectively examines both individual programs and broader issues associated with the creation of military strategy and force structure.

Partisan, parochial, institutional, and ideological conflicts during the 1970s and 1980s produced four major institutional developments that have, in turn, made possible the transformation in Congress's role in the creation of military strategy and force structure:

1. improvements in the research capabilities of Congress,
2. changes in the organization and functioning of the armed services committees (ASC),
3. centralization of the overall budgeting process, and
4. reform of the defense policy-making process within the executive branch.

Taken together, these four institutional changes served as the four major building blocks—the pillars—upon which CDD was built. As we enter 1995, they remain the foundation upon which it rests.

Block 1: Analytical Tools for Defense Policy-making

Congress has always depended on a variety of sources for its information on defense-policy issues. Throughout much of the cold war, DOD and the military services provided most of the data and analysis on defense strategy and force structures needed by members of Congress for their analysis of defense policies. However, tight presidential control of what was presented and how, tended to limit congressional evaluation of executive-branch activities. Further complicating matters, during the cold war era, there were few individuals or organizations outside the Pentagon with access to enough defense information to confidently evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of executive-branch proposals.

This situation began to change signifi-

cantly in the 1960s and 1970s, and—by the 1980s—the growing capability and influence of congressional staffs had been well documented.⁴ The expansion of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the General Accounting Office (GAO), the creation of the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the explosion of personal and committee staffs, and the rapid growth of national-security think tanks have all produced significant improvements in the analytical resources available to Congress. Both the development of these resources and a growing appreciation of their capabilities make it possible for Congress to challenge the executive branch's defense-policy proposals on sound empirical grounds as well as on what has often been termed "political grounds." Just as the introduction of systems analysis and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in the 1960s radically changed the way DOD and the military services conducted business, so did the development of enhanced analytical capabilities within Congress transform the way many people in the legislative branch now view and evaluate defense policy in general. By the end of the cold war, Congress had built an information network fully capable of challenging assumptions underlying the defense-related material that was crossing the Potomac (table 1).

Block 2: Reorganizing the Armed Services Committees

In addition to the expansion of congressional analytical research capabilities, the 1980s also produced several important organizational changes within the ASCs. These changes now provide the modern Congress with a more efficient means of assembling and evaluating defense policy in terms of strategy and structure than existed during the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the 1980s, both the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) implemented several organi-

Table 1

Congressional Defense-related Staffs, 1969–88

Organization	1969	1978	1988
Congressional Budget Office	0	25	25
Congressional Research Service	7	18	28
General Accounting Office	820	1,220	1,100
Office of Technology Assessment	0	N/A	11
Armed services committees			
House	9	26	40
Senate	9	17	32
Appropriations committees			
House	1	8	13
Senate	2	3	7
Budget committees			
House	0	2	3
Senate	0	3	4

Source: Barry M. Blechman, *The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 12. Figures for the Office of Technology Assessment are from Office of Technology Assessment, *Annual Report to the Congress, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988).

zational changes that increased their ability to coordinate and integrate numerous aspects of defense policy that must be considered in order to create coherent, integrated, and large-scale overall defense proposals. Although the impact of these changes seemed limited initially, it proved to be extremely important when Congress began analyzing defense-policy issues following the end of the cold war.

Both SASC and HASC had been organized to deal with defense spending in light of appropriations accounts. Funds for military functions of DOD are allocated according to several major titles: military personnel; operations and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; military construction; family housing; revolving; and management funds. In 1981, when Sen John Tower (R.-Tex.) was elected chairman of SASC, he reorganized SASC's subcommittees from their traditional deline-

ation along budgetary lines to those focusing on major strategic missions that the military must accomplish. When Sen Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) became chairman of the committee in 1987, he continued the reorganization that Tower had begun. Table 2 compares the old organization of SASC subcommittees to the current organization, which resulted from the Tower and Nunn reorganizations.

Senator Tower also made a significant change in the internal organization and functioning of the SASC staff—a change that would have continuing ramifications. Prior to 1981, SASC was one of the few committees that retained the tradition of a nonpartisan staff. This policy was part of the effort by the committee to reinforce its long-standing—if somewhat artificial—position that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” When he assumed the chairmanship, Tower created separate staffs for the majority and minority contingents on the committee. This change provided the basis for hiring staff members

Table 2

SASC Subcommittee Organization

<i>96th Congress (1979–81)</i>	<i>103d Congress (1993–95)</i>
Arms Control	Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, and Defense Intelligence
General Procurement	Regional Defense and Contingency Forces
Research and Development	Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces
Manpower and Personnel	Force Requirements and Personnel
Military Construction and Stockpiles	Military Readiness and Defense Infrastructure
Procurement Policy and Reprogramming	Defense Technology, Acquisition, and Industrial Base

who were more supportive of the Republican administration's spending priorities than might be the case in a deliberately nonpartisan staff. It was also arguably a hedge against a future when Senate Republicans would once again find themselves in the minority. Thus, during the early years of Republican control of SASC, partisan policy promotion and policy analysis also became complementary rather than competing activities.

When the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986, the increasing emphasis of SASC on defense policy continued. As early as 1985 and 1986, Senator Nunn—then the ranking minority member on SASC—had begun to emphasize the importance of congressional debates about the overall defense policy the nation was pursuing. After he became chairman in 1987, SASC began to hold annual “strategy” hearings prior to considering the specifics of the defense budget.⁵ These hearings helped Nunn dominate the early defense budget debates for fiscal year 1991 and strongly influenced the post-cold-war defense policy that emerged later in the year.

While SASC was in the process of trying to increase its strategy-making ability through reorganization and adjustments in its staff, similar changes were also taking

place in HASC. Although it retained a subcommittee structure based on budget categories, HASC still sought to improve its ability to integrate spending and strategy. In 1975 Rep Les Aspin (D.-Wis.)—then a very junior member of HASC—severely criticized the committee's lack of a broad focus on policy.⁶ In 1985, as newly elected chairman of HASC, he created the Defense Policy Panel to integrate the activities of various subcommittees he oversaw and to change the committee's perspective. The purpose of the panel was “to examine some rather broad national defense policy and strategy issues [and] to get into some really rather fundamental questions about defense policy and defense strategy.”⁷

Although the official jurisdiction of both ASCs has included responsibility for “common defense generally” ever since their creation in 1947, HASC—unlike SASC—had never seemed particularly interested in the broader issues associated with military strategy. While Aspin was chairman, the panel conducted a number of hearings each year that attempted to establish links among defense strategy, force structures, and defense budgets. As Aspin continually emphasized at meetings of the panel, HASC sought to resolve several basic questions during the waning days of the cold war:

What is our foreign policy, what kind of a defense establishment do we need to support that foreign policy and what are the components of that defense establishment. . . . What do we really need to spend on defense of our national security and what should be our priorities?⁸

In 1993 Aspin became secretary of defense for newly elected president Bill Clinton. Ron Dellums (D.-Calif.), the new HASC chairman for the 103d Congress, did away with the Defense Policy Panel but not with its approach to policy development. Dellums transferred the mission of the panel back to the full committee in an attempt to expand the policy focus of HASC even further. Since by 1992 the panel had grown to include almost the full committee, Dellums's change had little adverse impact on the ability of HASC to create defense policy. Justifying his decision during a discussion about HASC organization in January 1993, Dellums stated,

I choose not to pursue a policy panel but to pursue policy. I want to take it to the next step. I think that the full committee is indeed the policy group of the Armed Services Committee. That I would like to see the full committee's status elevated to a higher level than it has been in the past, and that we do indeed grapple with some of these significant policy matters [sic].⁹

Block 3: Budget Procedures and Strategy Making

In the mid-1980s, several additional developments fundamentally altered the political environment in which Congress operated. These events provided an opening for strong congressional challenges to executive-branch efforts to exert a measure of autonomy over the defense policy-making process. Dramatic changes in the international security environment that began to occur with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the seemingly uncontrollable nature of the budget deficit disrupted the process of budget "incrementalism" that had domi-

nated defense policy-making in Congress during much of the cold war.

Significant changes in the overall budget process also contributed to the recentralization of defense policy-making. Passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Deficit Reduction Act in 1985, the subsequent budget agreement between Congress and the president in 1987, and—most notably—changes resulting from adoption of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act during debate over the federal budget of fiscal year 1991 significantly reduced the ability of either branch to increase spending on defense.

GRH capped overall spending levels and made the entire budget subject to the imposition of automatic budget cuts if the levels were exceeded. The agreement of fiscal year 1988–89 established separate spending levels for domestic, defense, and international aid programs but left sequestration procedures virtually unchanged. The agreement of fiscal year 1991 disaggregated the sequestration process so that overspending in any of the three categories would trigger sequestration only within the category that failed to meet target spending figures. According to one observer, the new procedures were designed to "force the authorizing committees to fashion revenue-neutral bills."¹⁰ It also helped to increase the level of centralization of the budgeting process within the ASCs and thereby increase their control over the process.

In any case, competition for existing funds between Congress and the executive branch became more acute in 1990 than was the case under the original provisions of GRH. As cost overruns inevitably began to emerge, some defense programs needed to be cancelled so that others could continue to be funded, and some bases had to be closed so that others could remain open. The right to make these decisions—or, more accurately, the framework within which they would be made—ultimately emerged as a central focus of the strategy and force-posture debates between Congress and the executive branch during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The outcome of these early de-

bates reflected the effort by Congress to expand its power over the policy-making process and to more closely link strategy proposals to their force-structure and budgetary outcomes.

The nature of the defense-budget arena changed yet again in 1993 when the Clinton administration and the Democratic Congress joined forces to pass an entirely new budget package to replace the one agreed upon during the 1990 budget summit at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB), Maryland. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and the concurrent resolution on the budget passed in Congress set new levels of spending for fiscal years 1994 through 1998. In general terms, the new budget agreements meant more money for domestic programs and less for defense. They also tore down the "walls" between domestic, defense, and international spending that had been established in the 1990 agreement. This allowed budget makers to transfer funds between budget categories, thus enabling both Congress and the administration to use the defense budget as the bill payer for domestic programs. This change has led Congress to take an even more aggressive look at the defense budget—and at defense policy more generally conceived—in search of ways to generate more efficient uses of increasingly limited defense dollars.

Block 4: Reforming the Process in the Executive Branch

Historically, the executive branch has come under frequent criticism for its inability to constrain service parochialism, its unwillingness to produce strategy and force-posture proposals that reflect resource constraints, and its refusal to acknowledge a role for Congress in fundamental decisions associated with defense policy. Previous efforts to correct these problems—most notably, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958—failed to adequately integrate the wide array of forces involved in the defense policy-making process and did little to solve prob-

lems associated with program and force-structure development by the individual services.¹¹

During the 1980s, Congress entered the realm of executive-branch restructuring in a much more deliberate fashion than during the previous years. In addition to its attempts to increase its own ability to develop military strategy and force-posture proposals, Congress sought to limit executive-branch control over the process and to centralize the military component of the process. The most substantial change in terms of strategy and policy development concerned the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Responding to recommendations contained in the president's Packard Commission Report, Congress developed and passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which both enhanced the role of the regional commanders in chief (CINC) in the policy-making process and centralized control over the military services in the person of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Goldwater-Nichols significantly strengthened the power of the CJCS and tasked him to make critical decisions about the relative value of various service capabilities and strategies in the face of resource constraints. The provisions of Goldwater-Nichols also require the chairman to produce an annual report that outlines how various elements of the national military strategy fit together and to evaluate the extent to which available force structure and other resources limit the implementation of that strategy.¹²

Goldwater-Nichols benefited Congress in two ways. First, it provided Congress—particularly the ASCs—with an honest broker in the person of the CJCS, thereby enabling Congress to better evaluate opposing military viewpoints. In addition to the military strategy coming out of the White House, each military service has routinely attempted to advance its own variation of where and how the nation will most likely fight in the future. Rather than serving as supporting elements of the overall administration military strategy, service proposals

generally compete with it.¹³ During the early post-cold-war years, Senator Nunn often accused the Republican administration of having too many strategies: "You have a Navy strategy, an Army strategy, an Air Force strategy, a Marine strategy."¹⁴ The continuing struggle over roles and missions tends to reinforce this perspective.

Goldwater-Nichols also provided Congress with a baseline document against which to measure the president's own budget. The administration must develop a regular comprehensive military assessment of the balance between existing military strategy and force structure. Though it is presented from the administration's point of view, the National Security Strategy Report presents a snapshot picture of the president's understanding of risks to the country's national interests as well as a discussion of how he intends to use the instruments of power to counter these risks. As stated in the legislation creating the National Security Strategy Report,

the report must stipulate (1) the nation's interests, goals, and objectives; (2) the defense capabilities needed to deter aggression and to achieve those ends; (3) the president's proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of U.S. national power; and (4) an evaluation of the nation's ability to carry out the stipulated strategy.¹⁵

The National Security Strategy Report, first issued in January 1987, serves as a way for Congress to better identify the forces necessary to accomplish any given mission and to increase or decrease the forces available for that mission as the international threat and its view of national priorities change. The report is one way Congress has sought to force the administration to articulate the overall strategy behind its defense budgets and force-posture proposals.¹⁶

Congress now also requires the secretary of defense and CJCS to prepare a National Military Strategy Report that even more specifically outlines strategic thinking within the Pentagon.¹⁷ This report also provides

Congress with a benchmark document against which it can evaluate the administration's defense-budget request. Congress can then revisit each step of the policy-making process and determine the extent to which it agrees or disagrees with the assumptions, assessments, and decisions underlying the president's strategy, force structure, and defense budget.

Defense Policy-making in the Post-Cold-War Environment

We tend to think of the development of strategy, force structure, and the defense budget as a process that originates in the executive branch and is then validated by Congress. In most instances, however, the defense policy-making process has become a simultaneous activity rather than a sequential one. Frequently, congressional assessment of the threat environment—item one in the process of developing military strategy—has led Congress to pursue a defense policy radically different from the one promoted by the administration. When this occurs, the military strategy and force structure advocated by DOD and the administration actually play only a limited role in determining the defense budget that emerges from debates on Capitol Hill. Instead, Congress employs its own strategy-making resources and generates alternative defense policy and budget proposals.

Congress can mobilize its own organizations and processes to complete many of the tasks accomplished in the executive branch during interaction between the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the PPBS, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and the DOD Acquisition System. Although this is hardly a complete listing of players involved in the process, it suggests that the basic organizational structures and functions of the two branches of government are becoming increasingly similar in form and function (table 3).

Creation of CDD has given the legislative branch the institutional capabilities necessary to develop defense-policy alternatives using essentially the same theoretical process employed by members of the executive branch, especially at the highest levels. Although the two processes share many of the same inputs from the military and other government agencies, there is often great dissimilarity between their outputs. This is especially true in times of rapid change and uncertainty, when Congress is developing its own strategy, force structure, and budget proposal regardless of the way the president is reading the data.

Building a Post-Cold-War Strategy and Force Structure

The closest situation to the one we have today in the defense policy-making process

occurred in the 12 months prior to the Gulf War. During this period, there was great uncertainty about the nature of the threat, existing national security documents were rapidly becoming out-of-date, the budget deficit was squeezing defense spending, and the president was facing a hostile Congress controlled by the opposition party. Because of these similarities, this period provides a clear look at how CDD may operate during the early days of the 104th Congress.

In 1990 Senator Nunn, then chairman of SASC, used resources available to CDD to discredit both the Bush administration's defense budget for fiscal year 1991 and the assumptions upon which it had been built. Operating in what quickly became a policy vacuum, Nunn advanced a strategy and force-structure proposal radically different from the one the administration had worked

Table 3

Competing Actors in the Defense Policy-making Process

<i>Executive Branch</i>	<i>Role</i>	<i>Legislative Branch</i>
President (NSC/OMB)	Set priorities	Budget committees (majority party leaders)
CIA, DIA, NSA, CJCS, CINCs, NSC	Conduct a threat assessment	Intelligence/ASCs (CIA, DIA, think tanks)
OSD, CJCS, JS, services, CINCs	Develop strategy/force- structure proposals	ASCs (staffs, CRS, CBO, think tanks)
OSD, CJCS, DPRB, serv- ices	Develop specific defense programs/budget request	ASCs/appropriations committees (staffs, CBO, CRS)
OSD, DPRB, JROC, OMB, president	Resolve force- structure/budget disparities	Authorization/appropria- tions conference com- mittees
President	Approve final policies/budget	Full Congress

CIA = Central Intelligence Agency
DIA = Defense Intelligence Agency
DPRB = Defense Planning Resources Board
JROC = Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JS = Joint Staff

NSA = National Security Agency
NSC = National Security Council
OMB = Office of Management and Budget
OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense

on for the previous 18-month planning cycle.

From his position as chairman of SASC, Nunn conducted a number of strategy hearings "to understand and analyze some of the fundamental assumptions on which our national security policy, our military strategy, and ultimately our defense budgets are based."¹⁸ Following a series of eight hearings focusing on the Soviet threat, allied perceptions of the threat, and implications of changes in the Soviet Union for Western security, SASC began an extensive examination of existing US military strategy and force posture. With the exception of the secretary of defense's initial budget presentation before the committee on 1 February 1990, the six SASC military-strategy hearings all preceded testimony by administration officials on the president's budget request for fiscal year 1991. The information obtained by members of the committee during these strategy hearings significantly increased their ability to challenge—on policy and strategy grounds—many programs proposed by the administration in the actual defense budget for fiscal year 1991.

Nunn eventually outlined his concept of what America's new military strategy and force structure should look like during a series of four speeches on the floor of the Senate in the spring of 1990. The "Five Blanks" speeches, given on 22 and 29 March and 19–20 April, dealt with what he considered to be unanswered questions in the administration's defense program. In his speeches, Nunn developed his vision of the post-cold-war world and his view of appropriate defense-policy responses to changes in the international security environment. During these speeches, Nunn proposed the adoption of a strategy of "flexible readiness" that required only a small number of high-priority nuclear and strategically mobile conventional forces rather than the large forward-deployed force structure characteristic of much of the cold war. The Nunn strategy also relied more heavily on the use of reserve forces in the event of a large-scale conventional war in Europe than did the

existing strategy. According to Nunn's proposal, US troops would serve as reinforcements to allied forces rather than as key elements in the forward defense of Europe—a role they had long played in NATO strategy.¹⁹

In his comments on the floor on 20 April, Nunn attempted to match specific force-structure and program changes to each of the five major elements of the strategy that he had proposed on 19 April. Finally, he estimated budget savings that would accrue through each of his changes (table 4).

There were a number of attempts to challenge the specifics of Nunn's proposal throughout the committee markup stage and floor consideration of the SASC bill. Despite these efforts, the Senate essentially ratified Nunn's concepts when it approved the bill on 4 August. The defense appropriation bill would also support the major funding requests outlined in the authorization bill.

The House versions of the defense authorization and appropriations bills for fiscal year 1991 reflected many of the same concerns as those of the Senate. Like its Senate counterpart, the HASC Defense Policy Panel had begun a series of hearings on the changing nature of the Soviet threat as far back as September 1988. Testimony produced during these hearings, which ended on 25 April 1990, was combined with a number of other materials and was eventually consolidated into a single document entitled *The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline*, released on 9 July 1990.²⁰ In this document—the functional equivalent of an HASC "net threat assessment"—Chairman Les Aspin concluded that

- (1) The conventional threat to the U.S. and NATO is greatly diminished and cannot be revived.
- (2) The Soviet global conventional threat has also declined, although not as precipitously as in Europe. . . .
- (3) While the Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic forces, the risk of nuclear war has receded.
- (4) Soviet military spending is clearly on the decline.²¹

Table 4

**Estimated Savings from Implementing
the New Strategy
(in \$billions)**

	FY 91	FY 91-95
1. Place nuclear deterrence at lower levels	3-3.5	20-25
2. Reduce forward deployments and emphasize deployable forces	1-1.5	20-25
3. Shift more to reserves	0	12-15
4. Employ flexible readiness	1.5-2.5	20-30
5. "Think Smarter, Not Richer"	10.5	100-300

Source: *Congressional Record*, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 20 April 1990, vol. 136, S4658.

Acting very much in line with SASC initiatives that called for cuts in overseas forces and expansion of the roles and missions of National Guard and reserve forces, HASC reduced the ceiling on European forces by 50,000 and prohibited reserve-component force-structure cuts proposed by the administration. The authorization and appropriations bills that passed the House were slightly more restrictive than those in the Senate. Still, the final bills that emerged from Congress and that were signed by the president in November strongly reflected the strategy and force-structure approach developed and presented by Nunn earlier in the year.

The Nunn initiative dominated most of the debates on the defense budget for fiscal year 1991. Not until 2 August was the administration able to release its own updated defense policy—the Regional Defense Strategy and the Base Force. The administration strategy proposed the reorganization of military forces into four basic components according to region of employment and type of threat: Atlantic Force, Pacific Force, Contingency Force, and Strategic Force. The Atlantic Force would consist of mostly Army and Air Force units designed to deal with

any resurgence of the Soviet threat to Central Europe and with any large-scale conflict in the Persian Gulf. Although it would rely heavily on forward-deployed active duty forces, it would also require the mobilization of large numbers of reserve forces in the event of a full-scale war. The Pacific Force would include mostly naval and tactical air units to protect South Korea and other US allies in Asia. The Contingency Force would consist mostly of strategically mobile forces designed to deal with third world conflicts. Finally, the Strategic Force would contain the US inventory of long-range nuclear weapons.²² The administration's Base Force outlined the number and types of military forces necessary to implement the strategy (table 5).

Much of the expected debate on the administration's proposal was interrupted by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990—the same day as President Bush's speech on the new strategy. The Gulf War quickly consumed the president, the military services, and the Congress, temporarily setting aside debate over the Base Force. The proposal was not formally proposed to Congress until six months later, during testimony before the SASC on the FY 1992 and FY 1993 de-

Table 5
The Base Force

	FY 90	FY 95
Army divisions	28 (18 active)	18 (12 active)
Aircraft carriers	13	12
Carrier air wings	15 (13 active)	13 (11 active)
Battle-force ships	545	451
Tactical fighter wings	36 (24 active)	26 (15 active)
Strategic bombers	268	181

Source: Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993*, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 21 February 1991, 32.

fense-budget authorizations by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.²³ The proposal described by Cheney converged into four key strategic concepts: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution. Few of these concepts matched the ones Nunn had prescribed earlier, and the administration's new strategy met with little success.²⁴ Throughout hearings on defense authorization for fiscal year 1992, Congress repeatedly harangued administration officials about the inadequacies of the Regional Defense Strategy. In both the FY 1992 and FY 1993 defense budgets, Congress held the line on force-structure issues and prevented implementation of the Base Force. Despite what the National Security Strategy documents may have said, reality resided in the Nunn proposal—not in the Base Force.

In 1992 the main focus of congressional strategy-making efforts shifted from SASC to HASC. Chairman Les Aspin, still riding a wave of credibility based on his correct call in the Gulf War debates, picked up where

Nunn had left off in 1990. During the defense authorization process for fiscal year 1993, Aspin used resources available to him in HASC to further attack Bush's strategy and create his own alternative force structure. Aspin's "Option C" force structure and the threat analysis used to produce it came to dominate the debate over what was now viewed as the post-Gulf War—rather than post-cold-war—threat environment.²⁵

Following the defeat of the Republican administration in November 1992, the defense policy-making arena again changed dramatically. By January 1993, George Bush, the Regional Defense Strategy, and the Base Force were all effectively gone. Gen Colin Powell, the individual most closely linked to the Base Force, soon followed his old boss into retirement. Former HASC chairman Les Aspin carried his strategy and force-structure plan—modified slightly and renamed the Bottom-Up Review—with him to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.²⁶ Unsurprisingly, Aspin soon found his defense policy-making efforts soundly trashed by his old colleagues on the ASCs during the defense budget debates for fiscal year 1994. By the beginning of defense debates for fiscal year 1995, Aspin himself was forced into early retirement and was replaced by Assistant Secretary of Defense William Perry.

CDD and the Post-Cold-War Debates

Both Nunn and Aspin were able to use resources available to CDD to develop and promote strategy and force-structure proposals that were significantly different from those advanced by the Bush administration. The latter seemed tied to its long-range planning cycle and was unable to respond to the rapidly changing international threat scenario and ever increasing budget constraints that became the focus of much of the defense debate. Although one may wish to applaud the Bush administration for its

cautious approach, the strategy and force structure we are now pursuing look a great deal more like the Nunn and Aspin proposals than they do the Base Force.

Each of CDD's four building blocks played an important role in the development of congressional strategy proposals that were advanced during the post-cold-war budget debates. Congress relied heavily on its own internal technical expertise and analytical capabilities to challenge what it believed were faulty assumptions on the part of the executive branch. Subsequently, policy proposals that were developed in the strategy-making forums of HASC and SASC dominated congressional debate throughout the year. The budget crisis also helped to concentrate decision-making power in the defense committees, thereby further improving their ability to develop proposals that were politically sustainable on the floor. Finally, the requirement for the executive branch to produce a set of clear national security documents for Congress forced the administration to "play defense" throughout the entire debate. Congress was able to take advantage of this tactical situation and effectively counter the temporary political advantage the president gained by the outbreak of the Gulf War.

The Clinton Administration, the Republican Congress, and the Future of CDD

Only the election of Democrat Bill Clinton in November 1992 and the subsequent release of the administration's Bottom-Up Review by Secretary of Defense Aspin in October 1993 fundamentally altered the terms of the military strategy and force-structure debate in the executive branch.²⁷ According to the review, the US must be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Unsurprisingly, the force structure presented in the review was itself largely a variation of the threat-based alter-

natives developed by then-HASC chairman Aspin and his staff during defense budget debates for fiscal year 1993 in response to a Bush administration effort to generate a capabilities-based force structure.²⁸

The Clinton administration now finds itself in much the same situation as did the Bush administration in 1990. Many defense-policy initiatives generated by the administration have not fared well. The roles-and-missions report mandated by Congress and produced by outgoing CJCS Powell in February 1993 was poorly received on Capitol Hill, prompting Congress to call for a new study in the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994. The Bottom-Up Review of October 1993, which served as the basis for Clinton's national security strategy, interim national military strategy, and military force posture, has faced similar problems in credibility. It has also been strongly challenged by a number of influential think tanks such as the conservative Heritage Foundation and the Defense Budget Project.²⁹ Many conservative Democrats and most Republicans remain wary of what they perceive as faulty threat assumptions linked to an already underfunded defense program. Even optimistic estimates put Clinton's Future Years Defense Program at \$50 billion short of what is needed to sustain the force structure proposed in the Bottom-Up Review. Efforts to reduce this shortfall by additional personnel cuts or weapons-program cancellations have prompted even greater outcries than did the actual shortfall. Any supplemental defense appropriations will likely be paid for by cuts in domestic spending programs, an outcome sure to alienate many key Democratic supporters.

The Administration's Response

President Clinton has recognized that he is clearly on the verge of losing control of the defense policy-making process, just as

George Bush did in 1990. To help prevent the type of outcome that President Bush experienced, the administration has recently released a series of closely interrelated documents designed to fill the emerging defense-policy vacuum. These documents include a more hawkish version of the fall national security strategy, a new national military strategy, and an updated copy of DOD's *Annual Report to the President and Congress*.³⁰

Taken together, the new Clinton administration documents are designed to shape the upcoming congressional defense debates and to prevent the emergence of major initiatives from within CDD. This is especially true in the case of the national military strategy, the first such document since former CJCS Colin Powell's strategy was released in 1992. And, while it is possible that the administration's proposals will deter congressional initiatives, it is perhaps just as likely that Congress will dismiss the whole package as yet another inadequate response to both the emerging international security environment and the domestic political environment.

Final Comments

The defense policy-making process is both more complex and more competitive than it was at the time Senator Russell lamented the possibility of Congress legislating strategy. In the past 20 years, Congress has clearly emerged as an equal partner to the executive branch in the defense policy-making arena. Indicative of this status, the defense-budget debate for fiscal year 1996 will be a struggle between two competing defense policy-making institutions engaged in partisan, ideological, and—at times—personal conflict. Each institution will be seeking to prove that its perspective on defense policy better reflects national interests, the current international security environment, the constraints of the budget deficit, the best interests of the military services, and the will of the American people. Like the administra-

tion, members of Congress care deeply about national security issues.

The purpose of this article was to suggest an alternative perspective on the role of Congress in the defense policy-making pro-

In the past 20 years, Congress has clearly emerged as an equal partner to the executive branch in the defense policy-making arena.

cess. The current formulation of CDD is not a final model but a point of departure from which a substantial redesign of the defense policy-making process may ultimately be constructed. Although the National Security Commission is not the solution to current conflict between Congress and the president, it does recognize the need for closer cooperation and coordination between the branches of government during the formulation stage of any new national security strategy. The synergistic effect of simultaneously engaging both DOD and CDD toward a common end at this stage in the process would clearly produce a superior outcome to any that can be developed with each operating independently.


Short of amending the Constitution, however, a measure of competition will always exist between the legislative and executive branches of government—even during times of single-party control. Therefore, the military has a major—if indirect—role to play in ensuring that the coordination and cooperation necessary for the development of good defense policy actually takes place. The challenge of mediating between the two competing defense policy-making institutions will increasingly fall upon the shoulders of the nation's military leaders. In many ways, the military can be perceived as the glue that holds these two branches of government together. To operate effectively

in this new policy-making environment, the CJCS, the service chiefs, and the CINCs must constantly seek to balance the sometimes competing demands of remaining loyal to

the commander in chief while at the same time serving as honest brokers to CDD. As professional military officers, they can do no less.

Notes

1. S. 5, Peace Powers Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 4 January 1995; and H.R. 7, National Security Revitalization Act; NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 11 January 1995.
2. A broad range of individuals from both parties and across the ideological spectrum expressed this feeling. During personal interviews, I was frequently surprised to hear this comment from members of Congress who had strong voting records in favor of defense spending.
3. To be entirely accurate, senators are actually considered more trustworthy than insurance salesmen. Their counterparts in the House are less ethical than insurance salesmen but slightly more honest than used-car salesmen. Leslie McAneny and David W. Moore, "Annual Honesty & Ethics Poll: Congress and Media Sink in Public Esteem," *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, October 1994, 2.
4. See especially Harrison W. Fox, Jr., and Susan Webb Hammond, *Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking* (New York: Free Press, 1977); and Michael J. Malbin, *Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
5. Department of Defense, "White Paper on the Department of Defense and the Congress," 1990, 31.
6. Les Aspin, "The Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," in *Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control*, ed. Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 161.
7. House Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, *The MX Missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative—Their Implications on Arms Control Negotiations*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 1.
8. House Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, *What Have We Got for \$1 Trillion?* 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 2.
9. House Committee on Armed Services, *Committee Organization*, 103d Cong., 1st sess., 27 January 1993, 30.
10. Lawrence J. Haas, "New Rules of the Game," *National Journal*, 1990, 2797.
11. Samuel P. Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy," *The Public Interest* 75 (Spring 1984): 23.
12. John G. Kester, "The 1986 Defense Reorganization: A Promising Start," in *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*, ed. David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner Publishers, 1988), 382–87.
13. Carl H. Builder, *Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 57.
14. Lawrence J. Korb, "Spending without Strategy," *International Security* 12 (Summer 1987): 169.
15. Russell Murray, "Force Planning, Programming, and Budgeting," in *Making Defense Reform Work*, ed. James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1990), 195.
16. *Ibid.*, 194.
17. See Gen Colin Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).
18. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Threat Assessment; Military Strategy; and Operational Requirements* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 1.
19. Soraya S. Nelson, "Nunn: Rewrite Strategy, Rely on Reserves," *Army Times*, 7 May 1990, 19.
20. House Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, *The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline*, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990, committee print 11. Among the documents included in this report were the statement by CIA director William Webster on the *Joint Military Net Threat Assessment* of 1990, prepared by the JCS; and a trip report describing the results of a visit by 13 members of HASC and 15 professional staff members of HASC in August 1989.
21. *The Fading Threat*, 18–19.
22. Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," *New York Times*, 2 August 1990, sec. A.
23. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993*, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 21 February 1991, 8–40.
24. See Senate, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993: U.S. Military Strategy, Fiscal Years 1992–1993. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 11 April 1991.
25. For a good summary of the development of Aspin's proposals, see Dennis S. Ippolito, *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 84–97.
26. See Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1993).
27. *Ibid.*
28. These alternatives were developed in a series of papers written by Aspin prior to the authorization hearings for fiscal year 1993. The most influential of these were "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," 6 January 1992; and "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options," 25 February 1993. In these papers, Aspin directly challenged the legitimacy of the Bush administration's Base Force. He recommended a return to a threat-based force rather than the capabilities-based structure advocated by the administration.
29. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, 1994).
30. President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1995; Gen John M. Shalikashvili, CJCS, *National Military Strategy: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, February 1995; and Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, February 1995.



NONLETHAL WEAPONS

Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies

MAJ JOSEPH W. COOK III, MAJ DAVID P. FIELY, MAJ MAURA T. MCGOWAN



From A.D. 1200 to 1500 a group of mercenaries on the Italian peninsula called the *condottieri* waged what has often been regarded as a form of nonlethal warfare.

They were hired by the various mercantile city-states to protect vital interests. Many of

the major engagements between these city-states' *condottieri* were almost comical for their lack of casualties.

According to Niccolo Machiavelli, the battle of Zagonara in 1424 was a "defeat, famous throughout all Italy, [in which] no death occurred except those of Lodovico degli Obizi and two of his people, who, having

fallen from their horses, were drowned in the mire."¹ Several reasons have been extended for this low lethality. One of the more plausible reasons was the simple fact that the armor of the day was much superior to most offensive weaponry. A more personal reason is the fact that the surest way for a mercenary to lose his source of livelihood was for the condottieri to obliterate his enemies. As a result, mercenaries rarely sought set-piece battles, choosing instead to fight relatively minor and extended campaigns. Engagements between mounted warriors often resembled jousts and those between infantry often turned into shoving matches.

In the past, nonlethal warfare did not rely on the use of nonlethal weapons; rather, it was the fortuitous result of the superiority of body armor over offensive weaponry or the mutual lackadaisical approach of opposing soldiers and leaders. Today, nonlethal weapons might offer the ability to wage nonlethal warfare without relying on such fortuitous circumstances. The use of nonlethal weapons would serve as a means of keeping the level of conflict low and of dissuading belligerents from resorting to more forceful weapons. Also, the prospect of resolving conflict with low levels of lethality is especially exciting to a country that has a war-fighting doctrine of minimizing friendly as well as enemy casualties. Sun Tzu espoused a similar doctrine when he said:

- Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.
- To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them.
- For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.²

Nonlethal weapons are defined as "weapons that are designed to disable personnel, weapons, supplies, or equipment in such a way that death or severe permanent disability to personnel are unlikely." However, some proposed "nonlethal" weapons are not authorized under the international law governing weapons. Additionally, some non-

lethal weapons are not truly nonlethal in all employment scenarios. Some government organizations such as the National Institute of Justice prefer the term *less than lethal*³ to emphasize the point that "enough marshmallows will kill you if properly placed."⁴ Others have coined the phrase "nonlethal weapons of mass destruction" to emphasize the fact that nonlethal weapons span the spectrum of warfare from low-intensity conflict through theater conventional warfare and all the way to strategic global war. Biological or chemical agents that destroy crops without directly affecting people would still be considered lethal if starvation is the likely result. A microwave weapon that disables a truck that subsequently drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be nonlethal. The same weapon used against a helicopter in flight would have to be considered lethal.

Some nonlethal technologies may offer new options to our armed forces; others may prove to be more useful to our enemies because of our advanced society's many vulnerabilities. For example, a terrorist group with rudimentary knowledge of our information switches could shut down our stock market with several well-placed electromagnetic pulse generators. Regardless of a weapon's potential worth or our relative vulnerability, however, there is some value in pursuing these technologies if only to develop appropriate countermeasures and policies. In this article, we will examine the various nonlethal weapons in three contexts—potential technologies, legalities, and potential policies.

Proposed Nonlethal Weapons and Their Legality

In 1868, the Russian government issued an invitation to the International Military Commission "to examine the expediency of forbidding the use of certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations." At issue was the use of certain light explosives or inflammable projectiles. When used

against human beings, the new projectile was no more effective than an ordinary rifle bullet; however, it caused greater wounds and thus greatly aggravated the sufferings of the victim. The resulting document, the Declaration of St. Petersburg, prohibited the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grams of weight. It was the first international treaty imposing restrictions on the conduct of war.

Legal Framework

The Declaration of St. Petersburg is a significant document because it develops a line of reasoning governing the legality of weapons. This reasoning is found in the preamble to the declaration:

Considering the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war.

The only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.

It is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men, and this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable. The use of such weapons would therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.

Although it may appear to be an incongruous concept, the nations of the world have recognized the need to impose restrictions on the waging of war. War will necessarily result in death and injury to humans and the destruction of property; however, in the eyes of the international community, it need not be an unlimited exercise in cruelty and ruthlessness.⁵ The necessities of war must be conciliated with the laws of humanity. The resulting restrictions are regarded as the international law of armed conflict (LOAC), or the law of war.

These concepts did not originate in Russia. They can be found throughout man's history. The ancient Hindu laws of Manu prohibited the use of barbed arrows because they exacerbated the injury upon their removal. The Romans considered the use of poisoned weapons to be unlawful. During the Middle Ages, the Pope condemned the

crossbow, noting the appalling injuries it caused.

While most cultures saw a need to restrain the horrors of war, it was not until the nineteenth century that these concepts were codified. The Declaration of St. Petersburg was followed by the Hague conventions, which codified the "laws and customs of war on land."⁶ The Geneva conventions of 1929 and 1949 focused on ameliorating the conditions of civilians, prisoners of war, and the sick and wounded.⁷ The latest amendments to the law of armed conflict are contained in the 1977 Protocol.⁸ Additionally, a number of treaties address the legitimacy of specific weapons.⁹

The legality of a weapon and the legality of the specific use of a weapon are determined by international law. The sources of international law are international conventions, international customs, general principles of law, as well as the writings of publicists.¹⁰ International law is part of the domestic law of the United States. Treaties are regarded as the supreme law of the land in the Constitution.¹¹ Those practices of states that are regarded as custom are binding on all nation-states. A large part of the law of armed conflict is recognized as custom and must be observed by all nations.¹²

To examine the legality of nonlethal weapons, it is necessary to understand the wide array of legal principles and restrictions governing their use.

[I]n considering the use of any weapon, new or old, two questions must be answered. First, can this weapon legally be use? Second, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the proposed use of this weapon legal?¹³

We will review the general principles governing the law of armed conflict, restraints imposed by custom and treaty, and specific bans on weapons in order to review the legality of some proposed nonlethal weapons.

General Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict

International law does not enumerate those acts that may be committed in the

name of military necessity. Guidance is found in *United States v. List*, when the international military tribunal at Nuremberg determined that

military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. . . . There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy.¹⁴

Military Necessity

The rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of an advantage. *Kriegsraison*, the German doctrine of military necessity, was the belief that the ends justified the means. A matter of urgent necessity could override the LOAC. This principle was rejected in *United States v. Krupp*, when the Nuremberg tribunal held that

to claim that the law of war can be wantonly and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent be disregarded when he considered his own situation to be critical means nothing more than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely.¹⁵

Humanity

The principle of humanity calls for the mitigation of human suffering.¹⁶ As an example, an enemy soldier should not be subjected to unnecessary suffering. A wound should be inflicted to heal as painlessly as possible.¹⁷ Humanity's position in the law of armed conflict was also preserved by the "Martens' Clause," which specified that

the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protections and the principles of the laws of nations as they result from the usage's established among civilized persons, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience.¹⁸

The Rule of Proportionality

The concept of proportionality calls for a reasonable relationship between the amount of destruction caused and the military significance of the attack.¹⁹ The principles of humanity and military necessity are applied

together. Proportionality requires that the loss of life and the damage not be disproportionate to the expected military advantage. "Proportionality represents a movable fulcrum on which necessity-humanity scale may be balanced."²⁰ The law recognizes that a military activity will result in some loss of life and property, but the action is illegal if the loss exceeds the military advantage.

Principles Governing Weapons

International law establishes certain principles governing the prohibition of weapons. Two such principles are unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate effects caused by certain weapons.

Unnecessary Suffering

Article 23(e) of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibits the use of "arms, projectiles or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."²¹ This concept has been the subject of much concern as there is no precise definition of unnecessary suffering. As stated in Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, *International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict*, all weapons cause suffering.²² The St. Petersburg Declaration speaks in terms of arms that uselessly aggravate "the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable."

Indiscriminate Effects

A primary concern of the law of armed conflict is the protection of noncombatants. A belligerent may not attack a noncombatant and must cancel an attack on a legitimate military target if the injury to the noncombatant population would be disproportionate. Belligerents cannot employ a "blind" weapon, one that cannot discriminate between noncombatants and combatants.

Restraints Imposed by Custom or Treaty

A weapon that complies with the general principles of the law may not be used in a manner that is restricted by custom or

treaty. The Hague conventions underline that there are restrictions on the conduct of war in Article 22, which provides that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."

Weapons may be used only against military objectives. An object is considered to be a military object if its use, nature, location, or purpose make effective contribution to the military action.²³ Some objects are considered dual-use objects. They meet the needs of the civilian population but also effectively contribute to the enemy's military action. These objects may be attacked if there is a military advantage to be gained by their attack. During Desert Storm, the coalition forces bombed bridges across the Euphrates River, not only to restrict the movement of enemy forces but to sever the communications systems. The bridges contained fiber-optic links that provided Saddam Hussein with a communications system to his forces.²⁴ The attack produced a military advantage for the coalition forces.

The attack may only be against lawful combatants. The LOAC prohibits attack against noncombatants or civilian property. Again, attacks against military targets may result in injury to protected persons and property. It is the attackers' responsibility to minimize collateral damage against protected persons and property. Places such as buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, charitable purposes, historic monuments, and hospitals are protected from attack.²⁵ The Hague Convention also prohibits the use of poison,²⁶ treachery, and perfidy.²⁷ Emblems of protection such as the Red Cross must be respected.²⁸ There are rules governing the use of uniforms and certain signals.²⁹ Assassination is prohibited.³⁰

Technologies

Man is constantly using technology to devise new weapons that international law must address. These weapons range from the very deadly to the nonlethal.

Biological Weapons

Biological warfare is defined as "the technique of destruction by disease."³¹ Biological agents are living organisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa, and rickettsiae) or the toxins derived from such organisms. These organisms or toxins can be targeted against animals, plants, or material.

The idea of using bacteria and toxins to harm an enemy is not a new one. During the fourteenth century, the Tatars catapulted bodies of plague victims into a Crusader fortress to spread contagion. The Crusaders, weakened by disease, lost their stronghold.³² Historically, biological weapons have been regarded as so horrible that they should be prohibited. The objections are based on a number of grounds. Bacteriological agents owe their effects to the multiplication of their organisms within the victim. Their multiplication after dissemination is hard to control. They are unpredictable in scale and duration.³³ They increase the possibility of epidemics that would indiscriminately strike noncombatants. They may also indiscriminately attack the disseminator's own troops. The medical profession, entitled to protection, would suffer at the same rate as the combatants, decreasing chances of survival for the whole population.³⁴ Bacteriological warfare may be impossible to defend against. This type of warfare does not destroy property but strikes against personnel, animals, and crops. Suffering may be prolonged due to the destruction of crops.³⁵ An important consideration was that toxins are technically poisons, and poisons have historically been prohibited.

Although it is conceivable that under limited circumstances biological weapons could be employed in accordance with the generally accepted principles of the LOAC, they have been banned by international treaties. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. In 1975 the United States ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weap-

ons and Their Destruction. Under the terms of the convention, the parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic protection and other peaceful purposes."

The impact of these two conventions is the clear prohibition of the use and development of biological weapons. Attempts to employ biological warfare, even in a non-lethal capacity, would be prohibited under international law. The drafters of the Biological Convention focused on the development of biological weapons for hostile purposes.

One of the methods of nonlethal warfare under consideration is the use of recombinant DNA technology to attack an ethnic population. This would be a prohibited hostile use of biological agents. In addition, such an action could be a violation of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³⁶ The use of biological agents even to cause mild sickness or destroy a food crop would be unlawful. The criteria for the use of the biological agent is whether or not it is a hostile use, not whether or not the use will result in death.

Some bacteriological agents have genuine medical uses, and stockpiling for these purposes is not objectionable. Accordingly, it would follow that the use of bioremediants, biological agents that break down material, to clean up oil spills would be legal under these treaties, but the use of these same agents to destroy an enemy's fuel supply would be considered hostile intent and therefore illegal.³⁷

Although the original impetus for the prohibition against biological warfare was the damage or injury to man, the conventions have been written to prohibit any hostile use of biological agents, even those which are nonlethal.

Chemical Weapons

The end of the nineteenth century saw the development of chemical weapons on a significant scale.³⁸ Chemical weapons were fre-

quently used during World War I in the form of toxic chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gases. Phosgene has a slow effect on the victim. "The person will have increasing difficulty in breathing as the lung tissue is slowly destroyed and fills up with bodily fluids. Death, which is slow in coming, is by asphyxiation."³⁹ Since death was slow in coming, the victims damaged lungs would suffer bacterial infection that would be the actual cause of death.⁴⁰ Sulfur mustard gas also destroys tissue. If the gas contacts skin, the skin is destroyed. If the gas is inhaled, the lung lining is destroyed.⁴¹

The military and the general population were horrified by these weapons, which had the same treacherous characteristics of poison that had been prohibited by custom and international treaties. The weapon could not be seen, and defenses were limited. Its effectiveness was subject to the whims of the wind. Gas was released to cover an area, and would indiscriminately strike all in the area, be they combatants or noncombatants. And last, the weapon caused unnecessary suffering.

The 1925 Gas Protocol was drafted in response to the horrors seen during World War I. A number of nations reserved the right to retaliate against the use of chemical weapons with chemical weapons. The United States had several objections to the Gas Protocol. It believed chemical weapons did not include chemical riot-control agents. The United States has historically argued the dichotomy of allowing riot control gases by a nation's police force against its own citizens while prohibiting their use against enemy combatants in battle.⁴² Again, it argued that the use of herbicides and defoliants may be more humane in some cases than the use of conventional weapons.⁴³ Fifty years later, in 1975, the Senate abandoned these arguments and unanimously ratified the treaty. In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford issued an executive order renouncing first use of riot-control gases and herbi-

cides except in limited noncombatant situations.⁴⁴

The Gas Protocol has been subject to a number of criticisms.⁴⁵ Following the United States's lead, the United Nations took efforts to develop comprehensive arms control of chemical weapons. The Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction⁴⁶ prohibited the use, development, production, acquiring, or stockpiling of chemical weapons. It also prohibited the use of riot controls as a method of warfare.

The Convention defines chemical weapons to include "Toxic chemicals and their precursors, *except when intended for purposes not prohibited under this convention*" (emphasis added). *Toxic chemical* is defined to mean "any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals." Prohibited toxic chemicals have been listed in schedules contained in the "Annex of Chemicals":

"Riot Control Agent" means any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in human sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure."

Article II, Section 9, goes on to define "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention" to mean:

c) *Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare* (emphasis added).

d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.

Following are some of the chemical anti-personnel nonlethal weapons under consideration.

Tear/Riot Gases. The domestic law enforcement community possesses and uses riot gases. However, in a warfare situation, the use of tear gas is currently strictly limited by an executive order. When the chemical convention is entered into force, the use

of tear gas and other riot controls will be completely forbidden.

Calmative Agents. These agents, sometimes called sleep agents, can be made more effective by combining them with dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), a chemical that promotes transmission of the calmative through the skin and into the bloodstream. Calmative agents were allegedly used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. The reports indicated that the mujahideen would lie down and sleep until they awoke later in Soviet custody. The reports are discounted because such a chemical has not proven effective.⁴⁷ If the chemical that comprises the calmative agent is not listed on the prohibited chemical schedule, then a further determination of whether the agent constitutes a prohibited riot-control agent must be made. Under the definition of "riot-control agent," calmative agents would be prohibited because they cause disabling physical effects.

Sticky Foam. These polymer agents will hopelessly stick a person to anything. It can be argued that these weapons amount to prohibited riot-control agents under the convention since they are "chemicals . . . which can produce rapidly disabling physical effects."

Markers. These chemical agents come in numerous forms and are currently used in law enforcement. A covert variety can surreptitiously expose a criminal to an invisible dye that shows up under special lighting. An overt dye that is impossible to wash off can be sprayed on a fleeing felon.

Nonlethal chemical agents that attack material are promising and diverse. If the chemical that comprises the weapon is limited on the schedule of prohibited chemicals, it may be possible to claim that the weapon is exempt. These chemicals are "not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare." "Toxic Properties" means using chemical action on life processes that cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals. This category of weapons would include the following agents.

Combustion Alteration Technology (CAT). CAT agents change the viscosity or combustion characteristics of fuel to degrade engine performance. Near-instantaneous engine failure is possible if the agent is applied in appropriate quantities.

Smart Metals. These special metals, formed with chemical additives or blended in a particular form, could be introduced to control certain activities while allowing legitimate ones. For example, a notional metal designed to perform satisfactorily in a legitimate chemical plant might be designed to fail or give off telltale signs to inspectors if the plant is used for more insidious purposes.

Super Caustics. These super acids can be used against weapons, tires, roads, roofs, optical systems, or even shoes. They could also be used to deny human contact and can be stored in a harmless binary form.⁴⁸

Metal Embrittlement. These agents severely weaken metals by chemically changing their molecular structure. They are clear, leave imperceptible residue, can attack almost any metal, and can be applied with a felt-tip pen.⁴⁹

Antitraction Technology. These super lubricants severely reduce traction. They are specially blended to attack specific targets such as roads, runways, rails, and the like.⁵⁰

Polymer Agents. These agents are similar to sticky foams but are designed to target material instead of personnel. They can foul engines or ventilation systems and can also deny the use of weapons and facilities.⁵¹

Electromagnetic Weapons

Nonlethal electromagnetic weapons span the spectrum from simple to exotic. Many can be employed (or can have collateral effects) against both personnel and equipment. Blinding and shocking effects are the most common nonlethal results of the use of this class of weapons. We will now look at potential nonlethal applications of certain technologies for which there are presently

no specific prohibitions but which could certainly have LOAC implications.

Electrified Baton, Stun Gun, Taser. These weapons deliver immobilizing, low-energy pulsed shocks either at close range (baton and stun gun) or at long range (taser). They are used by police in criminal enforcement. The taser has electric currents of high voltage and low amperage that cause the muscles of the body to contract forcefully.⁵² The individual experiences spasms.⁵³ The contractions may fracture bones. If the individual collapses, he may suffer further injury.⁵⁴ If an individual is repeatedly shocked, he may be rendered unconscious. The individual may suffer electrical burns that may be difficult to treat.⁵⁵

High-intensity Light. These omnidirectional bombs or flares can flash-blind personnel even in existing intense lighting situations. They can also degrade sensors and night vision devices.

Lasers. Low-energy lasers can be directed or aimed at specific targets to blind personnel or sensors either temporarily or permanently. They can also be used to make a gun or other weapon too hot to hold. The most advanced blinding lasers oscillate between numerous colors to make goggles and other countermeasures ineffective.

One factor in the assessment of the legality of a weapon is discrimination. A weapon that injures the civilian population or civilian property along with military personnel and objects, without distinction, is considered indiscriminate and thus illegal. Electromagnetic weapons, and most specifically the laser, can "almost always be directed very precisely against specific targets."⁵⁶

A second factor of assessment is "unnecessary suffering." Several electromagnetic weapons, such as the high-intensity light and laser, may produce temporary or permanent blindness. These weapons have been the subject of much discussion. Sweden has been actively condemning the use of lasers as antipersonnel weapons on the grounds that they cause unnecessary suffering.

Several sophisticated types of military

equipment, such as sensors and optics, are rendered useless when subjected to laser weapons. These pieces of military equipment are legitimate targets. Their destruction, however, may result in injury to personnel. Such injury would be incidental to the primary target of the weapon.⁵⁷

The controversy surrounding lasers focuses on the legitimacy of deliberately blinding human beings. Exposing a pilot's eyes to a laser may result in the destruction of the entire plane.⁵⁸ Intentionally blinding an attacking infantry unit would render them unable to fight. Some scholars, in particular experts from Switzerland and Sweden, argue that intentionally using a laser to permanently blind a combatant is a disproportionate injury to the gained military advantage.⁵⁹ The essence of their argument is that the Declaration of St. Petersburg authorized the incapacitation of an opponent only for the duration of the conflict. "Although it is permitted to kill combatants under the law of war, and thus to put them permanently out of action, it is not permitted to use methods or means of warfare exclusively designed to injure soldiers with injuries lasting not only the duration of the conflict but for the rest of their lives."⁶⁰ It is their position that intentional irreversible permanent blindness by a laser constitutes "unnecessary suffering."

The United States rejects this position. In a memorandum of law, it noted that there was no legal obligation to limit wounding so that the opponent would be temporarily disabled for the period of the hostilities and no longer.⁶¹ Additionally, it noted, "Blinding is no stranger to the battle field." The use of a number of conventional weapons could result in blindness.⁶² However, these conventional weapons are more likely to cause death. It is the United States' position that lasers do not cause unnecessary suffering but are more humane because the victim is likely to suffer less injury than that caused by conventional weapons.⁶³

The injuries suffered as a result of electromagnetic weapons are typically less severe than those injuries resulting from conven-

tional weapons. Although it is possible that a belligerent may be permanently injured or killed as a result of the use of these weapons, there is no evidence that the suffering experienced is greater than that experienced from conventional weapons.

Acoustical Weapons

Nonlethal acoustical weapons also range from the mundane to the extraordinary as described below.

High-intensity Sound. High-intensity sound sets the ear drum in motion. These vibrations cause the inner ear to initiate nerve impulses that the brain registers as sound.⁶⁴ The inner ear regulates the spatial orientation of the body. If the ear is subjected to high-intensity sound, the individual may experience imbalance.⁶⁵ Low-frequency, high-intensity sound may cause other organs to resonate, causing a number of physiological results, including death.⁶⁶

The British use high-intensity sound as a means of riot control in Northern Ireland. The Curdler is a device that emits a high "shrieking noise at irregular intervals."⁶⁷ The sound is emitted at levels lower than the pain threshold.

The assessment of high-intensity sound as a legal weapon must be reviewed in terms of "unnecessary suffering." If the acoustical weapon emits sounds below the pain threshold, then unnecessary suffering is not an issue. If the sound does inflict pain, the suffering must be balanced against military necessity. It may be lawful to use high-intensity sound against an attacking force, although some of the attackers may experience disorientation, pain, or even death. As noted earlier when discussing the legality of blinding soldiers, it is permissible to injure a combatant even with a wound that may incapacitate the soldier for a period exceeding the term of the hostilities. Combatants have been rendered deaf from conventional warfare, or have even been disoriented from the confusion of the battle. The use of high-intensity sound as a weapon to disorient, or to cause pain or death, does not constitute unnecessary suffering.

However, acoustical weapons run the risk of being an indiscriminate weapon. The release of high-intensity sound would impose the same degree of damage on the noncombatant as the combatant. It may be used only in circumstances in which the damage to noncombatants is merely incidental in proportion to the necessity of the military objective.

Infrasound. This is a powerful ultralow-frequency (ULF) sonic weapon that can penetrate buildings and vehicles and can be directional and tunable. As a weapon infrasound, low-frequency sound entails the same concerns as high-intensity sound. After being exposed to high-intensity infrasound, a subject suffers from disorientation and reduced ability to perform simple sensory-motor tasks.⁶⁸ At elevated levels, experimental animals cease breathing temporarily.⁶⁹ The principles and findings regarding high-intensity sound would apply to infrasound. The suffering would be no greater than that experienced by conventional weapons. The suffering must be proportionate to the military objectives. The sound must be applied so that damage to noncombatants is incidental in light of the military objective.

Unfortunately, large banks of speakers are required to provide directionality, and the power demands are enormous.⁷⁰ Area denial is a very plausible mission for such a device as the level of pain or damage increases predictably as range decreases.

Sonic Bullets. These are packets of sonic energy that are propelled toward the target. The Russians apparently have a portable device that can propel a 10-Hertz (Hz) sonic packet the size of a baseball hundreds of yards. When employed against humans, the energy can be selected to result in nonlethal or lethal damage.⁷¹ The sonic bullet uses direct sonic energy. If the energy can be controlled so that it is used only against lawful combatants, the concerns surrounding acoustical weapons may be reduced or eliminated.

Deference Tones. These are sophisticated arrays that can project a voice or other

sound to a particular location. The resulting sound can only be heard at that particular location.⁷² Deference tones, a means of projecting sound, would not directly cause injury upon the enemy. Its use must be in accordance with the constraints of the law of armed conflict. For example, if the tone is generating a sound such as an SOS signal, the enemy has an obligation to respond to that sound. If the SOS sound is used to lure the enemy to a place where they will be ambushed, such a use of the tone would be perfidious and therefore illegal.

Informational Weapons

Recently, a new class of nonlethal weapons has drawn considerable interest in defense circles as well as in international law. Two types of such weapons are discussed below.

Voice Synthesis. This is the ability to clone a person's voice and broadcast a synthesized message to a selected audience. The propaganda value of this technique in our highly media-dependent world would be enormous. We currently have the ability to control the broadcasts of foreign radio and television stations by using orbiting platforms packed with electronic gear.

In considering whether it is legal to clone a person's voice in order to gain a military advantage, it is important to determine whose voice is being cloned. In most cases, it would be realistic to expect that the voice cloned would be that of a political leader or a military officer. The cloned voice might give orders to the enemy combatant that might prove detrimental to the combatant. The combatant would most likely be under an obligation to follow these orders. That obligation, however, is owed to his own chain of command and is not under the law of armed conflict. Treacherous acts, those which abuse an obligation to be truthful under the law of armed conflict, are illegal. But if there is no obligation to be truthful under the law of armed conflict, then the misinformation amounts to a lawful ruse. Morris Greenspan, a prominent writer in the field of international law, notes that exam-

ples of legitimate ruses are "making use of the enemy's signals, bugle and trumpet calls, watchwords, and words of command."⁷³ Giving orders by voice is analogous to giving orders by bugle calls or signals. Cloning a voice would not violate the law of armed conflict.

Computer Viruses. The ability to severely disrupt computer operations with viruses has already been demonstrated by amateur American hackers. A more sophisticated and professional effort might be that of being able to produce viruses that can be injected into enemy hardware at long range.

When planning to disrupt computer operations, it is necessary to distinguish whether the computers are military objectives. If they are civilian property or their loss would impact only the civilian population, then they are not legitimate targets. However, if the computers serve a dual use (for both the civilian population and the military population), they may be considered valid targets. The next step in the analysis calls for applying the rule of proportionality to determine if the military advantage outweighs the impact upon the civilian population.

Potential Policies

In this section we will discuss several possible scenarios for the employment of nonlethal weapons. These include special operations missions such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, as well as more conventional forms of warfare. We will also examine the potential for nonlethal weapons to lower or raise the threshold of war and the issue of escalation.

Special Operations

Special operations forces typically operate in a highly volatile political environment. They must often minimize the use of force if they intend to complete the mission without alienating international as well as domestic political players. Such alienation would make future missions much more difficult.

Hostage Barricade Situation. One counterterrorism scenario that must be resolved with a maximum degree of control is the hostage barricade situation. The ideal nonlethal weapon for a hostage barricade situation would be one that instantaneously and selectively disables the hostage takers. Unfortunately, any feasible weapon would probably disable the hostages as well. Therefore, any disabling effect should be controllable so that the hostages could cooperate in their rescue. At the very least, if the weapon is indiscriminate, the effect must not permanently injure the hostages. The use of lasers to temporarily blind personnel could cause permanent blind spots depending on range and weapon intensity. In the final analysis, however, any nonlethal weapon must be judged against the normally lethal alternatives. A typical hostage rescue operation involves a violent plan that results in the death of the hostage takers and the rescue of the hostages. The weapons employed are concussion grenades, flash-bang devices, and conventional small arms. The tactics involve the so-called "double tap"—one bullet to the chest and one to the head. Even a well-executed mission can result in the deaths of one or more hostages. The primary potential usefulness of nonlethal weapons is the decreased chance of lethality for the hostages and the possibility of increased safety for the rescuers.

The worst-case hostage situation would involve an in extremis assault. This would occur if the terrorists start executing hostages. In most situations, the result would be an immediate and violent raid by special operations forces to resolve the situation. The level of violence and lethality acceptable in this circumstance would increase drastically. Ironically, this might also be the situation most conducive to the use of nonlethal technologies. If hostages are already dying, then the advantages of instantaneously incapacitating everyone are obvious. Some unwanted permanent injuries to hostages who would otherwise have surely died are probably acceptable. In contrast, injuries to hos-

tages that occur when rescuers preempt the in extremis situation are inevitably attributed to the rescuers and may not be acceptable.

Each hostage situation is so unique that one universal course of action cannot be recommended. Variables include the condition of the hostages, potential access by rescuers, the capabilities and proven intentions of the terrorists, the use of dead-man triggers, and other factors. The solution seems to be the development and testing of a repertoire of possible nonlethal technologies that gives the mission planner more options. Cooperation with domestic law enforcement in the development of nonlethal weapons could yield synergistic benefits for the resolution of hostage situations.

Counterinsurgencies. The key to winning a counterinsurgency is winning the hearts and minds of the affected population. In this scenario, any weapon that reduces collateral damage to innocent people or property is advantageous. Insurgents who are interspersed with innocent civilians are especially hard to target. However, it is not even necessary or even desirable to kill the insurgent in order to defeat him. Certain nonlethal weapons might offer solutions to these tactically difficult situations. In Vietnam, for example, the only options available to a patrol under fire from a "friendly" village were (1) return fire and risk generating friendly casualties, or (2) withdraw. Both options have the potential of further alienating a largely friendly population. The ability to incapacitate the insurgents would enable troops to sort out the good from the bad without killing anyone. A secondary advantage of capturing an insurgent rather than killing him is the intelligence that can be garnered from the prisoner, a critical element in defeating an insurgency.

Some nonlethal technologies that offer promise in counterinsurgencies include chemical defoliants and tear gasses, caluminate agents, blinding weapons, and acoustical weapons. Of course, as discussed earlier, the weapon chosen must be a legal one. Ad-

ditionally, such practical issues as portability, training, and effectiveness must also be addressed before relying on such weapons in the hands of troops facing a mortal enemy. Insurgents might be emboldened and able to attract more (though less dedicated) followers if they know that death is a very unlikely prospect. The insurgency could deteriorate into a game in which the insurgents are incapacitated and captured while counterinsurgents are killed.

Peacekeeping and Peacemaking. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are rapidly expanding roles for special operations as well as conventional forces. The use of minimal lethal force may be desirable in both situations. Nonlethal technologies may offer some solutions. In Somalia, soldiers confronted with a hostile crowd often had no options other than to fire upon the crowd. Effective nonlethal crowd control techniques might have been used.

One potential role for nonlethal weapons in a peacemaking scenario would be the ability to defeat the "iron sight." For example, in spite of all our technological successes in countering infrared and electronic threats, we have not developed a technique to defeat a lone sniper with a rifle, or a radar precision guided (RPG) or other optically guided weapon. Small numbers of snipers can wreak havoc on an entire city as they did in Sarajevo. They can also bring down helicopters as they did in Mogadishu, and they can also destroy the morale of a normally effective combat force. Lasers might offer an effective means of point defense and could even be used to counter snipers. For example, a relatively simple laser device strapped on a helicopter could be scanned to blind anyone looking in the direction of the aircraft. Likewise, a laser scanned around a compound or guard shack could blind anyone attempting to target the site. Indeed, by using the unique optical reflection signature from the back of the eye, a low-power laser could be used to locate anyone persistently looking at a specific target.⁷⁴ A human operator (or an automated system) could then

decide whether to target the detected signature with a higher-powered laser weapon or even a lethal weapon. Disadvantages of this sophisticated antisniper device include possible indiscriminate targeting, adjustment of power levels to account for environmental conditions, and the possibility that the laser itself may provide a more sophisticated enemy with an emission source that could be targeted.

The role of peacekeeping (as opposed to peacemaking) troops does not generally involve combat. Many UN observers are required to be unarmed. Perhaps nonlethal weapons could be used to aid in separating warring factions or as antisniper devices to protect the peacekeepers.

Conventional Warfare

Nonlethal weapons can also be used in conventional conflicts. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons can be used to disable grounded aircraft or vehicles rendering them useless on a temporary or even permanent basis. These weapons can also be used to down airborne aircraft although this would hardly be considered nonlethal. One key to effective war-fighting doctrine is to attack an enemy's critical nodes of command and communications as well as other infrastructures. While smart weapons can attack specific complexes and bunkers, nonlethal weapons offer the opportunity to disable entire nodes on a much grander scale. For example, the remote injection of a computer virus into an enemy's command and control system could be devastating. Likewise, certain biological agents that are designed to attack silicon or other computer components could effectively destroy computerized war-fighting equipment. Super caustics can be sprayed on roads to deteriorate tank tracks and truck tires. Antitraction compounds can render mountain roads impassable, and embrittlement compounds could be sprayed on virtually any mechanical device—rendering them ineffective over a period of time. Combustion alteration technology agents could be used to shut down an entire harbor

or airfield. Of course, practical matters such as method of delivery, persistence, concentration, and efficiency of these agents versus more lethal weapons must be considered.

One advantage for using nonlethal technologies in combat is the possibility of reducing fratricide. Nonlethal weaponry that disables a tank rather than killing it enables friendly forces the option of "shooting first and asking questions later." Additionally, nonlethal weapons such as acoustical and laser devices might offer good point defense options for high-security areas, further reducing the chances of fratricide.

Threshold of War

Raising the threshold of war is a consistent overarching goal of most arms control negotiations. In light of the fact that many hostile countries possess weapons of mass destruction, quick escalation from rhetoric to shooting could prove disastrous. Indeed, conventional weapons in the hands of fairly skilled armed forces often result in significant casualties. Therefore, a primary concern in the employment of nonlethal weapons is the possibility that they might lower the threshold of war. What one country might consider a "normal" economic sanction, another country might consider an act of war. Even if such a sanction was not considered an act of war, it could, nonetheless, provide a path for escalation. National sensitivities and vulnerabilities are too variable to accurately predict a response to the employment of a particular nonlethal weapon. For example, if a third world country brought down our stock exchange and electronic funds transfer system with a computer virus, we may consider this an act of war. The world community, however, would probably condemn us if we retaliated with lethal weapons—perhaps our only option against a less-developed society.

The most tempting use of some nonlethal weapons would be in the area of clandestine operations. With computer viruses, for example, an attacking country would almost certainly enjoy plausible (if not total) deni-

ability. In some cases, the targeted country might never realize they were attacked at all. For example, a liquid metal embrittlement agent introduced clandestinely in an industrial plant could cause a catastrophic failure that might be attributed to normal wear and fatigue. Clandestine operations of this type might muddy the international waters to the point that nobody knows when or by whom they are being attacked.

Conclusion

Nonlethal weapons offer new possibilities in warfare, especially in the arena of special operations. However, it is not an unlimited exercise. Each newly developed weapon must be designed and used in compliance with international law. We must then consider the practicalities of the weapon's use. Nonlethal weapons show promise, but they are not bringing us to a

new golden age of warfare. Carl von Clausewitz lambasted the idea of nonlethal warfare outright when he remarked,

Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until some one steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.⁷⁵

Likewise, Robert E. Lee remarked during the Battle of Fredericksburg, "It is well war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."⁷⁶ The condottieri largely avoided terrible battles and thus apparently grew fond enough of war to elevate it to a game. Modern nations might also be tempted to engage in a game of nonlethal warfare only to see it escalate to something much more terrible.

Notes

1. Joseph Jay Deiss, *Captains of Fortune: Profiles of Six Italian Condottiere* (New York: Crowell, 1967), 28. Contemporary scholars almost universally agree that Machiavelli's contempt for the mercenaries caused him to exaggerate the nonlethality of their encounters. Nevertheless, many engagements were indeed devoid of significant casualties. See also Geoffrey Trease, *The Condottieri: Soldiers of Fortune* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 18-22.

2. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77.

3. "NIJ Initiative on Less-Than-Lethal Weapons," *National Institute of Justice Research in Brief*, March 1993.

4. "Non-Lethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 7 December 1992, 50.

5. Frits Kalshoven, *Constraints on the Waging of War* (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Publications, 1991), 12.

6. The Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1899), in *Treaty Series* (TS) 403 (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State), and the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter cited as Hague 1907).

7. Following are these conventions, which can be found as noted in *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* (TIAS) (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 1956):

I. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3362.

II. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363.

III. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3363.

IV. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, TIAS 3365.

8. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977 (hereinafter Protocol I), in Dietrich Schindler, *The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents* (Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981), 621. The United States has not ratified Protocol I.

9. These include the following agreements:

The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925 (hereinafter Gas Protocol), in *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 26 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 571 (26 UST 571), TIAS 8061.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 10 April 1972, 26 UST 583, TIAS 8062.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 10 December 1976 (hereinafter ENMOD), 31 UST 333, TIAS 9614.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179.

Protocol on Non Detectable Fragments, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices, 10 October 1980, in Schindler, 179.

Protocol on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, in Schindler, 179.

10. Gerhard von Glahn, *Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 17-22.

11. Article VI, Section 2.

12. Von Glahn, 12-23.

13. Maj William J. Neinst, "United States Use of Biological Warfare," *Military Law Review* 24 (1964): 17.

14. *United States v. List et al.*, in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals*, vol. XI, *The High Command Case; The Hostage Case* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1950), 1253.

15. *United States v. Krupp*, *Ibid.*, vol. IX, *The Krupp Case*, 1433-48.
16. Jean Pictet, *Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims* (Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1985), 28-29.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Hague 1907, Preamble.
19. Judith Gail Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 87 (1993): 391; and Brown, "The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare," *Cornell International Law Journal* 10 (1976): 134.
20. G. J. Adler, "Targets in War: Legal Considerations," *University of Houston Law Review* 8 (1970): 1, 17-18.
21. Hague 1907.
22. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, *International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*, November 1976, par. 6-3(b)(2).
23. *Ibid.*, par. 5-3(b).
24. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), 9.
25. Hague 1907, art. 27. See also Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1954.
26. Hague 1907, art. 23 (a).
27. *Ibid.*, art. 23 (b).
28. *Ibid.*, art. 23 (f).
29. *Ibid.*
30. Assassination is considered a treacherous act. See Patricia Zengel, "Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict," *Military Law Review* 134 (1991): 123.
31. W. F. Biddle, *Weapons Technology and Arms Control* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 281.
32. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *International Law and Armed Conflict* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992), 245.
33. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical, Technical, Military, Legal, and Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures*, vol. 4, *CB Disarmament Negotiations* (New York: Humanities Press, 1971-1975), 268. Hereinafter cited as *CBW Negotiations*.
34. Neinst, 9.
35. *CBW Negotiations*, 270.
36. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, defines genocide to mean any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group such as:
 - a. killing members of the group;
 - b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
 - c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
 - d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
 - e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
 See *United Nations Treaty Series* (UNTS), vol. 78 (New York: Secretariat of the United Nations, 1951), 280.
37. Harald Mhuller and Richard Kokoski, *The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Political and Technical Prospects and Dangers in 1990* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, c. 1990).
38. *CBW Negotiations*, 270.
39. Hugh D. Crone, *Banning Chemical Weapons: The Scientific Background* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 18.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*
42. *CBW Negotiations*, 23; and W. Hays Parks, "Classification of Chemical-Biological Warfare," *University of Toledo Law Review* 13 (1982): 1168.
43. *Ibid.*, 285. The use of herbicides must be in accordance with the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD). The convention requires that parties not engage in modifications being widespread (an area of several hundred square kilometers), be long lasting (a period of months or approximately a season or more, or have severe effects (serious or significant disruption or harm to life, nature, or economy).
44. Executive Order 11,850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1976.
45. The Gas Protocol lacked any verification or enforcement means. Chemical weapons have been used a number of times, including by the Italians against the Ethiopians, by the Japanese against the Chinese, and by the Soviets against the Afghans. Phillip Louis Reizenstein, "Chemical Biological Weapons: Recent Legal Developments," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 95 (1986): 105.
46. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 156 UN Doc. CD/500, 8 April 1974.
47. Crone, 80-81.
48. Paul R. Evancoe, "Non-Lethal Technology Enhances Warriors Punch," *National Defense*, December 1993, 28.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Anti-personnel Weapons* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 203.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, *Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age* (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 207.
57. *Ibid.*, 209-12.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, 211.
61. "Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Antipersonnel Weapons," *The Army Lawyer*, November 1988, 3.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Anti-personnel Weapons*, 203.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, 204.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*
70. Evancoe, 28.
71. "Non-Lethal Weapons Offer New SO/LIC Capabilities," *Tactical Technologies*, 3 February 1993, 5; and "Russians Continue Work on Sophisticated Acoustic Weaponry," *Defense Electronics* 26 (March 1995): 12.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Morris Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1959), 317-22.
74. This phenomenon can be observed using visible light. Anyone who has spotlighted a deer or a cat in their headlights has witnessed this retroreflection in the form of glowing eyes.
75. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1968), 345.
76. Quoted in Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*. In vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 462.

Net Assessment

Reading is to the mind what exercise is to the body.

—Sir Richard Steele

The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf by Michael R. Gordon and Lt Gen Bernard E. Trainor. Little, Brown and Company, 1271 Avenue of the Americas, New York 10020, 1995, 477 pages, \$27.95.

The Generals' War may be the best single volume yet written about the Gulf War. Gordon, chief defense correspondent for the *New York Times*, and Trainor, a retired Marine Corps general officer now at Harvard University, have produced a "warts-and-all" history that is both sweeping in its scope and yet detailed in its insights. The warts they reveal will upset some readers and demonstrate that many of the senior leaders in the war were subject to very human frailties. The scope of their work ensures that this is much more than a drums-and-trumpets history, as the scene shifts from Washington to Baghdad to Moscow to Riyadh and to battlefields in and above the desert. The insights are in the form of a critical analysis of what went right and, more importantly, what went wrong—militarily and politically.

Although the authors touch all the bases in this sweeping historical analysis, they focus on the generals who planned and executed the war. Few of them come through the analysis unscathed. The authors portray Gen Colin Powell as the reluctant warrior whose caution contributed to the escape of the Iraqi Republican Guard at war's end; Gen Norman Schwarzkopf as a tempestuous, imperious warrior who was something less than a master strategist; Lt Gen Charles Horner as an often self-serving tyrant whose postwar reputation is due to the unacknowledged brilliance of others; Brig Gen Buster Glosson as a swaggering fighter-general who alienated a good many soldiers, sailors, and marines but had the clearest picture of what airpower was all about—and the list goes on.

Gordon and Trainor are particularly critical of Schwarzkopf for failing to realize that the battle of Khafji was the defining moment of the war. In their opinion, Khafji revealed that the Iraqis could not put up a vigorous defense and that a major change in the overall war plan was required if Schwarzkopf was going to destroy the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf ignored Khafji, refused to change his plan, and—as a result—the Marine "fixing" action in Kuwait became a major offensive, pushing the Iraqis out of Kuwait before the Army's "Hail Mary" left hook from Iraq could trap the Republican Guard.

Airmen will be pleased with the treatment of airpower and its accomplishments. The authors present the most balanced and accurate portrayal yet seen in print of what airmen accomplished. As the authors see it, airpower may not have won the war by itself, but it was clearly the dominating and decisive element.

People who have held up the Gulf War as a classic example of jointness will be angered by the authors' analysis. Gordon and Trainor argue convincingly that planning for the war was anything but joint. Schwarzkopf, they maintain, decentralized planning to the point that airmen, soldiers, marines, and sailors were essentially doing their own thing to fight their own wars. One of the consequences was the escape of the Republican Guard.

Unfortunately, the book has several significant flaws. The first and most important of these is spotty documentation. The authors excuse this as a common flaw in writing "current history" because sources will often discuss issues only as background information or under rules of nonattribution. While this may be true, the work suffers when authors list sources only as "senior military officials" or as unnamed and untraceable "classified reports."

This reviewer also believes that the authors were overly harsh in their treatment of many senior participants. The luxury of hindsight was not available to these generals, who were operating under great stress with far-from-perfect infor-

mation. Further, the comparatively favorable treatment of senior Marine Corps commanders makes one wonder if General Trainor's Marine Corps background is more than coincidental.

Finally, the book contains a number of instances of sloppy editing. For example, on page 365, the authors identify one Marine officer as "a former lineman for the Washington State Huskies." Either he was a Cougar or he attended the University of Washington. On page 394, one must doubt that an advanced Army logistical base was called "Buckeye" because it was "established by a National Guard unit from Iowa." Perhaps the unit was from Ohio—but not Iowa. Or maybe the name was "Hawkeye"—a fitting name for an Iowa unit. Finally, on page 421, it was Maj Jerry Hust (not Huss) who attempted to drop the special GBU-28 bomb on the command bunker at Taji in the closing hours of the war. These are all

minor points, of course, but they cast doubt on the thoroughness and accuracy of the book, especially when combined with spotty documentation.

On the whole, however, Gordon and Trainor have produced an excellent volume containing a superior, no-holds-barred analysis of the war. They have also provided remarkable insights into the men who ran the war and thus provide a reminder to the reader that in spite of so-called technowar, much still depends on personalities. Many readers will not appreciate the warts-and-all treatment of our popular heroes. But they all remain heroes—just more human.

On balance, I highly recommend this work. If you read only one book about the Gulf War, *The Generals' War* would be an excellent choice.

Dennis M. Drew
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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


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


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